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**Foreign policy as theater: Understanding Spain and NATO**

**Stanton, Sheldon Lewis, Ph.D.**

**The Ohio State University, 1993**

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**FOREIGN POLICY AS THEATER: UNDERSTANDING SPAIN AND NATO**

**DISSERTATION**

**Presented in Partial fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of  
The Ohio State University**

**By**

**Sheldon Lewis Stanton, B.A., M.A.**

**\* \* \* \* \***

**The Ohio State University**

**1993**

**Dissertation Committee:**

**R. Gunther**

**R. Herrmann**

**G. Shabad**

**Approved by**



**Advisor  
Department of Political Science**

## DEDICATION

I would like to make a three part dedication. First to three friends, Donald Disque Wood, Bryan Howard Ward, and Michael Franz Roehrig: easily the most insightful aficionados of real-world politics I have ever met. Second, to my long-suffering parents for their consistent support. Finally, to Michelle Rigual who made the seemingly impossible not just bearable but pleasurable.

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## VITA

November 24, 1961

Born-Jamestown, Kentucky

1984

B.A., University of Cincinnati  
Cincinnati, Ohio

1989

M.A., The Ohio State University  
Columbus, Ohio

## FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in Comparative Politics and International Relations

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## CHAPTER 1

### UNDERSTANDING SPAIN AND NATO

#### Introduction

This study provides an analysis of the role played by the issue of Spanish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the domestic political battles of the first years of the post-Franco era. While it is common to ascribe the motivations for foreign policy decisions (like the decision whether or not to join a military alliance) to considerations of the geostrategic calculations, balance of power, or other outward looking factors, this effort at understanding the issue represents a different type of analysis. Rather than explaining the complex series of decisions and events (i.e., geostrategic calculations) related to NATO membership for Spain in terms of external concerns, it casts these decisions and events in terms of internal concerns: specifically, calculations of domestic political effects.

This effort to explain the episode in terms of a domestic political model, rather than more common models, relies upon a variety of sources of information. These include historical materials, elite interviews conducted both in Spain and the United States, biographies, autobiographies, contemporary news accounts concerning the issue, and public opinion polling data drawn from both governmental and non-governmental sources. While the story these sources help illuminate is complex, three general conclusions seem valid. The bulk of the study will flesh out these general contentions.

First, in the specific period 1976-1986, Spanish foreign policy in the matter of NATO membership can best be described as the externalization of the domestic political priorities of the

three most important leaders of the decade: Adolfo Suárez, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, and Felipe González. For each of these leaders the important question of Spanish membership in NATO was seen primarily in terms of that membership's effect on internal political conditions. Based mainly on the effect it would have on domestic political conditions and competition, Spain's membership in the premier military alliance of the free world was first delayed, suddenly pursued, quickly achieved, strongly rejected, and finally formally accepted.

Second, this emphasis on the impact of the external on the internal in the question of NATO membership was not without precedent in the history of Spanish foreign policy. As chapters two and three argue, the practice of judging the relative merits of competing foreign policy choices in light of domestic ramifications is a practice common in Spanish history: particularly during the twentieth century. Patterns evident during the early part of this century, and especially during the long regime of General Francisco Franco, continued in place during the resolution of the NATO issue. By appreciating the domestic political elements operative in decisions like that of neutrality during World War One, as well as those underpinning the foreign policy initiatives of General Franco, the complex debate over NATO membership becomes less puzzling.

Finally, and most generally, this study will argue that the divisive debate over NATO membership in Spain is an excellent example of a more broadly applicable principle regarding the generic relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics. As such, the NATO debate in Spain is a fascinating phenomenon representative of what I believe to be a more common process. That process centers on a seeming paradox (explored briefly in chapter six), a paradox in which most foreign policy issues remain depoliticized while some become hyperpoliticized: sometimes to the point of defining the political discourse of an entire era. The Vietnam War was

such an episode for the United States, NATO membership (I believe) was also such an episode for Spain.

The politicization is the result of a conjunction, the meeting of a particular issue with particular potential for divisiveness and a particular moment in the nation's history well-suited to bringing out that potential. For the United States the Vietnam War, as political an issue as any war, developed in an atmosphere of erosion in the Cold War consensus (an erosion debate over the conflict hastened), as well as a more general reexamination of American society. NATO membership for Spain, an issue that (as such) had a long history in late twentieth century Spanish foreign policy, exploded in the context of a special moment: the post-Franco democratization which held the possibility of changing virtually every aspect of how Spain operated, including its attachment with the West in terms of foreign and security policy. As in the case in Vietnam and the United States, both the issues and the moment were necessary.

As opposed to the often rancorous debate accompanying more limited foreign policy questions, these definitional issues take their power to divide from the fact that they serve to force the nation involved to define itself internationally, to decide which face it will show to the world. In the case of NATO membership for Spain, joining the Alliance (an act, as we shall see, of limited concrete security consequences for the nation) became the flash-point for a heated, but necessary, surrogate debate: a debate not primarily over the practical merits of membership in the Alliance, but over the international identity of an ancient nation in the process of reinventing itself.

### Three Dates

In terms of the post-Franco period of the NATO membership issue in Spanish foreign policy (an issue with relevance as far back as the Alliance's creation) it might be convenient to

summarize the progress of events by briefly examining some important moments in the issue's evolution. Running from 1976-1986, three dates suggest themselves as most informative.

On Thursday, July 3, 1976 a less than famous political journeyman name Adolfo Suárez was appointed as prime minister by Spain's monarch Juan Carlos I. Adolfo Suárez's predecessor, Carlos Arias Navarro, had been appointed as head of government by Spain's long-lived dictator Generalissimo Francisco Franco to replace the latter's close associate Admiral Carrero Blanco. On December 20, 1973, Carrero Blanco had been blown to pieces by a bomb planted by Basque terrorists under a street in Madrid.<sup>1</sup>

The young king was the foreign-born grandson of the last Borbon occupant of the royal palace in Madrid. That king, Alfonso XIII, had been forced to flee the country in 1931, bowing to the will of republican-minded mobs in the capital. Despite the subsequent installation of a republic (Spain's second failed experiment with republicanism) Alfonso and his heirs had never relinquished the family's claim to the throne of Spain.

While Juan Carlos' coronation in the ancient cathedral de San Jeronimo had, in marked contrast to Francisco Franco's funeral, been well attended (Vice President Nelson Rockefeller represented the United States), the latest Spanish monarch had yet to impress many observers. His subsequent appointment of Adolfo Suárez was both a surprise and, for the many Spaniards determined to decisively repudiate the past and affect real change in Spain, a genuine disappointment.<sup>2</sup> For these Spaniards, Adolfo Suárez seemed a singularly bad choice. The trouble was simple: Suárez appeared to be just another old-fashioned political hack, a willing servant of the Franco regime and the latest in a long line of unremarkable apologists for authoritarianism. Foreign observers were similarly puzzled. For example, given the obvious need for some move towards reform, officials at the American embassy were genuinely startled that someone lacking even the flimsiest democratic credentials would be selected.

Adolfo Suárez had a long history of service to the Franco regime, though never in any high profile position with genuine prestige or an independent power base. Over the years Suárez had served as a member of the powerless national legislature, as the appointed civil-governor of Segovia (a picturesque rural province in the mountains northwest of Madrid), as director-general of the state-run television and radio network, and head of the 'Movimiento Nacional' (the 'National Movement'): the massive, but moribund, bureaucratic remains of the Franquist regime's early flirtation with corporatism.<sup>3</sup> Only the latter post was of cabinet-level rank.<sup>4</sup> Adolfo Suárez had been around, but never at the top.

When the process of choosing a successor to Arias Navarro began Suárez had been only one of thirty-six possible candidates. The original candidates were screened by the 'Council of the Realm': a committee packed with the most conservative elements left in the regime.<sup>5</sup> The Council's major task was to narrow the field of potential ministers to three (by eliminating the ideologically unacceptable candidates) and to present the King with the final list or 'terna'. On that final list Suárez was a distant third in notoriety. Gregorio López Bravo, for example, had served Franco as foreign minister (1969-1973); Federico Silvo Muñoz was a member of an influential Catholic lay organization and had headed the ministry of public works during the late 1960s. While his nomination seemed to serve primarily to round out the ballot, Juan Carlos chose Suárez without hesitation. As mentioned, the choice was a distinct disappointment for many. General Franco had been dead eight months. In his final political testament, published upon his death, Franco had called upon the Spanish people to remain true to the patterns and principles established by almost forty years of dictatorship.<sup>6</sup> In the eyes of most observers, Adolfo Suárez seemed the perfect choice to insure and oversee that dismal continuity.

On Saturday, June 5, 1982 the flag of Spain was raised during a ceremony at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels. Spain's remarkably



swift, and remarkably peaceful, transition to democracy was already being held up as a model for other nations trying to throw off the vestiges of authoritarian pasts.<sup>7</sup> Excluding the brief—but significant—scare provided by the failed coup attempt of February 23, 1981, the new democratic system had functioned well since the December 1978 promulgation of the post-Franco constitution. With a combination of skill and good fortune, Adolfo Suárez had energetically and successfully propelled Spain irreversibly down the road to democracy before his 1981 resignation. The flag of the constitutional monarchy joined those of the other 15 European and North American nations making up the Atlantic Alliance.

Adolfo Suárez's successor, both as prime minister and head of the ruling 'Union Centro Democrático' (UCD), Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, had, during late 1981, forcefully moved to implement the government party's long-standing pro-membership policy: theoretically (along with membership in the European Community) a lynch-pin to its foreign policy platform. Indeed, in his speech upon assuming power Calvo-Sotelo had "introduced the issue as an essential priority of his governmental program."<sup>8</sup> That policy had, for a variety of reasons, been consciously placed on the back-burner by Suárez. Membership in this most prestigious of western defense organizations had been pointedly denied Spain all through the Franco years. To be sure, the exigencies of the Cold War had, during the early 1950s, led to a non-NATO linking of Spain to the western defense system. In Robert Graham's words, a "backdoor means" was found to exploit what Spain had to offer the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>9</sup> But, the demands of the Cold War notwithstanding, membership in NATO itself, and the endorsement it would have provided the dictatorial regime in Madrid, was simply impossible.

In his speech marking the occasion, Spanish foreign minister José Pedro Pérez Llorca made it clear that membership in the Atlantic Alliance meant much more to the government of Spain than the initiation of a new military arrangement: an arrangement that served mainly to

formalize and rationalize a long-standing de facto relationship. The benefits of membership accruing to Spain had little to do with enhanced national security. Membership in NATO, long denied on political grounds, was a deeply symbolic accomplishment for the Spanish political center. According to the foreign minister, entering NATO represented nothing less than the fulfillment of post-Franco Spain's democratic destiny.

Membership was not about increased security but, rather, it represented an opportunity for the newly transformed Spain to act positively in "the defense of freedom, in the defense of human rights, and in defense of a principle that is applied in the organization and in all of the democracies, of the supremacy of civilian control and the profound respect for the constitutional norms that guarantee it."<sup>10</sup> Spain's membership was also no small triumph for NATO. Securing the membership had been an Alliance goal since Francisco Franco's death made it politically feasible.

On Sunday, March 12, 1986 two dramatic events, one unprecedented and one unanticipated, took place in Spain. First, over 17 million Spanish voters participated in a referendum on the continued participation of their country in NATO. The vote was unprecedented in two ways. First, the Spanish electorate had never before been called upon to formally judge any foreign policy question. Indeed, owing to ambiguities in the Constitution of 1978, the very constitutionality of the exercise was never firmly established.<sup>11</sup> Second, no other member of the Atlantic Alliance, even the most troublesome and restive, had ever made either its entry into NATO or continued participation contingent upon electoral approval. The bond between member-state and alliance had always been forged and centered on the elite political level.

The result of the electoral judgment was unanticipated, almost unimaginable. The conventional wisdom (both among Spaniards and among foreign observers) was that it was

extremely unlikely that the general public, if consulted, would support membership. A broad coalition, running from the extreme right to the extreme left (but jumping nimbly over the political center), had opposed membership from the beginning. Pre-election polls repeatedly predicted a clear defeat looming for pro-membership forces. That defeat's expected dimensions ran from decisive to disastrous. For example, in a series of polls the very influential daily *El País* projected anti-membership forces winning by margins of up to 16%.<sup>12</sup> Only a government poll conducted just before the vote indicated a victory for membership, and then by less than 2%.<sup>13</sup>

In the history of the defense organization no nation had ever completely withdrawn from NATO. The French had substantially modified their participation but had not fundamentally repudiated the Alliance. That the seemingly inevitable repudiation of NATO by Spain would come in the form of a referendum was especially damaging, with its implication that all it took was a public consultation to show the uncomfortable truth about public opinion towards the Alliance. Before the vote was taken, NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington commented that a negative judgment and a Spanish withdrawal would "produce a very grave weakening of the Alliance." A subsequent analysis concluded that a Spanish withdrawal would have been a significant blow to NATO's "unity" and would have been a clear "propaganda triumph for the Soviet Union."<sup>14</sup> Contingency plans were made, in both Madrid and the capitals of other NATO states, to deal with the expected defeat. By the end of the vote tabulation, however, a surprising 52.54% of those voting endorsed remaining in the Alliance.<sup>15</sup>

This positive response (tarnished as it was by the large number of voters who chose not to participate—40.27%) had been vigorously pursued by the Spanish government. A public repudiation of NATO would have been generally interpreted as a repudiation of the government that supported membership. Not surprisingly, when the unexpected victory seemed sure,

government leaders (according to one report) "celebrated with champagne and caviar."<sup>16</sup> Reflecting an odd combination of relief and anticipation, both magnified by surprise, Spanish financial markets exploded on the following Monday. The Madrid market jumped 6.78% in one day; the market in the northern industrial city of Bilbao skyrocketed 12.71%: both were record increases.<sup>17</sup> At this point, the government had been controlled for nearly four years by the venerable 'Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol' (PSOE).<sup>18</sup> The Socialist Party, in turn, had been under the control of the Sevilla-born lawyer Felipe González, and his close-knit circle of advisers, since the internal party power struggle of the late 1960s and early 1970s. That struggle had pitted a timid and aging leadership in exile (based primarily in France) against a young and aggressive group of party insurgents operating clandestinely inside of Franquist Spain. Felipe González's rise to party power as a result of this struggle signaled an ideological radicalization of the traditionally moderate PSOE.<sup>19</sup>

During the successful 1982 general election campaign against Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo's rapidly disintegrating UCD, the PSOE had made the evils of NATO membership (both practical and moral) a central election issue. That election returned an absolute PSOE majority to the Congress of Deputies, with 202 of 350 seats. The UCD, plagued by internal strife and outmaneuvered electorally, was virtually eliminated. Its previous 168 seat total dwindled to a mere thirteen. PSOE moderation on many domestic issues and its radicalization on this foreign policy question had served it extremely well.<sup>20</sup> The PSOE appeal to the voters concerning NATO before the 1982 elections was unabashedly emotional: aimed at the gut and not the intellect. The colorful rhetoric employed to excoriate the centrist government's NATO policy represented, in the words of José Luis Gutiérrez and Amando de Miguel, nothing less than "an orgy of adverbs."<sup>21</sup> At various times Gonzalez (and other party leaders) described Spain's membership in the Alliance as: "an error", "a grave error", "a dramatic error", "a tremendous

error", "a fallacy", "irresponsibility", and an "historical barbarism."<sup>22</sup> According to party second-in-command, an unabashed socialist ideological purist, Alfonso Guerra, joining NATO would serve to effectively "convert Spain into a colony of the United States."<sup>23</sup>

PSOE's general condemnation of membership committed it to a concrete and seemingly airtight election promise, a pledge to hold a national referendum to undo the mistake. Despite pre-election promises to the contrary, however, that referendum was not forthcoming. Indeed, by October 1984 (if not well before) Felipe González's opposition to NATO membership stunningly evaporated. The PSOE-government leadership obediently (if at times grudgingly) followed suit. This breathtaking collective policy conversion was, in the words of one analyst, simply "Pauline" in its dimensions.<sup>24</sup> Another observer noted that the NATO membership issue represented "the longest ideological journey that Felipe would ever make."<sup>25</sup>

These three events conveniently define the evolution of the NATO membership issue in post-Franco Spain. In a very real sense, however, Spain and NATO had always been important to one another. In the case of the Alliance, Spain had served a number of purposes, political and military, since NATO's inception. In the early 1950s, with the Cold War at its coldest, Franquist Spain was delicately brought into the western defense network: aiding in the defense of nations whose fundamental political values the Spanish regime openly despised.<sup>26</sup> It was made an effective part of the collective defense effort without seeming to be. The method of inclusion was a bilateral relationship with NATO's most powerful member, the United States<sup>27</sup> The United States-Spain relationship benefited NATO by bringing to it the only real contribution Spain was able to make. That contribution was one of geography.

In case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Spanish territory would be of significant military importance. Spain's position in relation to the Straits of Gibraltar, North Africa, Southern Europe, and its possession of the Canary Islands, were of obvious strategic

value. In addition, Spanish territory might be useful in other ways. Its large size, rugged terrain, and position behind the Pyrenees suggested both a potential logistical staging area and strategic redoubt in case of a Soviet attack, a role central to the Pentagon's so-called 'Plan Offtackle'.<sup>28</sup> An attack on Spain from across the Pyrenees, and any subsequent attempt at occupying the country, was bound to consume a vast amount of human and material resources. As Stokesbury remarks, leaders as far back as Henry IV have accurately sensed that Spain is "a country where small armies are defeated and large armies starve."<sup>29</sup> The bilateral arrangement with the United States allowed the Alliance to gain Spain's positive contribution without the potential political disadvantages of membership.

Decades later the NATO calculus changed. By the early 1980s Spain was in a position to provide a greater positive contribution to the Alliance. While the Spanish forces would not (as some opposed to membership argued) tip the global balance of power, the nearly 350,000 active forces, the extensive reserve forces, the 210 combat aircraft and the forty major warships in the Spanish navy (combined with an industrial infrastructure with significant military production potential) would represent a net increase in Alliance assets.<sup>30</sup> More important, however, gaining the newly democratized Spain as a member of NATO was of great symbolic value to the Alliance. Losing Spain once it had joined would have been of even greater import. This was especially true given that NATO in the 1970s and early 1980s was clearly an alliance in turmoil.

As Gerald Ford has noted, the persistence of chronic problems, exacerbated by a succession of new difficulties, had, by the middle of the 1970s, created a profound "psychological" crisis for NATO.<sup>31</sup> In the age of Vietnam, OPEC, 'stagflation', 'national malaise', Iran, Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, seemingly endless burden-sharing debates, apparently popular peace movements in key nations like Germany, a growing hesitancy to host

nuclear weapons, and the outright hostility between some NATO member-states (i.e., Greece and Turkey) the decision by Spain to join the Alliance was a most welcome endorsement, bolstering NATO's democratic credentials and indicating that it was a vibrant alternative to neutralism. At least the top NATO political leadership saw it that way.

For example, a June 10, 1982 NATO declaration concerning Spanish membership concluded that Spain's membership in the Alliance "bears witness to the vitality of the Alliance as a force for peace and freedom."<sup>22</sup> In a June 5, 1982 radio address, Ronald Reagan asked: "did any nation in Eastern Europe freely choose the Warsaw Pact? Not one." Later, upon returning from a NATO summit following Spain's induction into the Alliance, Ronald Reagan publicly mused over the meaning of membership: "voluntarily asking to become a member of NATO—when have you heard of a nation voluntarily requesting to become a member of the Warsaw Pact?"<sup>23</sup> In a supreme bit of irony, the military alliance that had for decades denied an endorsement to the dictatorial regime in Madrid now sought an endorsement by the democratic successor to that regime.

For Spain, the NATO membership issue was important on at least four levels, none of which (interestingly) is especially connected to Spanish national security. First, Spain's membership in the Alliance ended nearly a century of profound isolation. That isolation had two dimensions. First, it was simply institutional. Spain was (especially during the period 1945-1955) excluded from an assortment of important international institutions in an attempt to force Franco from power.<sup>24</sup> During this ostracism Spain was (in the words of one author) "ignorant, abandoned, neutralized."<sup>25</sup> The ostracism eventually loosened, but the prestige organizations (including NATO) kept their doors closed to Franquist Spain. Second, and perhaps more importantly, for over a century Spain had been psychologically distant from the European, and

general western, mainstream. The psychological isolation had a number of roots and was longstanding.

By the middle of the 1970s Spain had undergone a remarkable process of fundamental economic and social transformation. With the death of Franco, a complementary political transformation occurred, bringing the formal institutions of government into line with the character of civil society.<sup>36</sup> With a modernizing military, a stable democratic system, diplomatic clout outside of Europe (e.g. Latin America), and a rapidly (if unevenly) expanding economy Spain had, by the early 1980s, become a significant player in European and non-European politics.<sup>37</sup> Spain's membership in NATO had helped solidify and signify this transformation.

The second way in which the NATO issue was important for Spain was its relationship with the concurrent question of Spanish membership in the European Community (EC). Unlike NATO membership, affiliation with the EC was an economic and foreign policy goal shared by virtually every group across the ideological spectrum. EC membership was lauded almost to the point of hysteria and cast as the functional equivalent of a long sought for 'Europeanization' of Spain. Fernando Morán, the first PSOE foreign minister, characterized EC membership as being above debate. Membership was, according to Morán, the "vocation" of the newly democratized Spain; an "almost metapolitical value."<sup>38</sup> At the very least, EC membership would put an end to the smug attitude (so galling to most of the educated Spanish, and especially Catalan, elite) that Africa began at the Pyrenees.

During Franco's tenure, EC membership, like NATO membership, had also been consistently denied. Spain was held to a strict test of democracy, though a preferential trade agreement between the Franco regime and the Community was arranged in 1970.<sup>39</sup> In the course of the lengthy and tortuously complex negotiations over the timing and conditions of Spanish entry into the Community, NATO membership was a key, if rarely publicly addressed,



issue. Members of the EC who were also members of NATO portrayed membership as the price to be paid for the potential riches of EC membership. Spain dangled NATO membership as an incentive for expeditious and favorable treatment of her application.

The third level of importance associated with NATO membership concerns the divisive domestic political character of the issue. As we shall see, NATO membership as such was not an inherently unpopular issue, either on the mass level or even among many major leaders of the non-communist Spanish left. A 1975 poll conducted by the Government Center for Sociological Investigations found a majority of Spaniards (57%) favorable to membership. PSOE leader Indalecio Prieto had hailed the Atlantic Alliance upon its creation, lauding NATO as "a pact that should guarantee peace for the entire world and the promise of liberty."<sup>40</sup> Understanding why and how it became unpopular, first on the non-communist left and then more generally, aids in understanding the political events in Spain's first years of democracy. The extreme politicization of this foreign policy question had significant domestic political consequences. While the intensity of the debate varied over time, it repeatedly erupted as an issue with the power to generate divisive internal party debate and to disrupt the relationship among the most important political parties in the young democracy.

Finally, the NATO membership episode was a genuinely formative incident. In a real sense it was a test. As mentioned, the membership issue was a difficult, complex, and incendiary political question. The explosive potential of the issue was rooted in the number of extremely emotional subsidiary considerations it tapped. These included profound questions of how the newly reinvented Spain would relate to the world, itself a binding choice as to what face to present. This divisive issue was digested by the new political system in a fashion whereby democratic principles were not sacrificed to secure domestic tranquility. For better or worse (and Spain's allies in the Alliance thought worse) the membership issue was dealt with by open debate,

party politics, parliamentary processes and the formal (if grudging) endorsement of the public. Ultimately the issue was settled in a reasonable fashion by a nation whose track-record on the reasonable resolution of divisive political problems was not good. The debate over, and the public endorsement of, this important foreign policy position served to forge a legitimate (if fragile) consensus on Spain's proper place in the world.

### Exogenous-Structural Explanation

The abstract importance of the NATO membership issue, both for the Alliance and for Spain, is clear. The question remains as to the best approach for understanding the episode. Two issues are important. The first concerns the proper strategy for illuminating motivation in this matter. This particular search for motivation is linked to the broader question of where best to place the origin for state behavior in the international arena. That debate is complex, the relevant literature voluminous, and absolutely cannot be adequately treated here. Some preliminary observations, however, are possible. First, the motivation debate turns on the question of which level (using an hierarchical image) in a multi-level matrix of possible explanations, is assigned causal power. Each level is associated with a different source for behavior. In their totality, these conceptual levels attempt to provide a full map of all possible origins of state behavior.

Examples of these multi-level schemes are common. Kenneth Waltz, for example, analyzed war in terms of its connection with three possible levels (the international system, the character of the state itself, and the characteristics of individuals).<sup>41</sup> Robert Jervis provides four: the international system level, the nation-state level, the level of bureaucratic politics, and the decision-making level---the later defined in both psychological and perceptual terms.<sup>42</sup> Kegley and Wittkopf envision five levels: the external environment, the societal environment, the institutional setting for decision, the organizational level, and the specifics of the policy-making

process. Michael Mandelbaum speaks of "outside-in" explanations (which focus on "the restraints and limits that the character of the international system and the state's place in it impose on national security policies,") and "inside-out" explanations (which center on "internal features of states.")<sup>40</sup> What characterizes all of these (and other) efforts is the assignment of causal power to sources exogenous or endogenous to the actor in question.

The exogenous sphere of explanation (basically comparable to the international system level) assigns state behavior to cues originating from some entity or phenomenon essentially external to the particular political system in question. That systems responds (based upon a complex of characteristics generic to state actors) to the form and changes in that external entity. A complementary characteristic of this sphere is the ability of the external phenomenon or entity to shape behavior in a manner that is (broadly speaking) consistent across cases and, thus, potentially predictable. In this sense it might more accurately be called an 'exogenous-structural' explanation.

The endogenous sphere of explanation (which is roughly comparable to the nation-state, bureaucratic, and decision-making levels) is very different. Motivation is not an externally-oriented entity, but an essentially internal affair. Thus, this sphere of explanation emphasizes the policy-producing power of dynamics internal and particular to the specific political system in question. While the overall processes may be general, the specific operation of these processes and their outcomes are significantly context-bound. In this sense it may be more accurately referred to as 'endogenous-idiosyncratic'.

Such a division is helpful as an organizing tool so long as three points are kept in mind. First, these spheres are general explanatory orientations and not systematic models. Within each sphere there are varied specific theories. Second, as with all dichotomies, this division has its artificial and arbitrary aspects. Connections across the spheres do exist. For example, as

mentioned, exogenous-structural explanations depend upon important assumptions concerning traits possessed by state actors and characteristics associated with individuals. Also, endogenous-idiosyncratic explanations very often take externally-based information as a given, and seek to trace how that information is uniquely processed then acted upon. Third, there is no claim that the division suggests the necessity to anoint one approach (or one theory) as having unarguably superior utility over all others at all times.

In this, my underlying assumption coincides with Jervis' observation that "rather than one level containing variables that are most significant for all problems, the importance of each level may vary from one issue area to another"<sup>44</sup> Indeed, as Cottman argues, within any given issue area, on any particular issue, many sources for behavior may exist. These bundles of motivations are "extraordinarily complex and include such interrelationships that separate motivations can be isolated and weighted only tentatively."<sup>45</sup> The complex interaction of various motivations creates a basic difficulty in specification. That difficulty is summed up in Deutsch's observation that assigning causality is "as hard as predicting the outcome of a game with moderately loaded dice."<sup>46</sup>

Robert Jervis' observation on the potential for differing sources of behavior depending on different issue areas is suggestive. The case of Spanish membership in NATO involved an ongoing relationship between Spain and a powerful military alliance, a relationship with undeniable consequences in terms of Spanish national security and (at least to a modest degree) the balance of power between East and West. As a preeminently military security issue it would seem to be best understood in terms of the traditional framework for dealing with issues. The traditional framework applied to questions of security involves one particular version of the exogenous-structural approach: political 'realism'. Realism is not, of course, just an approach

to understanding military security decisions, indeed its adherents often claim far greater explanatory competence. But it is in the realm of military security that it seems most applicable.

The overwhelming importance of realism (leaving the term undefined for a moment) to the study of foreign policy and international relations seems incontestable. In its classic form (and its modern reworking) realism has, according to Robert Keohane, "constituted the principle tradition for the analysis of international relations."<sup>47</sup> In their extensive survey of international relations theory, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff observe that, at least since World War Two, realism has "dominated the study of international relations in the United States."<sup>48</sup> Indeed, despite the conventional wisdom that domestic politics and international politics are qualitatively different phenomena, Wildavsky argues that many of the core assumptions of political realism (e.g. the notion of political behavior as driven by material self-interest) also structure the dominant interpretation of most domestic political behavior.<sup>49</sup>

This centrality does not mean that a majority of international relations analysts consciously identify themselves as 'realists'. Indeed, many theoretical efforts are explicit attempts to go beyond the assumptions and organizing concepts of realism, to incorporate more subtle variables. Still, versions of the central concepts of the approach, however, appear again and again, especially in the analysis of national security questions. Indeed, in this issue area, one author argues that realism simply "dominates" thinking on strategic issues.<sup>50</sup>

While clearly not an exhaustive list, realism is best seen as a series of core concepts. These include: the centrality of the state; the fundamental importance of the international system in shaping the behavior of individual states; the quest for (and utilization of) power in the national search for security within an essentially conflictual web of inter-state relationships; and the defining influence of a particular model of human nature/psychology. Realist theory, old and new, represents a complex interaction of these elements.

It is impossible to describe here in any sufficient detail the origins, interactions, and impact of these core concepts as they are sometimes ancient and always complex. State-centrism, Keohane notes, is the "centerpiece of realist work."<sup>31</sup> Ashley argues that "much as the individual is the prism through which methodological individualists comprehend", realists "refract all global collectivist concepts through the prism of the state."<sup>32</sup> Realism, Ashley concludes, "cannot accord recognition to—it cannot even comprehend—those global collectivist concepts that are irreducible to logical combinations of state-bounded relations."<sup>33</sup> This special status of the state traces its roots at least as far back as the Aristotelian argument that only contact with the state (in the form of the 'Polis') made humans fully human and it was the state that provided "the only framework in which man can fully realize his ... capacities."<sup>34</sup> Perhaps the strongest statement of the transcendental character of the state was provided by Hegel in his 'Lectures on the Philosophy of World History'. The state is transcendent, Hegel argues, since "the unity of the universal and the subjective will is present within the state, in its laws and its universal and rational properties."<sup>35</sup>

The substance of the interaction of individual states turns on the primacy of the quest for security (usually defined in military terms) within the context of endemic inter-state conflict. This security imperative underlies Karl Deutsch's observation that "the foreign policy of every country deals first with the preservation of its independence and security."<sup>36</sup> This act of preservation inevitably leads to the utilization of power, in the form of dominance, in an attempt to enhance the position of one state at the expense of another. The net result, according to Bruce Russett, is that world politics becomes nothing more than "a struggle ... a competition between nation-states wherein a state that fails to pursue its self-interest in a tough-minded manner thereby risks its security ... even its sovereignty."<sup>37</sup> Thus, realism and 'power politics' have become virtually synonymous. For example, Morgenthau's six principles of realism include the expansive

claim that "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and the evidence of history bears that assumption out."<sup>58</sup> Once, Morgenthau argues, we accept the power of 'power' to illuminate behavior we can "retrace and anticipate ... the steps a statesman, past, present, and future has taken, or will take, on the political scene."<sup>59</sup>

This security-imperative is, in the view of realism, a direct result of basic human nature and/or psychology. These crucial assumptions about the individual are tied, directly or indirectly, to conclusions about the expected behavior of the collective. Originally this basic nature was cast in primarily normative, even religious, terms. The evolution of classical realism to modern realism has, over the centuries, been marked by a fundamental shift in emphasis, a secularizing trend that served to replace judgments on morality with assumptions about psychology. As a practical matter, however, both morality and psychology envision humans, both individually and collectively, as predisposed to power maximization, though for distinct reasons. The premier evolutionary shift in realist thought centered on the seemingly simple question of whether this ubiquitous search for power represented "an end in itself" or "a means to other ends."<sup>60</sup> Classical realists tied behavior (e.g. the search for power) to the substance of human nature, a nature that was cast in unremittingly critical terms.

For example, as Brian Nelson notes, St. Augustine of Hippo held the image of "sinful man" at the core of his "psychological model or theory of human nature, a theory which has a direct bearing on his political philosophy."<sup>61</sup> Power over others (either individually or collectively) was, like all inherently evil goals, sought solely for its own sake. No other explanation for political behavior was necessary. In Machiavelli's estimation humans were congenitally alike: "ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit."<sup>62</sup> Individual and collective political behavior always reflects this nature. The practical result of this conception is that behavior must be seen as the result of a particular condition and

understood only in relation to that condition, no other interpretive lens can help. "Politics", E. H. Carr writes, "are not a function of ethics, but ethics of politics."<sup>63</sup> That is, the use of ethical or moral standards to cull meaning from politics, especially international politics, (and not an assumption of darker motivations) leads only to confusion.

Modern realism jettisons this classic model of human nature: though not the assumption that some basic trait defines human beings and, in some way, is related to actual behavior. Gone is man as evil (with his political behavior reflecting that pathology), replaced by the vision of man as 'rational actor'. The classical realists held some vision of the place of rationality in politics. Carr, for example, argued that political reality represented a "sequence of cause and effect": implying that understanding it depends on a rationalist methodology. Modern realism goes beyond this, however, and adopts a particular form of rationality as relevant to political situations. This particular form of rationality has been labeled in various ways: as objective rationality, statistical rationality, economic rationality, or instrumental rationality, and has its roots at least as far back as Francis Edgeworth's attempts to systematize utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham's rather vague "Felicific Calculation."<sup>64</sup>

Though he was not addressing the specific subject of international politics and realism's analysis of it, Herbert Simon provides an excellent description of this form of rationality. He notes that while, in general, rationality may be conceived of as simply behavior "appropriate to specified goals in a given situation", objective or economic rationality goes much further.<sup>65</sup> This vision of rationality, he observes, revolves around "the assumption that every actor possesses a utility function that induces a consistent ordering among alternative choices that the actor faces and ... he or she always chooses the alternative with the highest utility"<sup>66</sup> When uncertainty intrudes the expected utility involved in a decision (the weighing of preferences by probability) is substituted for raw utility in an attempt to "treat uncertainty as a statistical problem."<sup>67</sup>



Applied specifically to the international level, foreign policy becomes, in Stephen Krasner's words, "the outcome of a rational decision-making process."<sup>68</sup> That process has three steps: "The options for a given situation are spelled out. The consequences of each option are projected. A choice is made which maximizes the values held by the decision-maker."<sup>69</sup>

This mentality underpins many of the most influential works in the study of international relations. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's book The War Trap is, in many ways, exemplary. The leadership of the state, Bueno de Mesquita assumes, approximates "a rational utilitarian interested in maximizing his own welfare." That personal welfare is defined in terms of advancing the security interests of the state within the international system.<sup>70</sup> War is chosen over maintaining the peace as a result of a rational decision process and represents (at least potentially) a rational tool. The utility of this conceptualization of human psychology seems so self-evidently obvious that Bueno de Mesquita dismisses the possibility of other, contrary, bases of explanation, since they would (by definition) require us to "assume that the decision-makers are irrational."<sup>71</sup> For his part, Gilpin has argued, in War and Change in World Politics that monumental changes in the international system flow from the decision by a given state "to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs."<sup>72</sup>

Objective rationality is a method of processing information, essentially a process for combining two things. One source of this information is provided by the conditions in which the actor must operate (the capabilities and limitations on the actor at any given time). The conditions are provided by the information contained in the structure of the international system. Modern realists define the system in very profound terms: moving from a loosely conceptualized arena or playing field in which states interact to a more objective and behavior-conditioning phenomenon. The international system becomes "more than the sum of the foreign policies of states."<sup>73</sup> It seems to exist "autonomously, independent of the parts or the actors."<sup>74</sup> It

conditions the behavior of states because variations in its configurations produce variations in state behavior; thus, "changes in actor behavior ... are explained not on the basis of variations in these actors' characteristics, but on the basis of changes in the attributes of the system itself."<sup>75</sup> As a result, analysts are able to use "the system to explain and predict" the behavior of its constituent parts.<sup>76</sup>

The imposition of a structural explanation centered on the interaction of human rationality with the independent action of the international system serves to relegate a nation's observable behavior to a matter of "a surface practice generated by a deeper independently existing logic."<sup>77</sup> In this view, the power drive is instrumental, not pathological, and made necessary by both an unavoidable psychological characteristic of human beings and an overarching structural characteristic of the international system, namely its anarchic condition.

This overview of the core concepts of realism, classic and modern, is simplistic at best. Still, as befitting a venerable and ambitious approach to understanding politics, the various elements of realism's explanation of state behavior suggest numerous potential criticisms. Only a few of these can be treated here. For example, modern realist thought depends upon the identification and imposition of a structural source for state behavior. The elevation of the international system to the status of structural variable represented the important conceptual development that permitted modern realism to "cut through the subjectivist veils and dark metaphysics of classical realist thought", eliminating the central role played by the "normatively laden metaphysics of fallen man."<sup>78</sup> Elevating the international system to the status of structural variable allows conclusions concerning the ultimate origins of state behavior to be placed "securely in the scientifically defensible terrain of objective necessity."<sup>79</sup>

What is sometimes forgotten in this exercise is, of course, that the 'international system', as such, does not exist, just as (in terms of microeconomic theory) the 'market', as such, does

not exist. They are both analytic concepts and organizing labels and as intellectual creations they have the attributes and influence the creators wish to give them. Just as a novelist decides on the physical and personality traits possessed by his or her literary creations, the theorist does likewise. And while, just as with literary characters, the traits may be realistic and life-like the international system can never be real or alive. The 'market' does not punish the unskilled businessman with bankruptcy, his creditors do. Likewise, the international system does not independently require specific actions in given situations, individual decision-makers, each subject to a host of motivations, make that choice.

Also, both classical and modern realism demand that each nation be seen, in its most important aspects, as exactly like all other nations. As Jervis observes, to claim that "the international environment determines a state's behavior is to assert that all states react similarly to the same objective external situation."<sup>20</sup> The states are essentially similar in that all have their foreign policy choices generated by similar motivations, be it a pathological search for power or an instrumental search for power. The apparent differences between nations (e.g. differences of language, religion, geography, social structure, economic arrangements, historical experience, regime-type, ideology, cultural norms, leadership personality, etc.) regardless of how striking they may be, are, in functional terms, unimportant. They must be discounted as a source for behavior, a task that is intellectually uncomfortable at best. Realist analysis turns on appreciating a basic similarity between all states, not understanding empirical differences between them. As a result, effectively analyzing foreign policy becomes a form of self-analysis, as Morgenthau implies when he advises an explanation strategy in which we "ask ourselves" what we would do in any given situation.<sup>21</sup>

In addition, both classical and modern realism are schizophrenic on the issue of goals. The international system provides only one type of information necessary for the objectively

rational decision-maker. Goals, viewed as a preference ordering of values to be maximized (i.e., a utility function), provide the other. Often, however, the substance of policy goals as a key to understanding political behavior is dismissed, or (if not dismissed) automatically cast in a particular way. Morgenthau, for example, forcefully argues that the ultimate goals sought by an actor are probably unknowable and, thus, wholly irrelevant. Attributing behavior to the search to fulfill them is only a "popular" fallacy.<sup>43</sup> For modern realists, as Deutsch points out, there is a subtle tendency to equate rationality with a particular goal: acting constantly and consistently to increase one's capabilities.<sup>44</sup> While he was discussing domestic politics, Riker's argument in the Theory of Coalitions is illustrative. Those political actors who do not desire, or do not act, to win are characterized as "guilt-ridden", "shame-conscious", and (finally) "irrational."<sup>44</sup> But, as Herbert Simon notes in The Sciences of the Artificial, "it is unrealistic to suppose that utility functions are given and remain fixed."<sup>45</sup> The origin and evolution of particular goals would seem to be extremely important.

Finally, the models of human nature that underpin classical and modern realism are problematical at best. Most of the contentiousness between rival political theories is a conflict between rival models of human nature. As Brian Nelson observes, we disagree over political theories because "we disagree about human nature."<sup>46</sup> In the specific case of realism, Bruce Russett points out, non-realist critiques of the approach essentially flow from "fundamentally opposed views of human nature."<sup>47</sup> The classical view of a malignant nature is difficult to prove or disprove, as is the contention that subsequent political behavior, both individual and collective, is a direct result of this negative character. The modern realist embrace of the objective rationality model is clearly not the only possible vision. As Simon points out, the basic problem with the assumptions supporting the objective rationality model centers on the crucial fact that

"although they are empirical assumptions almost no empirical evidence supports them."<sup>88</sup> There are at least two possible contrary models: irrationality and limited rationality.

Writing in the 19th century, for example, Charles Mackay was deeply impressed with the positively irrational appearance of much of political behavior, both within and between states. Nations, Mackay observes, "have their whims and peculiarities: their seasons of excitement and recklessness", an excitement and often violent recklessness that does not abate until those involved have "shed rivers of blood and sown a harvest of tears and groans."<sup>89</sup> Twentieth century writers as diverse as Freud (especially in his writings on the origins of war) and Walter Lippman have been struck with the power of the irrational to shape human affairs. Lippman argued (in his Preface to Politics) that "no genuine politician treats his constituents as reasoning animals." The political dialogue is by necessity not with the intellect but with the "dynamics--- with the will, the hopes, the needs and visions of man."<sup>90</sup>

It is not necessary, however, to adopt an irrationalist paradigm to avoid the empirical failings of an objective rationality approach. A long line of works have argued persuasively that the decision process (both in general and in the case of political matters), both for the individual and the collective, exhibits little evidence of the rationality placed at the center of modern realism. In place of this objective rationality is a limited, bounded, or "procedural rationality."<sup>91</sup> The central argument is simple: real-world circumstances conspire to prevent the more rigorous decision-making process from occurring. To use an economics term it is decision-making in the context of 'constrained maximization'. Optimizing becomes satisficing. Simon and March describe this phenomenon: "from a phenomenological viewpoint we can only speak of rationality relative to a frame of reference; and this frame of reference will be determined by the limitations on the rational man's knowledge."<sup>92</sup> In the case of foreign policy, the rational

analysis of the external world is disrupted and policy comes to reflect the character of that disruption.

There are two important points concerning these limitations. First, these limitations serve to both constrict the information available to the decision-maker and/or interfere with the processing of that information on the way to a particular decision. These limitations can take many forms; ranging from an individual's internal conflict over preference ordering, to a disrupted information flow connected to power dispersal within a collective entity, to the capricious influence of emotion, to the variations in the intelligence and skill of those making policy decisions. With the impact of these constraints the final decisions taken, the policies adopted, reflect as much the substance and impact of the limitations as any predictable connection of goals, circumstances, and processes.

Second, and of equal importance, limitations are fundamentally context-bound and, a priori, only generically predictable. The limitations operative in any given situation are of extreme importance to the production of policy but, "there is nothing obvious about these boundaries, there is no way to predict just where they lie."<sup>99</sup> Realism is intolerant of the possibility that foreign policy ought to flow from such idiosyncratic variations across nations and between situations. It implicitly rejects that any given foreign policy decision is the result of "variations in the calculating ability of states" (calculating ability variations related to the impact of these constraints).<sup>100</sup> The implication here is that understanding no longer turns on appreciating a powerful commonality between states but in understanding the often subtle differences between them.

To sum up: the vision offered by realism is that of an outwardly-oriented state applying a more or less strictly rational policy process to the achievement of a particular goal, power maximization vis a vis other states within the international system, a system whose essential

anarchic nature requires that search for power maximization as a price for security. Foreign policy choices are preeminently foreign policy choices, policies adopted with little latitude based on more or less objective circumstantial requirements. Applied to the specific case of Spain and NATO, this vision suggests a basic hypothesis (Spain's behavior was motivated by power considerations) and some fairly straightforward conclusions about motivation at various points.

For example, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo's 1981 move to enter NATO can be seen as essentially a geostrategic move representing an attempt by a politically, economically, and diplomatically reemergent Spain to enhance its position in the international system by using the Alliance to buttress its security. Felipe González's dramatic 1984 turnaround on the membership issue, and his subsequent fervent campaign to secure a positive vote in the referendum, may be seen as an instance where personal doubts and ideological scruples (foolishly allowed to enter the policy formulation process) were necessarily, if uncomfortably, subordinated to strategic necessity.

#### Endogenous-Idiosyncratic Explanations

The endogenous-idiosyncratic approach offers another vision. In this view the state is primarily inwardly-oriented, operating under the defining limits summed up in the notions of constrained maximization and bounded rationality. This inwardly-directed and constrained actor produces policy that is ostensibly externally-directed but (in reality) is aimed primarily at securing a variety of other goals. In this vision, foreign policy becomes spin-off policy: policy spun-off from a variety of tangential pursuits. The endogenous-idiosyncratic approach encompasses a wide variety of foci for the state's inward orientation, as well as a host of practical constraints preventing the tailoring of policy to purely external circumstance. These foci and constraints are directly connected to behavior and are uniquely associated with particular countries at particular times and in particular circumstances.

The goal of this approach involves the identification of variables particular to a given state, in a given circumstance, and the linking of those variables to particular actions. Two basic categories are relevant. First, the linkage of foreign policy, at least in its broad outlines, to system-defining characteristics (i.e., national attributes). Based on the premise that "differences in the national attributes of states will be related to differences in the foreign policy behavior patterns of those nations."<sup>95</sup> Abstractly, these attributes involve any broadly held characteristic, relatively resistant to change, and accessible to measurement; for example: geography, resource availability, demographic features, technological development, etc.<sup>96</sup> Various models have been constructed to explain how these attributes affect behavior. In the case of conflict, for example, Rummel has suggested attribute interactions (and not necessarily the attributes themselves) produce a sort of pull towards war. Maurice East suggests that attributes (especially in terms of resources) shape policy in the form of a structural veto on otherwise feasible policy options, with every nation constrained in a unique fashion.<sup>97</sup>

The second category includes attempts to link foreign policy (especially more limited decisions) to essentially micro-level factors; for example, leadership perception and misperception, leadership psychology and personality, the dynamics of small group decision-making, and the influence of bureaucratic politics. The latter linkage represents a major approach to understanding state behavior. By focusing on the impact of bureaucracies on the decision-making process, foreign policy becomes a response to the tangle of demands issued by the "multiplicity of actors comprising the entity of the state."<sup>98</sup> Policy is less in response to either an innate power drive, or the rational fusion of national goals and systemic circumstances, and more a reflection of the "clash of interests, bargaining, and the need for compromise" among the competing elements constituting the state.<sup>99</sup>



In this view, policy deviates from the strictly rational because the smooth sequence from goal to policy is repeatedly disrupted, distorted by irregularities in the flow of information, the pressure to preferentially distribute resources, and the blocking of policy implementation. Jiri Valenta, for example, has rather convincingly applied a bureaucratic politics model to the 1960 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Valenta argues that the invasion (indeed Soviet foreign policy in general) was less a case of a coherent and rational policy aimed at particular goals than the net result of "a process of political interaction.. .among several actors, in this case the senior decision-makers and the heads of several bureaucratic organizations, the members of the Politburo, and the bureaucratic elites at the Central Committee level."<sup>100</sup> Some analysts (like Stephen Krasner) have gone so far as to claim that "the bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom."<sup>101</sup>

As with realism, this particular endogenous-idiosyncratic approach suggests an interesting overall hypothesis (Spain's behavior was a reflection of the bureaucratic competition within the PSOE government), as well as some interesting interpretations concerning the particular considerations relevant at various points in the evolution of the episode. Particularly intriguing in this respect is the period preceding Felipe González's 1984 turnaround on the membership issue. This period of indecision seemed to be marked by a significant division within the top leadership of the PSOE and the Spanish government over the value of continued membership in the Alliance.<sup>102</sup> It is extremely tempting to cast this leadership split in terms of bureaucratic competition, especially since the earliest and easiest turnaround occurred among ministers responsible for those bureaucracies most likely to gain from membership (i.e., Narcis Serra at the ministry of defense and Miguel Boyer at 'Hacienda y Economía').<sup>103</sup> The switch was later and much more grudging among ministers responsible for those internally-oriented bureaucracies that were not obvious winners from NATO membership (e.g. Ernesto Lluch at 'Sanidad y

Consumo' and José Maravall at the ministry of education).<sup>104</sup> The tug-of-war within the PSOE government, the 'calculated ambiguity' of 1982-1984, presented a public image of the PSOE prime minister as Hamlet-like, placed uncertainly at the center of a swirl of party and government controversy.

This particular interpretation suffers from at least two weaknesses (weaknesses representing specific versions of more general criticisms of the bureaucratic approach).<sup>105</sup> First, the ministers assigned to the various ministries took an ideological predisposition to their job and did not gain it later. Indeed, the division within the top leadership replicated a philosophical division within the ruling party and society as a whole, a split which represented a genuine clash of ideas and contrary visions of Spain's proper future rather than an a theoretical institutional struggle.<sup>106</sup> Second, this interpretation dangerously downplays the extensive control of the party freely exercised by Felipe González: especially in the realm of foreign policy which he considered to be his particular bailiwick.

Since the dramatic events of the May 1979 PSOE party congress (in which a brief resignation by González served to tame the volatile 'sector critica' of the party and force significant changes in PSOE organization and doctrine) González was fully in charge of the party.<sup>107</sup> His authority had been buttressed by the smashing 1982 electoral victory and, as a practical matter, the influence of party lieutenants and government ministers was extremely limited. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the whole internal split was more show than reality, a public relations stunt to cast González in the mold of wise and moderate mediator attempting to reconcile the dispute in the interest of the party and Spain.

While this charge fundamentally misses the real ideological tensions in the PSOE of the late 1970's, it does serve to suggest an alternative explanation. Based upon a careful examination of the record, I believe that there exists little evidence that either an outward-looking concern for

Spain's military security and position in the international arena or the inordinate importance of bureaucracies was an important source for behavior in this case. It seems most reasonable to explore another set of concerns in the search for motivation. These concerns center on the impact of domestic politics on the formulation of Spanish foreign policy in regards to NATO.

### Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

The relationship of 'domestic politics' (leaving the term undefined for the moment) to 'foreign policy' shares many of the attributes of a bureaucratic politics approach. Foreign policy is not simply, or even primarily, a response to foreign-based demands, it also reflects internal realities. While the relationship of domestic politics and foreign policy will be fleshed out in more detail in the next section, two preliminary remarks are relevant.

First, the linkage of domestic politics to the assumption of various foreign policy positions is not a new insight. As Kegley and Wittkopf observe: "the proposition that domestic stimuli are a source of foreign policy is not novel ... Thucydides observed how the external behavior of the Greek city-states was often shaped less by what each was doing towards the other than by what was occurring within them."<sup>108</sup> Second, as a matter of academic investigation, however, it is hard to disagree with Hampson's conclusion that most studies of foreign policy have (for a variety of reasons) "underplayed the role of domestic politics."<sup>109</sup> As Hagan observes, scholarly work on the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy is mainly theoretical or casually speculative, with a distinct "gap" in empirical research into the matter.<sup>110</sup> Where it is featured as a relevant factor, considerations of what exactly constitutes 'domestic politics', and its exact relationship to foreign policy, is frequently only vaguely defined.

Aaron Wildavsky has criticized political science for an excessive concern for tracking empirical political behavior and neglecting the origin and substance of goals. As Wildavsky writes, "while it is eminently reasonable to study ... how people try and get what they want, it

is also unreasonable to neglect the study of why people want what they want."<sup>11</sup> In that spirit, this very brief study of Spain and NATO is an attempt to do two things. First, to begin to fill Hagan's empirical "gap" by sketching out why the relevant political actors wanted what they wanted for Spain in regards to the Alliance. Second, to discuss the consequences of that pursuit, consequences whose particulars were uniquely Spanish but whose basic dynamics are more generally applicable. There are two basic arguments related to these two efforts.

First, what each of the relevant actors wanted for Spain in regards to the Alliance was fundamentally conditioned by a complex obsession with one thing: the domestic political effects of various policy options. Again and again, as we shall see, foreign policy positions were formulated, implemented, and discarded with a keen eye towards the potential internal political ramifications. This basic pattern is firmly established during the Franco regime, though the particularly strong connection between the internal and external can be seen much earlier in Spanish history. The advent of democracy significantly changes the precise form of this complex obsession, but not its relevance.

Second, the NATO issue became, as I have argued, a central domestic political issue. As such it was wonderfully illustrative of the two-sided position sometimes held by foreign policy issues addressed in the domestic political arena. As domestic political issues foreign policy questions can be seen as both dependent and independent variables, reflecting both the consequences of the operation of the domestic political process and serving to (sometimes) fundamentally shape that process and the polity of which it is a part. The NATO membership issue was directly affected by the workings of Spanish politics in the 1970's and 1980's: the positions adopted at the various decision points mentioned are impossible to understand adequately outside of this domestic political consequence. But the NATO membership also served to change the political context within which it was processed.

Understanding that two-sided character of the issue requires the application of the spirit of what James Rosenau calls 'single country theory'. Single country theory reflects a recognition that a nation's foreign policy choices reflect "two convergent dynamics", a fusion of two more or less independent forces. The first dynamic involves "all the distinctive features of its political structure, economic organization and cultural history." The second dynamic "embraces all those processes that are common to countries with the same characteristics."<sup>112</sup> Any particular foreign policy choice is the result of the combination of that which is unique to a given national case with that which is general. The analytic trick lies in properly appreciating, in any given case at any given time, the fundamental balance of power between the two relevant dynamics.<sup>113</sup> The process by which a foreign policy issue shapes the polity in which it is addressed is a general dynamic; the particular form of that effect in the case of Spain and NATO is particularly Spanish.

In the United States, at least, the popular view of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy has two quite contradictory dimensions. First, there is an easy and recurring suspicion that many foreign policy decisions are ultimately rooted in domestic political considerations. Spectacular foreign policy events (for example Richard Nixon's dramatic visit to China in the election year of 1972 or Ronald Reagan's decision to send troops into Grenada in the midst of a lingering recession and only slightly more than a year before a presidential election) are just as easily interpreted as spectacular attempts to shape the course of domestic politics (e.g. by portraying the president as a bold statesman or by diverting attention from pressing domestic problems) as calculated attempts to address genuine external problems or legitimate responses to the global balance of power.

The other dimension of the popular view is summed up in the cliché that 'politics stops at the water's edge' (and its variants). This represents a dismissal of any fundamental linkage between the domestic political and foreign policy spheres. This readiness to dismiss linkage

stems from several sources. To be sure, there may be a cynical and manipulative element to it. Dean Acheson once remarked that: "bipartisan foreign policy is the ideal for the executive because you cannot run this damned country any other way except by fixing the whole organization so it doesn't work the way it is supposed to work." Acheson's plan to achieve this ideal was straightforward: "the way to do this is to say that politics stops at the seaboard and anyone who denies that postulate is a son-of-a-bitch and a crook and not a true patriot; now if people will swallow that, then you're off to the races."<sup>114</sup>

Less cynically, many people simply want to believe this is true, they want to believe that in matters affecting the nation as a whole we are able to subsume petty partisanship and divisive squabbling to advance the collective good. Another portion of the populace, by accepting the fundamental assumption that domestic politics and foreign policy are qualitatively distinct enterprises, makes an essentially prescriptive argument: a normative claim that the two spheres ought not mix. The case is made that the principles that quite properly govern one sphere (e.g. the value of maximum public participation in the creation of domestic policy or the utility of secrecy in the formulation and execution of foreign policy) have no applicability in the other sphere. Indeed, cross-sphere contamination can lead to policy disaster.

Finally, another portion of the populace adheres to the empirical argument that the two actually do not mix. This empirical argument is connected to two things. First, focusing on the impressive, but always transient, upswell of public support and the always temporary cessation of partisan wrangling generated by foreign policy crises. Second, by extrapolating the experience of the two decades following World War Two—when foreign policy seemed embedded in an overall consensus and much less susceptible to political conflict than did other types of issues—into a general model of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.<sup>115</sup>

The psychological phenomenon of wishful thinking and the potential functional value of consciously separating domestic political considerations and foreign policy are both interesting topics, but both outside the realm of this study. Central to my interpretation of the NATO membership episode in Spain is an exploration of the link between the two spheres. Such an exploration centers on determining the parameters of any linkage. That is, if domestic politics and foreign policy are interrelated, in what way or ways do they interrelate?

That some sort of linkage does exist seems undeniable. Operating under the hypothesis that "foreign policy decision-makers are heavily influenced by the domestic political environment in which they operate", Bruce Russett argues that: "for elected leaders (and those who try to keep them in office and those who would take their places) foreign and security policy are, in a large degree, domestic politics."<sup>116</sup> It is not that the outside world does not matter, only that (as a general matter) it matters less than the domestic realities facing decision-makers. Time and time again, Russett observes, policies are adopted "because they gratify friends and disarm adversaries: not because they necessarily seem sensible in some abstract principle of the national interest abroad."<sup>117</sup>

It is not that the effects abroad are not considered, only that they are considered to be of secondary importance. One study concludes that policies are created and adopted "not so much on their intrinsic worth, but largely in terms of how they will affect the regime's political fortunes." On a more specific issue, C. Ostrom and B. Job have argued that domestic political considerations (most importantly the level of public support enjoyed by a president) are the chief factors in the decision to utilize military force, not necessarily considerations of abstract strategic necessity or the demands of the national interest.<sup>118</sup>

Even limiting (for a moment) our attention to the United States, the historical record seems very clear. A cursory examination of several events reveals an interesting paradox. Most

foreign policy issues do tend to remain depoliticized (for whatever reason), free to develop in isolation from the glare of publicity and the public pressures of blatantly competitive politics (that is, safely dealt with by special interest groups and bureaucrats). Some foreign policy issues, however, become so inextricably entangled with domestic political considerations that understanding their evolution, and (where it occurs) final resolution, is impossible without fully understanding the competitive dynamics that underpin them. The case of Vietnam, of course, leaps to mind. Almost all phases of the American involvement in the war (initiation, escalation, and termination) have been interpreted in terms of domestic politics.

For example, escalation of the war, Daniel Ellsberg argues, represented the priority of domestic politics over strategy. Escalation was rooted less in the inertia of the 'quagmire', where originally valid commitments took on a momentum of their own than in a series of clear decisions taken with an eye towards a particular incentive structure: the consequences for domestic politics. So long as the anticipated domestic political costs of terminating the conflict (a termination capable of being characterized by political opportunists as a defeat for the President ending the involvement) the diplomatic, economic, and human costs of continuing to fight were judged to be tolerable. When the situation was reversed, an accommodation became possible. If there were tragic consequences it was, to use Stoessinger's metaphor, a Christian and not a Greek tragedy: a tragedy of choice and not irresistible necessity.<sup>119</sup> And, of course, it is a cherished tenet in the catechism of the American left that public outrage, demonstrations in the streets, and not a change in strategy, that ended America's participation in the war.

What is important to realize, however, is that the Vietnam war was only spectacular, not unique nor novel in its eventually extreme politicization. In the late 19th century, for example, the national debate over America's entry into the world imperialist scramble was a significantly divisive force. In this century, public wariness over things European helped to keep the United



States out of the First World War, and then helped bring the country into war in 1917 as an 'Associated', and not as an 'Allied', power. Following the war, domestic political conflict between parties—but representing a genuine societal split over the proper role for the United States—scuttled the Treaty of Versailles and kept the United States (which was emerging as the most important nation on the globe) out of the League of Nations. The presidency of Woodrow Wilson was, in the process, destroyed.

In the 1930's, President Roosevelt labored against a generalized isolationist tide and (after September 1, 1939) a nascent anti-war movement, an anti-interventionist mentality symbolized by the four so-called 'Neutrality Acts' foisted upon the administration.<sup>120</sup> This anti-interventionist sentiment was so deep that a 1938 measure introduced into Congress by Representative Louis Ludlow to amend the constitution so as to require a national referendum before any declaration of war attracted 188 votes.<sup>121</sup>

Following World War Two foreign policy issues were often partisan political flash-points, this in the era normally portrayed as one of bipartisan consensus. With the sudden death of classic isolationism on December 7, 1941, a genuinely contrary vision of America's role in the world did not exist to challenge the interventionist consensus underpinning the Cold War. Still, the two political parties often fought enthusiastically over who could best implement the accepted geostrategic doctrines. The debate turned on both grand and specific issues.

For example, the handling of the Korean war became a major political issue with the April 1951 dismissal by President Truman of Republican-favorite General Douglas MacArthur. The firing was so controversial that it led to a series of official Senate hearings on the conduct of the war. The hearings were less a search for facts than (in the words of one historian) a clear "contest between two parties."<sup>122</sup> The 1952 Republican national platform likened the Democratic administration's policy of the containment of communism to the prewar appeasement

of Hitler.<sup>123</sup> On the campaign trail in 1952, candidate for vice-president Richard Nixon characterized Adlai Stevenson as a product of "Dean Acheson's Cowardly College of Communist Containment."<sup>124</sup>

In the case of the United States, the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy seems clear. Several recent empirical studies have attempted to trace the shape and extent of this link. While some have made the argument that the United States is particularly prone to such an intermingling (indeed that its basic institutional features almost guarantee it) the connection seems widespread, respecting neither geographic or ideological boundaries.<sup>125</sup> In a multilevel analysis of the origins of World War One, for example, James Joll notes that, at least in the case of one nation—the Austro-Hungarian Empire—foreign policy leading up to the war was "wholly the product of its internal problems."<sup>126</sup> Totalitarian, or otherwise restricted systems, might seem an exception to the connection, since political decisions can be taken with, by definition, a minimum of non-elite input. As Salmore and Salmore observe, regimes that are "well established, autonomous from other sectors of society, and in control of the disposition of many societal resources will be freer to act." In their study of Mexican and Cuban foreign policy, Jorge Dominguez and Juan Lindau reach a similar conclusion concerning the issue.<sup>127</sup>

But, as Dallin argues, such is not necessarily the case. Writing years before the onset of Gorbachev's reforms and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, Dallin observed that "while it would be an oversimplification to think of Soviet foreign policy as purely and simply a dependent variable of domestic inputs, such an approach might well be a lesser error than to assume ... that Soviet leaders are immune to various constraints, diverse opinions, and political pressures arising out of their own polity and society"<sup>128</sup> Accepting a linkage and beginning to specify its parameters are, however, two different things.

At this point it is necessary to introduce a vital distinction in terminology in order to clarify the subsequent argument. It is necessary to distinguish between foreign policy positions growing out of 'domestic considerations' and foreign policy positions growing out of 'domestic politics'. The terms have so far been used interchangeably. The two are certainly related (as will be discussed) but, for this analysis, necessarily distinct. For the purposes of this study, 'domestic politics' is an extension of 'domestic political considerations': a specific version of the latter generated by particular circumstances. While all nations pay heed to the demands made by domestic factors in their formulation of foreign policy (to do otherwise would constitute a death wish), certain nations (i.e., democratic polities) are more acutely affected by a special version of these demands. These are the exigencies associated with the workings of competitive liberal democracy.

By definition, 'politics', in its broadest definition is a feature of all political systems, electorally-based or otherwise. As I use the term, however, politics is an electoral phenomenon; grounded in institutional arrangements and codified in a prevalent electoral mentality. Those arrangements and that mentality result in a particular set of behavioral consequences. Depending on the particular contextual circumstances, either domestic considerations or domestic politics significantly shape foreign policy decisions. In non-electoral systems the relevant considerations are centered on a particular form of power maximization, not of the nation's position within the international system, but of the regime's position within the domestic political system. Non-electoral systems face the special challenge of maintaining systemic legitimacy without the very powerful legitimating device of routinized popular involvement (most importantly genuine elections). Speaking of the particular case of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Guillermo O'Donnell observes that the non-democratic state unavoidably "entails an anticipated rejection of the basis for its own legitimation."<sup>129</sup> In the absence of this legitimating

device, some other strategy must be formulated. Political control is maintained by the use of psychological legitimation (e.g. an ideological tool for mobilizing support), the generation of material out-put generating affect for the system among the populace (meeting needs), and (ultimately) by the application of force. No leader or leadership group can expect to survive without minimal resources in each of these areas: an ability to persuade, to reward, and to punish. Foreign policy is utilized to enhance these resources.

#### Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Case of Franquist Spain

The evidence of the Franquist period, for example, strongly suggests that Spanish foreign policy choices were very often made in an attempt to increase the dictatorial regime's capabilities in all of these areas and less out of concern for Spain's international position. Indeed, as will be argued later, Franco's most important foreign policy initiatives following World War Two injured Spain's standing in the international arena, primarily by mortgaging Spain's effective freedom of action. The erosion of Spain's position vis a vis other states was a point of contention even among the dictator's staunchest supporters.<sup>130</sup> The initiatives went a long way, however, to enhance Franco's position within the internal Spanish political system. As will become clear, Franquist Spain pursued policy options whose primary effects were internal and not external: seeking the endorsement of the regime by influential powers, trying to enhance Spain's economic performance, and seeking the improvement and availability of the regime's coercive resources. The projection of the policies' effects on Spain's internal politics dwarfed any considerations of their impact on Spain in the international system.

With the change from the dictatorship to democracy, both generally and in the specific case of Spain, the scope of relevant domestic considerations widens considerably with the appearance of an open and specialized political competition. While democratic regimes—including the post-Franco regime in Spain—also pursue policies aimed at enhancing

their capabilities (mobilization, output effect, and the potential use of coercion remain features of democratic regimes), increasingly political actors (both those in power and those seeking power) also pursue their purely electoral goals by utilizing foreign policy issues. By making policy choices, or promising to do so, actors seek to garner political advantages over opponents in the never-ending search for power. The material advantages gained by pursuing certain policies are supplemented by important psycho-political advantages. As Russett observes, in the context of a competitive electoral system "foreign policy actions are ostensibly directed at actors in the external world but ... that may be so only nominally."<sup>131</sup> In short, "no elected official can ignore the process by which he or she originally obtained electoral approval or the ease with which that approval can evaporate."<sup>132</sup>

It is important to emphasize that we are not talking about a relatively unchanging relationship between a fixed set of policies and a particular regime type. In other words, there is no claim that a particular type of regime is automatically connected to one type of policy: for example, that democracies are more peace loving than non-democracies. The relationship we are concerned with is not that focused upon by Salmore and Salmore when they discuss the policy implications of a particular "internal structure and general system." We are discussing a broader set of potential policy consequences stemming from discrete decisions in reaction to the structural conditions imposed by a regime. In that sense, we can distinguish four distinct periods in Spanish foreign policy since 1939.

The first involves the period 1939-1976. In this period we see the full use of foreign policy to sustain the regime, not primarily in the face of external threats (of which there were few) but in response to internal sources of danger (of which there were many). Protecting the regime (which effectively meant Francisco Franco's personal power) became the transcendent goal, a goal that justified virtually any collateral damage to Spain's sovereignty, standing,

latitude, and ability to influence international affairs. The 1953 base agreement with the United States was exemplary of this fixation. The second involves the period 1976-1979. Here we have a transitional period featuring a modified competition between coalescing political forces within a democratizing Spain. As a general matter, foreign policy issues were effectively postponed or consciously side-stepped; in the case of membership in the EC by a widespread agreement on the value of the policy, or (in the case of NATO membership) by premeditated policy and agreement (e.g. the 'Moncloa Pacts' between Government and opposition). Policy initiatives were geared to, and judged by, the success of the overarching domestic fixation: democratization.

The third includes the period 1979-1982. During these years foreign policy (as exemplified by the NATO membership issue) becomes a decisive and almost purely political issue. Membership in NATO (as opposed to membership in the EC) is mined, by all sides, for all the partisan electoral benefits it will yield. The period includes two overlapping campaigns: 1979-1982, the PSOE effort to discredit the government using the membership issue; 1981-1982, the UCD government's attempt to counter the attack by utilizing the issue for its own purposes.

Finally we have the period 1982-1986. In this period we see a temporary return to the condition of modified competition made possible by the smashing Socialist victory in the general elections of October 1982. The PSOE's absolute legislative majority (coupled with the strict party discipline that existed after 1979) granted it a virtual free-hand in policy formulation. As a result there was a reemergence of the earlier model of foreign policy as a method to directly affect general internal conditions and, subsidiarily, the survival of the regime (in this case one that came to power by democratic means). The period 1984-1986 (initiated by the party leadership's turnaround on the issue of membership in the Alliance and concluding with the March 1986 referendum) saw a temporary reemergence of foreign policy as an electoral issue.

### Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Elite-Mass Relationship

The question remains, however, as to how, within a democratic polity, politics and policy mix. One potentially helpful way of operationalizing the question is by considering how elite and mass interact on foreign policy issues. By definition, the overall policy output of a democratic system is subject to some amount of public input; either before the fact or after, by way of influence or by the ex post facto judging of policy at the polls. The prudent politician is sure to be "sufficiently responsive to the vox of particular populi."<sup>133</sup> Bruce Russett suggests four types of elite-mass relationships concerning foreign policy issues, models that can be organized into three basic categories.

The first is an argument for a functional non-linkage between politics and foreign policy. The argument for a functional non-linkage between politics and policy is, in many ways, a restatement of structural determinism, implied or explicit. This model argues for the irrelevance of the mass-elite connection since, owing to the importance of other factors, this connection does not, indeed cannot, have a bearing on the decisions made. Succinctly, "leaders do not obey public opinion, but neither do they control it."<sup>134</sup> Policies are dictated, at least in their broad outlines, by immutable human nature, the realities of human psychology, or the impact of the system. Not only the relationship, but the mass and elite are, in policy terms, "mutually irrelevant."<sup>135</sup>

The second model is unidirectional in substance and comes in two specific types. One version is hyper-democratic. The relationship between mass and elite is characterized by an almost completely deferential set of decision-makers and a situation where "public opinion is controlling ... policy obeys the dictates of public opinion, as stated in the extreme versions of democratic theory."<sup>136</sup> In Kegley and Wittkopf's words the relationship is one in which "public policy flows upward rather than downward."<sup>137</sup> The second version of this unidirectional model

is the exact opposite, a hyper-elitist relationship. In this view, the deferential decision-makers of the hyper-democratic are replaced by a deferential, disconnected, public. Elites are almost completely free to formulate and implement policy. The public is, in Russett's words, "controlled: the policy-makers basically shape and manipulate opinion; the democratic mythology is false, and the ruling elites persuade the populace to support whatever the leaders wish to do."<sup>138</sup>

This latitude comes from two sources. First, the unique characteristics (characteristics we will discuss in greater detail later) of foreign policy issues prompts the public to abdicate its role. Essentially, the public grants the political elite the power of attorney to act on its behalf. As Wittkopf and Dehaven observe, the "mass publics are notorious for their lack of sustained interest and involvement in foreign policy issues", an apathy stimulated by the arcane and esoteric aura often surrounding foreign policy.<sup>139</sup> In this (to use Miller and Stokes terminology) 'Burkean model' the public's real role is to make itself available to support the decisions ultimately made by the elite. The second source of latitude comes from a conscious exclusion (by a variety of means) of the public from the decision-making process by the political elite. Why is the exclusion necessary? Primarily because of the dysfunctional attributes the public unavoidably brings to any consideration of foreign policy. These dysfunctional attributes include opinion volatility and attitudinal incoherence. The view of the American public as unable to fruitfully deal with foreign policy issues is a longstanding assumption.

Decades ago Walter Lippmann argued that: "The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at theoretical junctures. The people have impressed a critical veto upon the judgment of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the government, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or what was necessary, or what was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist



in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiations, or too intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this country. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decision when the stakes are life and death. This traditional view has recently been subjected to significant empirical testing, a process which has cast doubt upon some of its fundamental premises.<sup>140</sup>

The third model is bidirectional. This bidirectionality takes two forms. First, the relationship is one in which influence flows in two directions: both from and to the mass and the elite. As Russett puts it, "opinion and policy interact: each influences the other."<sup>141</sup> A nation's foreign policy represents the results of this complex dance. Second, foreign policy is seen not just as a dependent variable subject to the outcome of a domestic political process, but also as a factor significantly affecting the course of domestic politics. This interaction is extremely subtle, but a taste of its character is provided by Russett's observation that "the political leader who ignores domestic politics hamstringing his or her ability to get things done domestically and ignores a set of resources---real or symbolic successes abroad---that could bring success at home also."<sup>142</sup>

One, limited, way of envisioning this form of the model's bi-directionality is as another form of mass veto on policy. That is, policy is formulated in response to perceived external needs but ends up being negated or distorted by the workings of the political process. In other words, good policy loses out to bad politics. Foreign policy becomes, in Quandt's words, "excessively geared to short-term calculations in which narrow political considerations often outweigh sound thinking."<sup>143</sup> The view is of domestic politics as a "constraint", something which "complicates foreign policy making."<sup>144</sup> A broader vision of this relationship sees it as something more than a mass veto and has several important dimensions.

The first of these dimensions involves the recognition that the relationship between the public and the political elite is complex and mutable in terms of its exact form for any given issue at any given moment in any given system. The exact relationship is a product of, among other factors, the "political and social context" in which the relevant actors interact.<sup>145</sup> Thus, specifying the relationship for any given issue at any given moment is an empirical matter, not a question of unchanging structure. That said, the relationship, in its overall form, is (as stated) mutually influential. While, as the preponderance of the literature indicates, foreign policy debates are elite-led, that elite is by no means free to lead the public anywhere it pleases.<sup>146</sup> Though the mass lacks the specific authority to make specific decisions, for example, the elite cannot stray far from the boundaries set by the public. The goals and tactics it employs are, to a very great degree, independently set by the historical, cultural, social, and political context in which the elite unavoidably operates.

Three specific strands tie the political elite to the mass public in this matter. First, the two are bound by a nearly tautological strand of formal accountability connected with democratic systems, what has been called "electoral retribution." While the image of foreign policy as the result of accountability alone is simplistic, it is relevant.<sup>147</sup> Second, elite and mass are joined by the important strand of collective resonance: some issues simply sell better than others; some causes resonate in the body politic far more profoundly than others. Third, both groups are linked by the subtle strand of socialization. The same historical, cultural, social, and political context forming the mass reality also, to a greater or lesser degree, informs the elite.

As John Vasquez observes (concerning the specific matter of security issues), "a person's security views are not derived from objective factors but are a function of individual beliefs and predispositions."<sup>148</sup> Several images suggest themselves. A physical metaphor is provided by Doble: "public opinion does not determine foreign policy so much as, like the banks of a river,

set the limits or boundaries within which policy can be carried out"<sup>149</sup> An apt philosophical metaphor is provided by Marx (in the "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte) when he observes that humans make their own futures but not exactly in the way they want.<sup>150</sup>

Third, one cumulative effect of these various strands binding elite to mass is to make the power of domestic politics to shape foreign policy one of subtle anticipation as much as conventional politics. Foreign policy is shaped not just by concrete domestic political reactions, but also by the responses projected by the decision-maker. Fen Osler Hampson argues that domestic politics affects foreign policy primarily by way of "the political expectations and concerns of the decision-maker. Fen Osler Hampson argues that domestic politics affects foreign policy primarily by way of "the political expectations and concerns of the decision-maker and the values he assigns to the consequences of his actions for his domestic political standing."<sup>151</sup> Those formulating foreign policy in democratic polities are, Hampson concludes, "Janus-like creatures: while one head is turned towards the international arena the other is firmly fixed on the arena of domestic politics."<sup>152</sup> This is because, long before they are statesmen charged with statesmen-like responsibilities, they are practical politicians charged with calculating gain.

Political leaders are unavoidably formatted to pay special attention to domestic politics. As a result, the psychological dynamics of the leaders (e.g. the mentalities rooted in socialization and maturation) become relevant. Specifically, what do they think is possible and impossible? Finally, as argued in the introduction, when foreign policy becomes domestic politics it sometimes takes on a very special role in the life of the nation. The full extent of that role will be discussed in much greater detail in the final chapter, both as a theoretical matter and empirically in regards to Spain and NATO.

### Five Questions

The second important issue centers on the recognition that in order to understand the evolution of the NATO membership episode it is necessary to understand the circumstances surrounding, and the considerations informing, several key decisions scattered throughout the ten years in question. I have discussed 'how' we can go about interpreting foreign policy decisions, now it is necessary to delineate 'what' decision or decisions were important to understand. In the case of Spain there was not a 'NATO decision', no single moment where a particular choice determined all that followed. Perhaps, unfortunately, there is no single decision whose minute dissection would grant a definitive understanding of the entire matter. Rather, there were a series of NATO decisions, the accumulation of which led to the outcome and gave character to the episode. This study represents an attempt to illuminate these decisions using as a tool the thesis concerning the conditioning effects of domestic political considerations and domestic politics discussed above.

In the strictest sense these decisions probably number in the hundreds and, strictly speaking, none stands alone. For our purposes, however, five, more or less distinct, decision points can be placed at the center of the following analysis. While the remainder of the study will touch upon numerous other related questions, gaining an understanding of the most important motivations underlying the following decisions forms the overarching effort.

First, Adolfo Suárez's decision to place NATO membership, a goal considered a relatively important item by his party, on the policy back-burner. What factors contributed to the hesitancy on Suárez's part to commit Spain to membership? Second, the decision, made late in Suárez's tenure as head of government, to move away from his early and very public flirtations with sometimes exotic foreign policy initiatives and towards a more mainstream orientation, including moving ahead on NATO membership. Why did Suárez finally reject

non-NATO options in favor of membership in the Alliance? Third, the decision by Adolfo Suárez's successor, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo to accelerate the membership process reluctantly begun by Suárez and enter the Alliance. Why did the new leadership pursue NATO membership with such enthusiasm? Fourth, the decision by the PSOE's leadership to feature one aspect of their party's policy agenda, opposition to Spain's inclusion in NATO, as a central election issue in 1982. What factors prompted the party to reject its tradition of moderation and assume such a confrontational stand? Finally, the subsequent decision by the socialist leadership to reverse themselves and support the continued (if provisional) membership of Spain in the Alliance. What moved the PSOE leader Felipe González to reject the party's radical position in regards to the Alliance (a position that had yielded enormous political benefit and which reflected the thinking of most Spaniards) and face the political damage that such a switch in policy would inflict?

#### Conclusion: Motivation and Methodology

As we have seen, realism simplifies goals or holds them to be unknowable; bureaucratic politics assigns them to considerations of institutional gains or the gains to be had within particular institutions. In the case of Spain and NATO I believe the goals held by the relevant actors were important (in that policy in some way flowed from them) and (at least in part) they are knowable. My hypothesis is that these goals were primarily related to the domestic political fortunes of the various individual actors. However, final conclusions concerning what goals were operative cannot, as Herbert Simon argues, be dependably deduced from "immutable first principles."<sup>153</sup> Rather, they come about only with the accumulation of "considerable empirical knowledge about the decision-maker."<sup>154</sup> That accumulation of empirical knowledge is not a simple matter and, by necessity, it can never be complete. It is important to appreciate, however, that gaps are the results of empirical difficulties and not an unchangeable matter of epistemology.

Any attempt to fully understand the interaction between internal and external in the case of Spain and NATO is an unavoidably daunting task. A full understanding would require empirically specifying actor goals in relation to the immense historical, cultural, social, and political context from which they developed and in which the political actions aimed at securing these goals played out. That reality suggests a particular approach. In many respects, the intensely focused case study is the only adequate way to understand the domestic affects on foreign policy. In their excellent study of the relationship between internal politics and external policy in the case of Soviet-American relations, Wittkopf and Dehaven conclude that to study this undeniable link "case studies and memoir histories may prove more useful instruments than the kinds of data and analytical tools used by comparativists." Wittkopf and Dehaven are not alone in that opinion.

For example, Ole Holsti has written that: "Although anecdotal evidence and correlational analyses can make useful contributions toward understanding the opinion-policy relationship, they are not an entirely satisfactory substitute for intensive case studies that could shed more direct light on how, if at all, public opinion influences foreign policy-making." Olsti concludes that, "there are no satisfactory alternatives to carefully-crafted case studies employing interviews and/or archival research designed to uncover how, if at all, decision-makers perceive public opinion, feel themselves motivated or constrained by it, factor it into their analyses of policy options, and otherwise take it into account when selecting a course of action, including a decision not to take external action."<sup>155</sup> The methodological strategy of this brief study of the NATO membership issue as a part of Spanish politics essentially springs from these observations.

The intensely-focused case study relying on "memoir histories" (in this case encompassing autobiographies, biographies, and general histories) suggested by Wittkopf and Dehaven also features other sources of information in an attempt to illuminate motivation. These include: an

extensive survey of the Spanish and non-Spanish press; an analysis of mass opinion surveys aimed at discerning public attitudes towards foreign policy issues; and supplemental elite interviews (with relevant Spanish and non-Spanish actors). Each of these sources is uniquely valuable in its potential contribution to an understanding of Spanish foreign policy in this event. The first set of resources (essentially historical and archival information) is valuable on several levels. For example, beyond the provision of basic (i.e., more or less non-controversial) facts, information contained in interviews, speeches, government documents, internal political party communications, etc. provide an important (if difficult to sort) insight on the mind-set of relevant decision-makers in the matter: essentially, their relevant working interpretations of events. In addition, in the case of the Spanish press, these sources provide a potential view as to what information decision-makers were being exposed to as policy was formulated. The second set of information resources, mass opinion surveys (both government and media sponsored), also has several levels of importance.

First, a general analysis of the available surveys allows us to begin to identify basic themes associated with mass thinking on foreign policy issues in Spain, in effect the foreign policy component to the overall Spanish political culture. This component formed the environment in which policies were formulated, implemented, and in which both elite and mass were socialized and interacted. This component of Spanish political culture provides the repertoire for political action on foreign policy. Also, and more specifically, the analysis allows us to track changes in that thinking over time: in response both to changes in overarching circumstances (e.g. Spain's fairly rapid move from dictatorship to democracy) and the premeditated attempts by the elite to manipulate this repertoire for political gain. Even more specifically, the public's thinking and evolution on the NATO issue can be at least partly traced over time. Finally, especially in the case of government-sponsored surveys, the polls give us the

invaluable opportunity to gain an appreciation for the information feeding into the decision-making process, not just its substance but its frequency.

The final source of information, elite interviews with relevant Spanish and non-Spanish actors, provided a crucial source of information, both to confirm previously obtained information as well as generating new information and new avenues for investigation. In addition to this, the interviews allowed an opportunity (where relevant) to conduct a more subjective assessment of the subjects involved. While the use of elite interviews to study Spanish domestic politics has been very common and often very valuable, to my knowledge no study of Spanish foreign policy has yet to explicitly incorporate the technique. The interviews were conducted during the period 1989-1990, in both Spain and the United States, and involved a group of respondents from a wide variety of backgrounds. I thank the following for their kind participation: Reginald Bartholomew, Welles Stabler, Alberto Aza Arias, Jose Pedro Pérez Llorca, Fernando Rodrigo, Antonio Marquina Barrio, Antxon Sarasqueta, Fernando Morán, Angel Lobo, Jesus Salgado Alba, Inocencio Felix Arias, Milagros Alvarez, Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, José Luis Leal, and Felipe Fernández de la Pena.

As a general matter, the use of elite interviews, in any context, presents a number of unique challenges to the researcher, though the difficulties involved are often well rewarded by the results received. Conducting elite interviews in a non-American context is especially challenging. In the case of my research, the subject matter involved (national security policy and, more specifically, the NATO membership issue) significantly affected the process of interviewing. These effects range from basic issues of subject access (e.g. foreign policy elites are, owing to the nature of their work, often physically unavailable for interviews with schedules constrained by considerations quite dissimilar from the average domestic political actor) and willingness to talk if available (the result of the unavoidable cloud of almost automatic secretiveness that clings



to national security matters combined with the particularly controversial nature of the NATO issue), to the fundamental philosophy of the interviewing strategy.

The character of this particular issue structured the goals of the interviewing process. Unlike an attempt to formulate a collective characterization of an institution (e.g. treating a topic along the lines of "the attitude towards agriculture reform of senior Spanish bureaucrats in the ministry of agriculture") in the case of this issue not all respondents were of equal value in trying to discover what happened and why. Sometimes the effective 'N' of relevant decision-makers on a given issue is '1'. The interview strategy adopted represented an attempt to target the most important feasible subjects. As such, there is no claim to representativeness in a strictly scientific sense. Still, without the elite interviews conducted, and the valuable information they provided, the project would have been impossible.

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CHAPTER II  
SPAIN AND THE WORLD, 1492-1945

Introduction

As Macridis and Brown observe, "all that is social is also political, firmly rooted in history." The issue of Spanish membership in NATO did not evolve in an historical vacuum. The evolution was fundamentally tied to the historical context in which it occurred. The impact of the past on the evolution of the NATO issue manifested itself in three important ways. First, the issue had to be dealt with in the face of important political realities that were intimately connected to past decisions. For example, as we shall see, the NATO issue was profoundly shaped by the existence of a bilateral security relationship between the United States and Spain. The bilateral relationship (initiated in 1953) reflected a host of often complex considerations (connected to internal Spanish politics, American domestic politics, as well as the global balance of power), all of which significantly influenced the course of the NATO membership issue in the period 1976-1986.

Second, the 'weight of history' generated certain mentalities among Spanish decision-makers, mentalities that are, in many cases, striking in their longevity. The Spanish (especially on the elite level) have enormously long political memories. The perceived lessons of their own history are extremely important in the formation of policy positions, especially (as Joseph S. Tulchin observes) in regards to foreign policy. The NATO membership question was no different in this regard. Time and time again, Spanish decision-makers justified particular positions based upon an appeal to the past. In the case of the relationship with the United States,

for example, PSOE leader Felipe González could, as late as November 1981, bitterly criticize the United States: not just for its important and self-interested support for the Franco regime, but also for the long ago events of 1898 when Spain's disastrous war with America finalized its pathetic exit from the world stage.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the examination of the broad character of Spanish history reveals intriguing regularities in the nation's approach to foreign policy, regularities with relevance for the NATO membership issue. Put simply, foreign policy was repeatedly connected to, and seen primarily in terms of, its domestic consequences. The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief survey (until 1945) of the many decisions that structured policy-making in regards to NATO, and to highlight what I consider to be the longrunning Spanish practice of formulating major foreign policy decisions in response to perceived internal political needs.

#### From Obscurity to Obscurity

From the very beginning Spain's entry onto the world stage was remarkable for its unprecedented character. From the very beginning of its participation in world politics Spain was different. As one historian of the period has noted, Spain was the first genuine "world power."<sup>2</sup> John Fraser Ramsey writes that "of the three great imperial experiments of western civilization---the Roman, the Spanish, and the British---the Spanish is the most intriguing and in many ways the most remarkable."<sup>3</sup> The remarkable character of Spain's imperial experience grew from the daunting combination of territorial scope and relatively modest technology. Spain's 16th century global power was based on modest military and communication technology. Most previous imperial enterprises (e.g. Rome or Byzantium) had involved the domination of much smaller areas (with essentially internal lines of communication), while the grandest

subsequent empires (e.g those of Great Britain or France) had benefitted enormously from much improved technology.<sup>4</sup>

The background to this rise to prominence is well-known. The Iberian Peninsula (an ancient battleground held for greater or lesser time periods by Celts, Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans) fell, following the terminal decline in Rome's power, under the domination first (505 AD) of Visigothic kings (with such un-Spanish names as Swinthila, Wallia, and Hermenegild) and, subsequently, waves of Moslem groups crossing from North Africa.<sup>5</sup>

The now almost mythological 'reconquista' (reconquest) of the peninsula by Christian forces began almost immediately following the shattering triumph of Islam.<sup>6</sup> The process was glacially slow, however, and in terms of detail tortuously complex. Over the centuries alliances of Christians against Moslems, Christians against Christians, and Moslems against Moslems, came and went. The marriage in Valladolid between Isabel and Fernando brought together the combined resources of the kingdoms of Castilla, León, Aragon, Navarra, Barcelona, and Mallorca and represented the culmination of a complex process of dynastic maneuver and negotiation.<sup>7</sup> With it the most important Christian powers on the peninsula were bound together. While easy to romanticize, the bond was essentially a cold-blooded alliance struck to pursue a specific and limited end: a political unification of the peninsula that did not necessitate a genuine national unification of the diverse peoples occupying the Iberian Peninsula. The multinational, multilinguistic, and multicultural character of the peninsula was left generally unaffected.

Isabel's asceticism, her almost fanatical devotion to Castilla and León, and her unarguably sincere piety oddly complemented Fernando's broader political ambition, more European identification and sophistication, and literally Machiavellian cleverness.<sup>8</sup> In 1492 the fruitful alliance achieved a final (though mostly symbolic) victory over Islam by forcing the surrender of the last Moslem stronghold in Granada. That same year saw two other momentous events:

the expulsion by the Catholic monarchs of Jews (as well as those remaining Moslems) who were unwilling to accept baptism and convert to Christianity, and the first voyage of Columbus across the Atlantic. The year 1492 also saw the emergence of what would be an enduring Spanish paradox: Spain's fascination and engagement with the world coupled with a profound self-absorption and sometimes shocking parochialism, particularly in terms of religious and ideological purity.<sup>9</sup>

Ironically, the expansion of Spain's power reached its culmination under two non-Spanish monarchs: the Habsburg's Carlos I (who also reigned as Holy Roman Emperor) and his son Felipe II. With the ascension of Carlos I in 1516 (who technically ruled the Spanish portion of the sprawling empire in the name of his reputedly insane mother Juana) the fate of Spain and the fortunes of the Habsburg family were irrevocably fused. Despite the subsequent military glory and economic prosperity, for many in Spain the end of a more genuinely Spanish line and advent of Habsburg rule "was regarded as a disaster."<sup>10</sup> The Spanish fear centered on Carlos I's dual obligation to both Spain and Austria. Those responsibilities were widely perceived as conflicting and it was generally assumed the conflict would be settled in favor of Austrian interests. Under Carlos, family, not nation, was paramount. In one sense then, it is misleading to speak of a 'Spanish' empire. Rather, especially under Carlos, there was an unwieldy Spanish-Austrian collection of imperial holdings whose substantial resources were ruthlessly employed to serve Habsburg family (and not yet genuinely national) interests and ambitions.<sup>11</sup>

The Habsburg family interests were far-flung and the family ambitions underpinning them seemed boundless. One historian has observed that the enemies of the Habsburgs (and there was certainly no shortage of these) "firmly believed the Habsburgs were bent upon absolute domination."<sup>12</sup> While no Habsburg manifesto (along the lines of Hitler's Mein Kampf) outlining the steps to world domination was ever issued, an impulse, vague as it might have been, towards

the integration (by force if necessary) of Europe under a single, Catholic, power became evident early in Carlos' reign.<sup>13</sup> Carlos' personal inclinations in this matter seemed clear enough. As one biographer of the Habsburg family has observed, following his coronation in Vienna as Holy Roman Emperor, the new monarch "was resolved to restore meaning to the medieval concept of a unified Christian empire."<sup>14</sup> Another study notes that Carlos I fervently believed that "it was his duty to maintain the political and religious unity of Western Christendom." Because of this conviction, the study concludes, Carlos I "was the last medieval emperor."<sup>15</sup> The resources of Spain were to play a decisive role in the attempt to realize that grandiose vision.

Complicated divisions of territory (occurring both before and after Carlos I's abdication and retirement to the remote monastery at Yuste) left his son, the fervently Catholic Felipe II, somewhat less grandly titled.<sup>16</sup> The Austrian possessions came under the nominal control of a Habsburg relative, though, as Ramsey notes, the Spanish branch remained a senior partner in the arrangement, involved in all facets of policy formulation.<sup>17</sup> The reorganization of territorial responsibility, as well as Felipe II's personal experiences, led him to begin to formulate foreign policy with more of an exclusive perspective. Carlos I had slowly become "Hispanicized" during his years in power, but Felipe II was a more genuinely Spanish king. Early on, his personal and family success, as well as the overall fortunes of Catholicism, came to be defined wholly in terms of an expansion in Spain's national power.<sup>18</sup>

The decline of Spain after Felipe's death in 1598 was, paradoxically, both dramatic and subtle and was rooted in several diverse sources. Economic mismanagement (running the gamut between outlandish instances of conspicuous consumption and less obvious cases of simply mistaken policy) had managed to effectively strangle commercial enterprise, as well as the beginnings of industrialization.<sup>19</sup> In many respects, the unprecedented bounty flowing so easily from the New World did more harm than good; helping to inflate prices and discourage initiative.



The mounting mania for religious and (to a much lesser degree) ethnic homogeneity had stifled social creativity; the harassment and outright expulsion of Jews and Moslems (who made up an important component of the commercial class) had wasted potential sources of innovation.<sup>20</sup> The quality of leadership, not just in the competent management of details but in energy and overall vision, deteriorated. To exacerbate matters, plague ripped through Castilla between 1596 and 1602. As many as half a million Castellans fell victim to the epidemic.<sup>21</sup> Traditionally, Castilla had represented the "chief peninsular source of revenue"; its decimation was Spain's decimation.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, motivated by personal and family ambitions, religious fanaticism, and the deadly inertia of imperial competition, Spain found itself trapped in a seemingly perpetual state of war. As mentioned, under Felipe II Spanish power was used to serve goals that increasingly defined the national interest as the unquestioning defense of Catholicism against the rising tide of Protestant influence. With such an expansive commitment, Spain "eventually became the leader of the Counter-Reformation."<sup>23</sup> In terms of the underlying motivation for Spanish foreign policy, as Paul Kennedy notes, ultimately "it became virtually impossible to separate the power-political from the religious."<sup>24</sup> Spanish foreign policy took on nothing less than a "messianic intensity."<sup>25</sup> This messianic commitment to Catholicism (along with the secular exigencies of maintaining the territorial status quo in Europe and elsewhere) presented an ongoing military situation whose demands on Spain "ruined her economy ... destroyed her military and naval establishments."<sup>26</sup>

The failed Armada and the expensive and demoralizing war in the Netherlands were spectacular episodes in this national unraveling, this descent from dominance. The resources that Spain could bring to the ultimately futile struggle to retain hegemony were unquestionably impressive. By 1600 for example (two years after Felipe II's death), Spanish gold and silver

mines in the New World had produced triple the amount of precious metal that had existed in all of Europe 100 years before.<sup>27</sup> The resources were impressive, but not inexhaustible. Paul Kennedy observes that "enormous though its financial and military resources appeared to contemporaries", the resources were "never sufficient to meet requirements."<sup>28</sup>

Under the first two Habsburg rulers, Carlos I and Felipe II, Spain was involved in epic battles and massive conquests, as well as the more mundane task of keeping order in places as diverse as Mexico and the Netherlands. During this eighty-one year period Spain, at one time or another, battled North African pirates, Turks encroaching into the Western Mediterranean, nationalistic and religious rebels in the Netherlands, Portuguese nationalists resisting incorporation into the Empire, the rising power of Britain, indigenous empires in the New World, as well as challenges from dozens of other sources. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648), following Felipe's death, sealed an exhausted Spain's fate.<sup>29</sup> The subsequent 'Treaty of the Pyrennes' with France "revealed that the age of Habsburg predominance in Europe was over."<sup>30</sup> Summarizing the cumulative demands on the finite Spanish resources, Kennedy writes that: "Swedish and German troops were pressing the imperial armies in the north. The Dutch and French were pincering the Spanish Netherlands ... a revolt by the Portuguese in 1640 diverted a steady flow of Spanish troops ... to much nearer home, although there were never enough to achieve reunification."<sup>31</sup> By 1650, Kennedy concludes, the situation had become so dire that "there was some danger of a disintegration of the Spanish heartland."<sup>32</sup>

### From Obscurity to Oblivion

The agonizingly prolonged collapse of Spain's empire ushered in a lengthy period of weakness, mounting domestic instability and a diminution of international influence. Spain in the early 1700's, while still a nominal great power, had been shorn of most of its European possessions and was faced by declining colonial revenues. With some exceptions, the economy

was moribund. Spain could no longer live on the resources of the past nor did it fully embrace the economic solutions of the future. As Stanley Payne has observed, the 17th century witnessed a Spain sunk into a "typically southern and eastern European pattern of ruralism, archaism, and slow economic development."<sup>33</sup> In many ways Spain had come full circle and was once again "in much the same state as had existed at Charles V's accession."<sup>34</sup>

Where Spanish monarchs had once arbitrarily decided the fate of subject nations and distant peoples, by the beginning of the 18th century, upstart European powers fought wars over which dynasty would rule in Madrid. As Eusebio Mujal-Leon observes: "Beginning in the late 17th century, Spain became a pawn in the dynastic struggles of the major European powers, suffering the occupation of Gibraltar by Great Britain in 1704 and enduring the humiliation of not even being invited to the Congress of Vienna in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars."<sup>35</sup> With the death of the childless Carlos II in 1700 the Habsburg line in Spain finally died out. As a result of an international agreement aimed at maintaining a continental balance of power that Spain no longer independently affected, Felipe V (the grandson of Louis XIV) ascended the throne, introducing the Borbon family to Spain. Three monarchs followed, with the latter, (Carlos IV) removed by Napoleon and, in 1808, replaced by the French emperor's brother Joseph.<sup>36</sup> Following the bitter struggle to expel the French, Borbon rule was restored in 1814 with the return of the ousted Fernando VII. A long period of political and social turmoil began, in part fueled by the volatile ideas and radical ideologies introduced and exacerbated by the French invasion. The turmoil was both internal and external, as colonies held for centuries took advantage of the unstable situation and began to break away from the Empire.

Fernando VII died in 1833 without a male heir and the vacant throne was claimed by Fernando's brother Carlos. That claimant and his supporters absolutely rejected (in line with the French tradition) the possibility that a woman (in this case Fernando's daughter Isabel) could

inherit the throne. Isabel eventually won out, but the sometimes fanatic Carlist resistance (which came to be defined in terms of establishing a reactionary political and religious absolutism) regularly contributed to the seemingly endless social and political disorder represented by coup, countercoup, pronunciamiento, sham-election, and generalized corruption. By one author's calculations, Spain experienced (between the Borbon restoration and April 1939), 4 civil wars, 13 partial changes in constitution, 109 governments, and more than 40 extra-legal changes in regime.<sup>37</sup>

For all of its progressive features, the Republic instituted on September 18, 1868 failed to energize and reform Spain. Politics remained "unstable and convulsive in the extreme."<sup>38</sup> Following a brief period of rule by an obscure member of the Italian House of Savoy, power was once again handed back to the Borbons: this time in the person of Isabel II's son Alfonso XII. In 1898, two years following the ascension to power of Isabel II's grandson, Alfonso XIII, war with the United States stripped Spain of most of its remaining imperial holdings and all of its remaining imperial pretensions.<sup>39</sup> The defeat was more than a military disaster. The social, economic, and political ramifications were much broader. The result of the defeat was nothing less than a "national trauma" that stimulated a flood of demands and plans for reform and national regeneration.<sup>40</sup> Stanley Payne observes that the disaster in 1898 "seemed to symbolize the failure of modern Spain as a state and system as well", and it necessitated some sort of radical response.<sup>41</sup>

As John Crow writes, "Spain entered the twentieth century with all of her old values intact."<sup>42</sup> In Spain's case these included a vibrant strain of political absolutism, an interventionist church, a restive military (made more restive with the contraction in economic support following 1898), an almost cultural ambivalence towards capitalism and industrialization, and a working and agricultural class with a stubborn predisposition towards socialism and

anarchism. The monarchy and the institutionalized leadership of the political groupings were only partly able to deal with the blizzard of problems that confronted Spain. By 1923, a dictatorship was established under the direction of General Miguel Primo de Rivera.<sup>43</sup> Primo de Rivera's 'Directory' was, for a time, fairly effective and only occasionally intrusive. General Primo de Rivera himself (at least at first) enjoyed a striking amount of apparently genuine personal popularity. It was, according to one socialist leader, a dictatorship "without corpses."<sup>44</sup> Indeed, some prominent socialists consented to serve as advisers to the Dictator.<sup>45</sup>

As might be expected, this chronic internal instability had both origins in and an affect on foreign policy. In this sense, the internal and external were always inextricably entangled. For example, the American rout of Spanish forces around the globe not only disrupted centuries old economic relations, it also unleashed a twin scourge on Spain that contributed to its internal instability: a flood of disgruntled returning soldiers and a group of disillusioned intellectuals devoted to analyzing and rectifying Spain's decline. On the other hand, several episodes during the period nicely illustrate Michael Mandelbaum's observation that we can expect internal divisions to shape a nation's foreign policy behavior "when they are acute, when a government is unstable, and when the legitimacy of the regime itself is in dispute."<sup>46</sup>

For example, Spain's neutrality during World War One was as much an outgrowth of enervating domestic conditions as it was an example of shrewd Spanish diplomacy.<sup>47</sup> The chief internal consideration focused on the division of Spain's political elites into opposing camps in regards to the war. The attempt to head off a confrontation between supporters of Germany and Austria (which included most members of the Church hierarchy, the officer corp, and the conservative landed aristocracy) and those of the Allies (e.g. labor groups, liberal and left-wing intellectuals, and the emerging commercial and industrial middle class) necessitated a strict

adherence to neutrality.<sup>48</sup> As Víctor Moráles Lezcano suggests, any other policy promised nothing more than chaos.<sup>49</sup>

Denied by its weakness any genuinely substantive role in world affairs, various Spanish governments after the war with the United States concentrated on Spain's last major holdings in North Africa. The political goal of the military fixation was simple, to play on the illusion of empire and feeling of nationalism in an attempt to whip up emotions that might translate into a minimal level of national solidarity and political support.<sup>50</sup> On the whole, however, the manipulative effort was a spectacular failure. Like many of the political leaders who would deal with the issue of NATO membership, many during this period were simply out of touch with the substance of mass opinion. The Spanish populace remained, by and large, singularly unmoved by the saber rattling and calls to glory. The adventures were not without some important effects. During the early part of the 20th century Spain launched several expeditions against rebellious tribes, expeditions that formed the sole military experience of young officers like Franco (who served, sometimes for extended periods, between 1912 and 1925).<sup>51</sup> Disaster was the normal result of Spain's involvement, an unfortunate tendency exemplified by the 1921 massacre of thousands of Spanish troops. As Payne argues, these foreign set-backs provoked a "more severe political crisis than had anarchosyndicalist revolutionism."<sup>52</sup>

### From Oblivion to Collapse

By the end of the 1920's, the previously tolerable Primo de Rivera dictatorship was increasingly unpopular. The global depression that began in 1929 created a new set of urgent demands to which the dictatorship was unable to effectively respond. The year 1930 saw General Primo de Rivera's dismissal by King Alfonso XIII. In 1931, bowing to the results of municipal elections, King Alfonso XIII fled Spain, though he refused to formally abdicate. His departure led to the installation of a republic. Spain's second attempt at republican government was only

marginally more successful than its first, and the consequences of its ultimate failure were extremely more profound than those connected to the previous collapse of republicanism.

During the life of the Second Republic, domestic social and economic policy lurched violently between left and right in response to the ideological character of whatever loose partisan coalition held power. The extreme alternations between coalitions were made almost inevitable by the "peculiar" and hyper-sensitive electoral system adopted by the Republic.<sup>33</sup> The net-effect was that the Republic was able to do just enough to anger important sectors of society but not enough to deal effectively with Spain's festering problems. While under the Republic Spain had become "a free, open, and democratic country ... permitting maximal expression and mobilization", that achievement was not, in and of itself, sufficient.<sup>34</sup> Structural conditions had not developed in synchronization with political conditions, a lag that produced a "fundamental contradiction between advanced cultural and institutional-juridical norms on the one hand and a weak, backward social economic structure on the other."<sup>35</sup> The profound dissonance bred a profound dissensus.

Put simply, more Spaniards (on the right, the left, and in the center) valued their particular ideological and partisan agendas than they valued the continued existence of the Republic itself. The construction of democratic institutions without the concurrent transformation of social and economic conditions resulted in the open proliferation of mutually antagonistic factions.<sup>36</sup> The rapidly deteriorating situation was a sad vindication of Madison's thesis in 'Federalist 10'. That is, the introduction of liberty feeds political, social, and economic factionalism just like oxygen feeds fire. Without structural stops on the competition between factions, the Republic could not last. Spain split along ideological, socio-economic, religious, and regionalist lines. By July 1936, the Republic faced what turned out to be its last crisis.

The events of, and leading up to, the outbreak of civil war in Spain are well-known. The conspirators acted after the razor-slim reelection of a leftist coalition in an increasing spiral of violence: violence highlighted by the murder of the prominent conservative José Calvo-Sotelo (whose nephew would take Spain into NATO some forty five years later) by leftist paramilitary and police operatives. The military uprising of July 18, 1936 did not come as any great surprise as conspiracies and proto-conspiracies against the Republic had flourished for years: indeed as early as 1932 serious plots against the democratic regime had been discovered.<sup>57</sup> The length and devastation of war that followed the anti-democratic uprising certainly was a surprise. Unlike the outcome suggested by previous pronunciamientos, the uprising of 1936 failed to secure a quick victory. The defenders of the Second Republic (for a variety of reasons) resisted in large numbers. The early clash of defenders and opponents of the Republic quickly deteriorated into full-scale war. The events of the civil war and afterwards introduced many of the fundamental realities that shaped the evolution of the NATO membership issue decades later.

From the beginning of the conflict there was an important international dimension connected to the Spanish Civil War. The connection was both coincidental and real. As a matter of coincidence, the myriad social and ideological divisions within Spain reflected the divisions within, and between, other European countries. As a practical matter, the conflict was abetted by, and played an important role in, the foreign policies of the European great powers. That said, however, the Spanish war was fundamentally a Spanish affair. That the war became more internationalized and foreign influence became significant is true, but (as one author points out) "no one intervened in Spain until the Spaniards themselves requested intervention."<sup>58</sup> That said, Stanley Payne is correct in arguing that it was both fanned and sustained by the "increasingly unstable international conditions" of the late 1930's.<sup>59</sup> Years after the conclusion of the war in Spain, this international aspect of the conflict would have significant repercussions for the



leadership in Spain and elsewhere. In a very real sense, the origins of many aspects of the NATO issue lie in the 1936-1939 self-destruction of Spain.

As Goldstone points out, the evolution of a coup into a civil war resulted in the creation of two Spains; the center-left republic with its capital in Madrid, and the deeply conservative military dictatorship.<sup>60</sup> Befitting parallel political systems, two distinct foreign policies were formulated and pursued. For the Spanish republic, the chief diplomatic goal centered on securing political and (especially) military assistance from the democracies (primarily Great Britain and France). These democracies sought to contain the war, sensing in it the seeds of a wider European conflagration and the possible replication of the 1914-1918 holocaust. The fate of the Spanish republic was of less concern (especially if that republic was serious in implementing its increasingly radical social and economic rhetoric).<sup>61</sup> The USSR quickly moved to make good some of the Republic's requests, while energetically acting to strengthen the pro-Moscow forces among the pro-Republic coalition. For their part, the rebels sought diplomatic recognition and material aid from the friendly nations of Germany and Italy. Such recognition and aid was not slow in coming.

During the course of the conflict the international ties of each side were of marked importance. If they did not serve to create the conflict, they certainly had a significant effect both on the course of combat and the character of the competing sides. Soviet assistance certainly affected the balance of power in the pro-republic coalition. And Robert H. Whealey has convincingly argued that Nazi and Fascist help to the Nationalist side (aid ranging from airlift to air attack) was aimed not just at a rebel victory but the ascendancy of the Franquist clique within the anti-democratic coalition.<sup>62</sup> That predominance became a fact after the September 29, 1939 promotion of Franco to sole control of the rebellion.

The international ties had repercussions after the end of hostilities. Franco's virtually unquestioned position of authority, and the looming Nationalist victory, led to a considerable tightening of the relationship between Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the future Spanish regime. On March 26, 1939, Francisco Franco signed the 'Anti-Comintern Pact'; the treaty basis for the Axis that made Franquist Spain an ally of Hitler, Mussolini, and the militaristic regime in Tokyo. While the agreement did not make Spain a full-fledged military partner, obligated to automatically support her allies with concrete military support, "it did commit Spain to political cooperation with Germany, Italy, and Japan ... Spain gave her cooperation and took part in Anti-Comintern conferences."<sup>63</sup>

The Anti-Comintern Pact was supplemented, on March 31, 1936, with a 'Pact of Friendship' which guaranteed each signator that the other would, in the case of war, maintain a friendly neutrality.<sup>64</sup> Combined with the 'Iberian Pact', signed with Salazar's Portugal (also March 31, 1936), these agreements tied Spain formally with the major totalitarian and authoritarian powers of Europe and Asia. In May 1939 Spain withdrew from the League of Nations. An editorial in the periodical Arriba described the international organization, now fully in its death agonies, as nothing more than the "naive delirium" of Woodrow Wilson.<sup>65</sup>

#### From Collapse to International Ostracism

Following its victory in April 1939, the Franco regime passed through several more or less distinct stages in its relationship with its Axis partners. The state of that relationship was both a reflection of, and a variable affecting, the balance of power within the victorious coalition. The relationship was extremely close, perhaps too close to assign any definite flow of causality. The importance of internal politics on the formulation of foreign policy, and vice versa, grew from the nature of the alliance Franco had led to victory. While Franco's ultimate authority

within this victorious coalition was clear, he did not (especially early on) completely control the activities of the various factions.

In their study of Spanish politics, Carr and Fusi identify several political "families" as the basis of Franco's attainment and maintenance of power.<sup>66</sup> These factions that provided the 'muscle' upon which Franco depended were a disparate group that included the military (especially the army); various monarchist groups (including both those who supported a return of the family exiled in 1931 and reactionary Carlists seeking the establishment of a competitive line); the landed aristocracy, and the Roman Catholic church. The deeply conservative hierarchy had considered the 1936 revolt and subsequent war to be a genuine crusade in support of the Church. Upon his victory, for example, Franco had received an almost gushing letter from the Spanish primate, Cardinal Goma, congratulating the Nationalist side on its glorious victory "over the enemies of Spain."<sup>67</sup> In many instances, the various members of this ruling coalition were, both as a matter of history and abstract ideology, committed to sharply divergent visions of Spain's proper organization.<sup>68</sup>

One major political family supporting the dictatorship, the fascist-inspired 'Falange Espanol' (which, on April 9, 1937, had been ordered formally fused with the Carlist political organization, as well as a rival fascist group) had three distinguishing characteristics. First, of all the members of the ruling coalition, it was consistently the most contentious, managing at one time or another to alienate every one, especially the Church, the various monarchists, and the commercial and landed aristocracy. While some members of the church hierarchy did embrace the doctrines of the Falange, most of its demands, as well as its basic secular orientation, were too much for the reactionary church. The group was unclear on the issue of monarchy, and the industrial and landed elite could not tolerate the calls for genuine worker participation in management and widespread land reform.<sup>69</sup>

Second, by cultivating extremely close ties with the other members of the Axis, the Falange became the only member of the ruling elite to have important foreign connections and foreign policy consequences. The Falange represented a conduit to the world outside of Spain, a world that was (especially post-September 1, 1939) extremely complicated. Third, the Falange represented a particularly Spanish version of fascism and, beyond that, the particular social, economic, and political vision of its founder, José Antonio Primo de Rivera (son of the dictator dismissed in 1930 and known almost universally as simply 'José Antonio'). That we can speak of a 'particularly Spanish version of fascism', or observe that the Falange was a manifestation of the vision of José Antonio, is possible because of the infuriatingly fluid nature of fascism as an ideology.

While no ideology is airtight, fascism is particularly jumbled, boasting no central body of defining works nor any genuinely authoritative oracle. As Paul M. Hayes notes, "fascists had no Marx."<sup>70</sup> We can focus on a few very general characteristics marking most fascist thinking: glorification of the state, dismissal of the individual or the socio-economic class as the basis of society, violence as a positive good, irrationality as the basis for politics, elitism, and the importance of a perceived racial and/or national destiny.<sup>71</sup> On the whole, however, fascism represented "a strange mixture of theories, ranging from the radical to the reactionary and encompassing ideas about race, religion, economics, social welfare, and morality which are at the very least dissonant."<sup>72</sup>

The Falange had been preceded in Spain by several small proto-fascist groups, as well as by more general strains of thought exemplified by the romantically reactionary Carlist movement and embraced by many of the politicized members of the military.<sup>73</sup> Programmatically, the Falange, as Ricardo Chueca has argued, stressed three basic points: a romantic nationalism, a virulent anti-Marxist attitude, and a complementary rejection of modern

capitalism and political liberalism. Nationalism represented the "basic ingredient" to Falangist ideology, the "fundamental motor": especially as summed up in the idea of a renewed "empire" bound together by 'hispanidad' and economic autarky.<sup>74</sup> Political liberalism, capitalism, and Marxism were excoriated for threatening the organic unity of the nation, for introducing the idea of society as essentially divided and competitive rather than unified and synergistic.<sup>75</sup>

The real essence of the Falange and its vision, however, was José Antonio himself. On the most visceral level, as Hugh Thomas has argued, the Falange represented a particular vision derived from the vague yearnings of José Antonio. These yearnings took the form of a "Father-Savior fixation", essentially "the longing for a new Solon who will not only abolish futile democratic striving but do this without even an apparatus of government."<sup>76</sup> The model for this 20th century Spanish Solon was, according to Thomas, José Antonio's father, General Primo de Rivera. Thomas concludes that José Antonio's fervent "attempt to recreate his father is the starting point of Spanish fascism."<sup>77</sup>

How genuinely 'fascist' José Antonio and the Falange were is difficult to assess. It turns, as Pike correctly observes, almost completely on "a matter of definition."<sup>78</sup> What is clear, however, is the important role the Falange played both in the 1936 uprising against the Republic and the subsequent diplomacy of the new dictatorship. The Falange brought at least three unique attributes to the exercise. First, the Falange provided the uprising with intensely motivated and deeply loyal soldiers moved by true belief rather than routine obedience or naked economic opportunism. Second, it provided the uprising with an at least vaguely positive and substantive ideological agenda. As Beevor points out, a coup can operate in an ideological vacuum, "a civil war, on the other hand, demands a cause, a banner, and a manifesto."<sup>79</sup>

One strength of the Falange in this area was its attractive ambivalence: conservative enough on many issues to attract the anti-democratic right, rhetorically progressive enough in

other areas to attract the dispossessed. As Hayes points out, the Falange was on record as promising to put an end to "the class struggle, parliamentary democracy, separatism, and social injustice."<sup>10</sup> Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, the Falange alone had direct international linkages and importance. The Falange served as a natural bridge to Franco's most important foreign supporters, Germany and Italy. Such a linkage was facilitated, in part at least, by the idiosyncratic tendencies of fascism and its lack of a recognized center. Unlike the doctrinal hairsplitting on the left, the fascist powers were willing to parlay with any group close to their position. The Falange was close enough for Hitler and Mussolini.

The relationship between the Falange, the Axis, and the Franco regime was always complex, but in its basic outline it reflected the porous nature of the relationship between Spanish domestic and foreign policy. The guiding principle was rather simple: when the Axis powers were riding high on a wave of seemingly unstoppable success (and Franco needed powerful friends) the Falange (as their principle supporter, indeed their veritable mouthpiece) prospered. Franco leaned on the Falangists and rewarded their support, both with governmental positions and more symbolic honors.<sup>11</sup> When the fortunes of Hitler and Mussolini declined so did the influence wielded by the Falange. This balancing act was reflected in the several periods of Spain's relationship with the warring powers between 1939 and 1945.

As Whitaker points out, Spain's pro-Axis period can be divided into several phases. The first of these, the phase of 'friendly neutrality', stretching from the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in March 1939 to the fall of France to the Nazi's in June 1940. While on September 4, 1939 the Franco regime had issued a brief official declaration of neutrality (referring to the expanding conflict as "unfortunate"), the previous agreements, as well as Franco's ideological predispositions and well-developed sense of political opportunism, meant a less than balanced neutrality could be expected from Madrid. While the populace was ordered to observe a strict

neutrality, the Spanish government did not.<sup>82</sup> The second phase (June 1940-February 1941) was a period of rapidly rising expectations and emerging national ambitions on the part of the Spanish regime. In response to the high stock of the Axis, 1940 saw the appointment of Franco's brother-in-law (Ramon Serrano Suner) as foreign minister. Serrano Suner was an enthusiastic Falange member and an unabashed promoter of the Axis cause.

Before becoming foreign minister he had served as interior minister and as the regime's minister for information and propaganda. During a June 1939 visit to Rome, Serrano Suner had slavishly complimented Benito Mussolini for establishing nothing less than the "reincarnated Empire" in the form of fascist Italy.<sup>83</sup> Once he was appointed to the office, zealous followers of Serrano Suner dug deep into the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Their influence would be amazingly long-lived.<sup>84</sup> The fascist functionaries took every opportunity to implement their particular vision of Spain's national destiny in the international arena. At one point, evidently in an effort to guard both racial purity and Spain's national security, the foreign minister officially forbade Spanish diplomats serving abroad from marrying foreigners, an unprecedented demand.<sup>85</sup>

A little more than two months after the fall of France, Franco met with Hitler at a railway station on the border between Spain and France.<sup>86</sup> The summit had been preceded by a visit to Madrid by Heinrich Himmler. The Spanish dictator's basic willingness to join what was a wildly successful war seems clear. Arthur Whitaker, for example, dismisses subsequent revisionist claims that Franco was engaged in some elaborate ruse in which he feigned sympathy for his Axis partners only in order to extract maximum benefits as simply a "myth."<sup>87</sup> Pollack and Hunter agree that, whatever the specifics of the arrangements, Franco was committed both to an Axis victory and to helping bring that victory about.<sup>88</sup> Franco was keen to join the Axis war effort, but not on an unconditional basis and without compensation. As with Spain's later

relationship with NATO, membership was at the center of a storm of conflicting peripheral issues.

These conditions and compensations took two forms. First, infrastructural demands (for oil, industrial equipment, advanced weapons, ammunition, food etc.) intended to enhance not just Spain's war-fighting ability, but also the political viability of a still insecure regime forced to rely more on coercion than economic success to remain intact. The second set of Spanish demands were territorial and intended not just to secure valuable property (the value of most of the territory was marginal at best) but to cover the regime in some measure of military glory and achieve some sort of rectification for past injustices.

While not as expansive and relentlessly bombastic as the demands of the other Axis partners, the Falange-inspired vision of international justice did include a series of territorial 'revindicaciones': territorial adjustments aimed at righting old wrongs and buttressing a newly expanded Spanish sphere of influence. The territorial demands presented to Hitler by Franco were a mixture of classic claims and newer targets of interest.<sup>89</sup> Chief among the classic claims was, of course, the recovery of Gibraltar, seized by Great Britain in 1704 (and made a part of the Empire by the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht). In terms of his territorial demands Franco felt himself to be on strong ground. During World War One, Germany had eagerly promised substantial territorial compensation (including Gibraltar, Morocco, and Portugal) in return for Spain's active support.<sup>90</sup> There was no reason to believe in 1940 that things would be different.

For their part, however, the Germans were not, at least at this early stage, absolutely determined to secure Spanish military intervention in a war that seemed nearly over.<sup>91</sup> German goals were rather more restricted and aimed at using Spain to guarantee that the seemingly inevitable Axis victory did in fact occur. They sought two things. First, they wanted the Spaniards to continue to practice their rather selective neutrality. The unbalanced neutrality



allowed extensive German use of Spain (for example to refuel submarines that stalked shipping in the Atlantic and Mediterranean) while not providing a clear-cut excuse for an attack on Spain. Second, Hitler wanted Franco's agreement to a planned military operation (code-named 'Operation Felix'), a Nazi attack across Spain on British forces in Gibraltar. In return for its support, Spain would eventually receive Gibraltar. The nine hour meeting produced nothing but ill-will. The Germans were not willing to make the territorial concessions in Africa desired by Spain and Franco did not trust the Germans on the matter of Gibraltar. The official communique issued after the meeting is notable for its brevity, remarking only that the two leaders had met and exchanged ideas in an atmosphere of cordiality and camaraderie.<sup>92</sup>

The ill-will of Hendaye produced a third, uncomfortable, phase in Spanish relations with the other members of the Axis. The chill lasted until June 1941. That month saw a reenergizing of the relationship stemming from the devastating German surprise attack on the communist motherland, the USSR. Prompted by his own anti-socialist inclinations, and by the glee of the Falange, Franco quickly moved to "throw off all pretense of neutrality."<sup>93</sup> It was a completely new war. Foreign Minister Serrano Suner led the way with a fire and brimstone speech shortly after the initiation of 'Operation Barbarossa'. Speaking to a crowd of Madrilenos the foreign minister bluntly declared: "Russia is guilty! Guilty for our civil war. Guilty in the death of José Antonio, our founder." Serrano Suner concluded that, "the extermination of Russia is demanded by history and the destiny of Europe." The assembly concluded with the singing of the Falangist anthem 'Cara al Sol'.<sup>94</sup>

The Caudillo was not far behind his foreign minister. In a July 17, 1941 speech to the 'National Council of the National Movement' (the umbrella organization of pro-regime groups to which the Falange belonged), Franco left no doubt as to his position concerning the new European war. "For twenty years, Franco declared "the world has endured the criminal agitation

of Russian communism, rare is the country that has managed to escape its divisive work."<sup>95</sup> And, the dictator concluded, despite the power of "communist gold and the Jewish press" one fact was inescapable: "the Allies have lost the war ... German arms are leading the battle ... in which the blood of our youth is going to be mingled with that of our comrades of the Axis, as a living expression of our solidarity ... our Movement achieves in the world today an unsuspected vindication."<sup>96</sup> In Franco's view, the new war represented a "battle for which Europe and Christianity have for so many years longed." Franco also issued a clear warning to the United States to stay out of the war, predicting disaster if it did not.<sup>97</sup> American intervention would serve to open the continent to irresistible attacks by the "European powers" (a group to which Spain now presumably belonged).<sup>98</sup>

The "mingled" blood referred to by Franco was tied to the official announcement of the departure of the Falange-dominated 'Blue Division': a military unit made up of volunteers committed to the destruction of the USSR and commanded by General Munoz Grandes.<sup>99</sup> The offer of volunteers had been made by Serrano Suner to German ambassador Von Stohrer on June 22, 1941 and, after consultation with the foreign ministry in Berlin, accepted three days later by the German representative in Madrid.<sup>100</sup> The Falange paper 'Arriba' greeted the formation of the force enthusiastically and confidently declared that the deployment of the Blue Division to the Eastern front to fight alongside the soldiers of the Third Reich would serve to "reveal the destiny of our generation" and conferred upon the volunteers the title of "The Chosen."<sup>101</sup>

Like most Spanish military experience after the age of conquest, the Blue Division ended in disaster. The initial force numbered 18,694.<sup>102</sup> The Spanish soldiers, most highly motivated anti-communist Falangists trained for about a month in Germany before making a forty-five day march to the front. The Spanish were assigned a twenty five mile stretch of front around the besieged Soviet city of Novogorod. On February 10, 1943 (what came to be known among

Spaniards as 'Miercoles Negro'--- 'Black Wednesday') a massive Soviet attack (supported by up to 800 artillery pieces) broke the siege of Novogorod and, in the process, effectively destroyed the Spanish division. Ultimately over 5,000 Spaniards died in service to the ideological vision of the Falange and in an effort to advance German military interests.<sup>103</sup>

The dispatch of the Blue Division represented a phase of non-belligerency, a legally ambiguous state that most interpreted as the preparation for a Spanish entry in the war. German diplomats familiar with the Spanish situation were extremely optimistic concerning Franco's entry into the war. Ambassador von Stohrer wired Berlin with a list of positive signs; including a Spanish-British clash near Gibraltar and the growing criticism within the Spanish military over Franco's decision to send an essentially Falange paramilitary unit to the Russian front instead of a regular army unit.<sup>104</sup>

The massive blows inflicted on the USSR, coupled with the Japanese success following December 7, 1941 seemed to guarantee an Axis victory. Nineteen forty-two, however, saw the Axis momentum slow, with significant set-backs for Germany and Japan at Stalingrad, El Alamein, and Midway. In the summer and fall of 1942 preparations for 'Operation Torch' (the allied invasion of North Africa) sent a wave of panic through the Spanish regime. Many in government refused to believe that North Africa was the actual target for the invasion and insisted that the ultimate goal of Torch was the conquest of Spain and the forcible removal of the Franquist dictatorship.<sup>105</sup> On November 16, 1942 Franco placed the country on military alert for fear of an attack.<sup>106</sup> That fear remained until an invasion eve message to Franco from President Franklin Roosevelt assured the dictator that the Allies intended to respect Spain's official neutrality.<sup>107</sup> The subtle shift in the fortunes of war did not slip past Franco. The General's cautious nature, and often underrated military acumen, began to lead him to the painful

conclusion that the Axis crusade would ultimately fail. Fearing future reprisals for his blatant indiscretions, Franco began to distance Spain from its Axis partners.

The preemptive move had two dimensions. Internally, Franco began an attempt to isolate the Falange, promoting the members and agendas of its rivals (especially the monarchists). The task was not a simple one and the Falange leadership strongly resisted demotion. Tension between the still fervent Serrano Suner and Franco increased until the former was dismissed as foreign minister.<sup>108</sup> Externally, he began to craft a foreign policy "devoted almost impartially to working both sides of the street."<sup>109</sup> By the end of 1942, even with the Blue Division still in action, Spain stopped attending Anti-Comintern meetings and relations between Madrid and Berlin began to deteriorate. Correctly sensing that Spain was preparing to switch allegiances, Hitler pursued two tracks. First, he increased the diplomatic pressure on Spain to enter the war on Germany's side. Second, plans were finalized for the potential forcible occupation of northern, and perhaps all of, Spain ('Operation Gisela') in order to deny her to the Allies. In response, the Allies made preparations to preempt the Germans.<sup>110</sup> Someone seemed destined to occupy Spain.

In April 1943, Spain offered herself as a mediator between the Allies and Germany. In a letter to Winston Churchill (who was not, as his post-war words and deeds would reveal, irrevocably anti-Franco) the Spanish dictator emphasized his desire for good relations between the two nations and offered Spanish assistance in a Western war against communism. The offer was refused. Churchill advised Franco that he did not "think it likely that Spain will be invited to join the future world organizations."<sup>111</sup> In October 1943 Spain signed a new 'Iberian Pact' with Portugal, which served both to shore up relations with the other occupant of the peninsula as well implicitly linking Spain with Great Britain and Brazil, both allies of Portugal.<sup>112</sup>

In November 1943 an order was issued to the controlled press comparing the Spanish regime with the governments of Germany and Italy. The new line was that Spain was not a fraternal fascist nation, but, rather, a nation based "exclusively on principles, political norms, and strictly national philosophies."<sup>113</sup> That line was not universally followed, however, with that portion of the press controlled by the Falange and Falange sympathizers (which at times operated with surprising independence) stubbornly dragging its feet on repudiating its faltering heroes.<sup>114</sup> All through 1944 and 1945 Spain made futile diplomatic advances to Great Britain and the United States, in the case of the latter even offering to smooth relations between it and those Latin American regimes with which it had influence. Ironically, as Whitaker observes, "the dictator who had begun as a suitor to the Axis ended up a suitor to the powers he had offered to help the Axis destroy."<sup>115</sup> With the final destruction of the Axis, Spain braced for the certain retaliation of the victorious Allies.

#### Conclusions: Themes in Spanish Foreign Policy

The preceding account, as simplistic as it is, does point towards several themes concerning foreign policy and Spain. These themes, while rooted in the sometimes distant past, directly, if in a subtle fashion, affected the evolution of the NATO membership issue. The first of these themes concerns Spain's clearly split orientation towards the world, an indecision over where to focus its attention rooted in the cumbersome (and incomplete) process of unifying the nation in the 15th century. While Fernando brought a European and Mediterranean focus, it had to coexist with a North African and Atlantic orientation connected with Castilla. The Spanish-Austrian connection following Carlos I's rise to power exacerbated a schizophrenia that would manifest itself in the competing visions, and policy predispositions, of Arabidad, Hispanidad, Europeanization, and Atlanticism.

Second, and not unrelated, from early on there is a jumbled self-definition containing important elements of national uniqueness, destiny and the fear of contamination by the outside world. While a sense of being different is part of nationhood (as well as more than a bit of xenophobia and a sense of mission), Spain was particularly prone to the attitude. As a senior American diplomat who served in Spain for years once remarked, more than most Europeans, Spaniards (of all ideological stripes) possessed a "deep-seated sense of national uniqueness."

Third, the almost unbreakable linkage of domestic politics and foreign policy marking Spanish thinking, a connection that is nicely summarized in Charles H. Cunningham's 1917 observation that "Spain only becomes concerned in the affairs of Europe when they become a part of her own domestic life."<sup>116</sup> Fourth, the ongoing split between the members of the political elite, a deep and persistent fracture that was coupled with a massive amount of mass indifference. While foreign policy issues repeatedly stirred up trouble on the elite level, for the average Spaniard "neither foreign nor international affairs have any interest except, perhaps, as a vague something described to them by their political or ecclesiastical leaders ... the majority of the inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula may be entirely left out of the discussion."<sup>117</sup> In the post-war period, including the years following the creation of NATO in 1949, these themes would be of great importance in structuring Spanish foreign policy.

NOTES

1. See Joseph S. Tulchin's 'Epilogue' to Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (Editors), Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 161. In a November 1, 1981 interview with the publication Ya, Felipe González remarked that: "We have very little to be in agreement with the United States, the last country with which we were at war". The statement is quoted in Jose Luis Gutierrez and Amando de Miguel, La Ambición de César: Un Retrato Político y Humano de Felipe González (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1989), p. 321. Macridis' and Brown's views on the importance of understanding the historical element of political phenomena are presented in "Comparative Analysis: Methods and Concepts" in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Editors), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), pp. 9-10, 13-14.
2. John Fraser Ramsey, Spain: The Rise of the First World Power (University: University of Alabama Press, 1973).
3. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-37.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-78.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-147.
9. On the stultifying social and political effects of the Inquisition in Spain see Peter de Rosa, Vicars of Christ (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988), pp. 170-172, 175.
10. John Fraser Ramsey, Spain: The Rise of the First World Power, p. 320.
11. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 31-35.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Dorothy Gies McGuigan, The Hapsburgs (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 89.
15. See John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill, John Buckler, A History of World Societies (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), p. 533.

16. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, pp. 37-39.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 320.
19. John A. Crow, Spain: The Root and the Flower, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 165-167.
20. J. H. Elliot, Spain and Its World: 1500-1700 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 219.
21. Ibid., p. 225.
22. Fraser, p. 321.
23. Ibid.
24. Kennedy, p. 33.
25. Fraser, p. 323.
26. Ibid., p. 321.
27. John A. Crow, Spain: The Root and the Flower, p. 442.
28. Kennedy, p. 44.
29. Ibid., P. 39.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 40.
32. Ibid.
33. Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 3.
34. Kennedy, p. 41.
35. Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Foreign Policy of the Socialist Government" in Stanley G. Payne (editor), The Politics of Democratic Spain (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), p. 199.
36. A good discussion of the period of French occupation is provided by Michael Glover, Legacy of Glory: The Bonaparte Kingdom of Spain, 1808-1813 (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1971).



37. Edouard de Blaye, Franco and the Politics of Spain (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 15.
38. Stanley G. Payne, "Representative Government in Spain: The Historical Background" in Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio Majal-Leon (editors), Spain at the Polls 1977, 1979, and 1982, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), p. 2.
39. On the 1898 war see G.J.A. O'Toole, The Spanish War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984).
40. Stanley Payne, "Representative Government in Spain: The Historical Background" in Spain at the Polls 1977, 1979, and 1982, p. 4.
41. Stanley Payne, the Franco Regime: 1936-1975, p. 9.
42. Crow, p. 284.
43. On the dictatorship of General Primio de Rivera see James H. Rial, Revolution From Above, (Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1977).
44. Indalecio Prieto is quoted in Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975, p. 29.
45. Victor Alba, Transition in Spain: From Franco to Democracy, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 58-59.
46. Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 6.
47. Charles H. Cunningham, "Spain and the War", American Political Science Review, Volume 11, Number 3, August 1917, pp. 432-436.
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49. Víctor Moráles Lezcano, "Neutralidad y Aliancismo en Espana: 1904-1945" in Hipólito delaTorre Gómez, Espana, Portugal, y la OTAN, (Merida: Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, 1989), p. 53.
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52. Payne, "Representative Government in Spain: The Historical Background", p. 4.

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55. Payne, Representative Government in Spain: The Historical Background, p. 1.
56. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975. p. 87.
57. Ibid., p. 99.
58. Robert Goldstone, The Civil War in Spain, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), p. 69.
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60. Robert Goldstone, The Civil War in Spain, p. 69.
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67. Documentos, p. 10.
68. Carr and Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 168.
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70. Paul M. Hayes, Fascism, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), p. 19.

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72. Paul M Hayes, Fascism, p. 17.
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74. Ricardo Chueca, El Fascismo en los Comienzos del Régimen de Franco, (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1983) pp. 17, 43-51.
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81. Carr and Fusi, p. 168.
82. Whitaker, Spain and Defense of the West, p. 7. The 1939 Spanish declaration of neutrality is reprinted in Documentos, p. 26.
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85. Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 10.
86. On the Hendaye meeting see Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), pp. 133-134.
87. Whitaker, p. 3.
88. Pollack and Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy, p. 7.
89. Ibid., p. 6.

90. Cunningham, "Spain and the War", p. 424.
91. Víctor Morales Lezcana, Historia de la No-Beligerancia Española Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Manicomunidad de Cabildos de las Palmas, 1979), pp. 17-110.
92. Documentos, pp. 66-67.
93. Whitaker, p. 10.
94. Documentos, pp. 101-102.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
96. See *Ibid.*, p. 119 and Whitaker, p. 10.
97. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975, pp. 282-283.
98. Documentos, p. 118.
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100. Documentos, pp. 104-105.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.
102. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975, p. 282.
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104. Documentos, pp. 108-110.
105. George Hills, Franco: The Man and His Nation, pp. 368-369.
106. Documentos, pp. 131-132.
107. Hills, p. 368. See also, Ernest K. Lindley and Edward Weintal, "How we dealt with Spain: American Diplomacy at Madrid, 1940-1944", Harper's Magazine, Volume 190, December 1944.
108. Ramon Garriga, Franco-Serrano Suner: Un Drama Político, (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1986), pp. 133-143.
109. Whitaker, p. 11.
110. Hills, p. 371.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 376.
112. Whitaker, p. 115.

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114. Hills, p. 372.
115. Whitaker, p. 20.
116. Cunningham, p. 422.
117. Ibid.

CHAPTER III  
SPAIN, THE WORLD, AND NATO, 1945-1976

Introduction

Spanish foreign policy in the years up to 1945 illustrates the observation by 19th century German historian Leopold von Ranke that "it is natural and inevitable that external and internal affairs interact with each other."<sup>1</sup> The basic relationship was relatively straightforward. Domestic political considerations (e.g., the desire to restructure internal conditions to enhance the viability of the Franquist regime and the exigencies of balancing the power and influence of the various members of the ruling coalition) led naturally to a series of foreign policy choices, exemplified by the relationship between Franquist Spain and the other Axis powers. As has been argued, foreign policy options during the period were judged to a great degree by their potential internal political consequences. Coming out of the war the interaction would persist. All major foreign policy questions over the next decades had a major domestic political element to them.

The relationship was by no means unidirectional. The ongoing evolution of external political conditions also led naturally to the reordering of internal Spanish political relationships. The case of the Falange is illustrative of the point. By arguing so vociferously for a Spanish foreign policy that ended with Spain backing the wrong horse, the Falange mortgaged itself to the fate of Hitler and Mussolini. The Axis defeat allowed Franco, and those more conventionally conservative elements in the ruling coalition, to tame the Falange. The Falange's basic problem was, as Stanley Payne observes, that the "sun of fascism had set in Europe and the continued existence of the party prejudiced the regime in the eyes of the victorious

democracies."<sup>2</sup> The character of the regime was modified (at least cosmetically) in an attempt to preempt Allied reprisals and reflect the new realities. For example, on July 17, 1945 the 'Fueros de los Espanoles' was unveiled in an attempt to put a democratic patina on the regime. The eclipse of the Falange by conventional nationalists, monarchists, and Catholic forces was an attempt to stave off Allied retribution. Its success was the result of "the political skill of General Franco" in maneuvering political groupings in and out of prominence.<sup>3</sup>

There was one last level. If external political reality demanded that internal Spanish politics be reordered, internal political reality (i.e., the ongoing necessity to balance the various elements of the ruling coalition) set a limit on how far it could go. It was an extremely delicate balancing act. As a result, Franco's first postwar cabinet did feature two Falange members: if only to deter too much freethinking among others in the coalition.<sup>4</sup> The external consequences of these internal realities were to fundamentally affect Spain's relationship with the United States, Europe, and those organizations (like NATO) which represented the emerging western consensus. These consequences were the legacy that post-Franquist Spain would receive as it dealt with the issue of NATO membership over the next thirty years. As I hope to show, for both Spain and the members of the Alliance, Spanish membership in NATO was as much a question of domestic politics as it was security policy.

#### From Ostracism to Conditional Acceptance

Spring and Summer of 1945 found Franco and his regime in a position teetering on disaster. Despite the fevered internal maneuvering to represent the dictatorship as a new entity, Allied intervention to destroy the regime was still a real possibility. Domestic revolt, stimulated by Spanish exiles and supported by Spain's enemies, seemed equally possible. Anti-Franco leaders (from all parts of the ideological spectrum), many in exile since 1939, made plans to return. But, as Pollack and Graham observe, even with the Spanish economy in a shambles, the nation

virtually defenseless in military terms, and his regime almost universally vilified, "the sense of opportunity that had helped Franco throughout his military and political career did not desert him."<sup>5</sup> Deprived of the benefits of a victory by the Axis, Franco played another card: anticommunism.

As mentioned, Franco had as early as 1943 mentioned the possibility of an anticommunist alliance with Great Britain, the United States, and Germany aimed at destroying the USSR. On August 21, 1944 the government-controlled press was ordered to distinguish between the two "fronts" to the war, that against the USSR (which was endorsed) and that against the "Anglo-Yankees" (which was deplored), and to begin playing up the fundamentally anticommunist essence of the regime, its credentials in the fight against Bolshevism.<sup>6</sup> When the victory over the Axis in 1945 did not lead to an immediate collapse of the East-West alliance, the rhetoric coming out of Madrid began to border on the surreal. While Franco's position as (in Juan Pablo Fusi's words) "a man of the Cold War ahead of schedule" was not immediately profitable, the policy would pay dividends down the line.<sup>7</sup> In the short-run, however, Spain could not avoid retribution.

The groundwork for Spain's brutal postwar ostracism had been laid as far back as 1943. During the Teheran conference, Stalin had suggested that postwar territorial compensation for the Allies ought to come in part from Spanish holdings, though no decisions were taken.<sup>8</sup> At the 1945 Potsdam conference, Allied policy toward Spain was to be finalized. The substance of that policy was a sharply divisive issue. The issue pitted Churchill (before his return to Britain following Labour's overwhelming election victory) against Stalin, with President Harry Truman straddling the fence.<sup>9</sup> The spirited debate over the regime in Madrid at Potsdam turned on two issues: the origin of the Franquist regime and the policy that origin made proper. The conflict



of opinions concerning these two questions became apparent as early as the agenda-setting meeting.

Stalin argued strongly for what Hills has called the "simpliciste theory": the claim that the Franco regime was (despite cosmetic changes like demoting the Falange) unrepentantly fascist and, most important, purely the result of German and Italian intervention in the period 1936-1939 and not primarily internal Spanish conditions.<sup>10</sup> Stalin called for the immediate and complete diplomatic isolation of Spain, as well as subsequent sanctions strong enough to force the Franco regime out of power. In addition, he called for the formal recognition of, and support for, exiled opponents to Franco.<sup>11</sup> Churchill, by contrast, saw the regime as the result of primarily Spanish circumstances and felt that dealing with it was a complex matter. There was, he argued, "more to Spanish policy than drawing rude cartoons of Franco."<sup>12</sup>

In Churchill's view the collapse of Spanish democracy and the triumph of the Franquist dictatorship were unfortunate developments, but only coincidentally connected with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Beyond that, Churchill stuck to a strongly legalistic noninterventionism. Churchill argued that the Allies ought not "interfere in the internal affairs of a state with whom we differ."<sup>13</sup> Beyond the issues of national sovereignty and the principle of noninterference, Churchill argued, there was also a question of utility. That is, there was a great possibility that the anti-Franco measures would not have the intended effect: "considering that the Spaniards are proud and rather sensitive, such a step ... could have the effect of uniting the Spaniards around Franco, instead of making them move away from him."<sup>14</sup> Churchill also plead economic necessity for not disrupting the situation through intervention. In the case of Britain, he pointed out, "Spain supplies us with oranges, wine and other products."<sup>15</sup>

Truman was very open about his opposition to the Franquist regime, an opposition bordering on the personal. After all, he was the president that led the United States to final

victory over the Axis, a Mason and a Baptist, passing judgment on a dictatorship that had been aligned with Germany, Italy, and Japan and which persecuted Masons (a surreal obsession with Franco) and restricted Protestantism as a virtual heresy. There was also an element of guilt. Truman had very quickly come to regret his 1937 vote in the Senate for the arms embargo. He later observed that "Republican Spain was lost on account of the embargo."<sup>16</sup> All of that being true, he was still inclined in the end to side with Churchill in the matter of intervention. He confessed that, as much as he might dislike the regime in Madrid, as President, he had "no desire to take part in a Spanish civil war." Rather, he concluded, "we should be happy to recognize another government but I think that is a question for Spain."<sup>17</sup>

Stalin remained adamant: "You are very well aware that the Franco regime was imposed by Hitler and Mussolini and is their legacy. By destroying the Franco regime we shall be destroying the legacy of Hitler and Mussolini ... we should not lose sight of the fact that the democratic liberation of Europe implies certain obligations." Beyond that, he claimed, the Franco regime was not just an internal Spanish matter since the regime in Madrid represented a genuine "international threat."<sup>18</sup> At President Truman's suggestion, the decision was made to settle the issue at the ministerial level and adopt the position formulated there.<sup>19</sup> The policy discussions at that level were also marked by a "relentless bickering" that reflected the clear differences between the three powers and the subsequent public declaration on Spain was (in one historian's words) both "presentable and meaningless."<sup>20</sup>

Explicit and unmistakable condemnation of the Franco regime was absent and the major sanction agreed upon was an important, but limited, bit of diplomatic exclusion. Specifically, the August 2 declaration advised Spain that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would not "back any application that the present Spanish Government may file to become a member of the United Nations."<sup>21</sup> Two days later, the Spanish government dismissed the

surprisingly placid condemnation as "arbitrary and unjust" and the result of a "false climate created by the treacherous campaign of exiled reds and their foreign fellow-travellers."<sup>22</sup>

Franquist intransigence inevitably led to stronger measures. The first substantive blow against the regime came with the closing of the French border with Spain on March 1, 1946.<sup>23</sup> Three days later the United States, Great Britain, and France (the latter two nations once again asserting their traditional leadership in Spanish matters) issued a declaration tying Spain's admission into the United Nations to Franco's resignation, the dissolution of the Falange, and the holding of free elections to determine the dictator's successor. It is likely the first condition would have been adequate.<sup>24</sup> The process of erecting a diplomatic and economic wall around Spain began in earnest at the United Nations in the middle of March 1946 with the appointment of a special investigative committee to look into the swirl of charges being made against the nation and the Franco regime.<sup>25</sup> Many of the charges to be investigated were nothing short of fantastic. Old rumors from the war were resurrected (e.g., the Franco regime had placed explosives in orange shipments to Britain in the hopes of spreading demoralizing terror) and new accusations appeared.<sup>26</sup>

In April 1946, a motion sponsored by the government of Poland accused Spain of harboring nuclear ambitions. Specifically, it was asserted that Spain was engaged in the production of atomic bombs with the help of 2200 fugitive Nazi scientists working in a secret laboratory in a small town south of Madrid.<sup>27</sup> Spain was also said to be producing advanced long-range bombers to deliver the weapons, as well as jet-fighters and modern tanks at secret factories scattered across the nation. These weapons were intended to be used by a fascist army said to number 840,700: of which 250,000 were supposedly poised to strike into France across the Pyrenees.<sup>28</sup> The Soviet delegation repeatedly demanded that Spanish political and military leaders be seized and tried as war criminals—especially General Augustín Muñoz Grandes who

had led the Blue Division to disaster in Russia.<sup>29</sup> For his part, Munoz Grandes was spectacularly unrepentant, proudly wearing the Iron Cross bestowed on him by the Nazis for years after the war ended.<sup>30</sup>

On June 1, 1946 the United Nations officially branded Spain a "potential danger to world peace." On December 9, 1946 three separate votes were taken. The first, banning Spain from participation in any United Nations organization, passed 32-5. The second, breaking diplomatic contacts between the United Nations and Spain, passed 27-7. The third (and most important), recommending that member states downgrade relations with Spain and withdraw their ambassadors from Madrid, passed 34-6: with only Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru dissenting.<sup>31</sup> Franco was publicly defiant.

Speaking to a huge crowd in Madrid in December 1946, Franco declared that: "not even an international organization ... has the right to involve itself in what is private for each nation." The declaration was met by an impassioned chant of "Franco! Franco! Franco."<sup>32</sup> The bombast did not stave off near diplomatic and economic disaster. A few months after the United Nations vote only four major legations in Madrid were left fully-staffed: those of Argentina, Portugal, Ireland, and Switzerland. Spain was (in the words of Jesús Salgado Alba): "ignorant, abandoned, neutralized."<sup>33</sup> Only the shipment of 400,000 tons of wheat and 120,000 tons of corn from Argentina (paid for with a low interest loan from Juan Perón's government) prevented widespread famine.<sup>34</sup>

It is important to understand the dynamics of the virulent opposition during the late 1940s and early 1950s to the incorporation of Franquist Spain into the new post-war international order; since, to a great degree, the character of the opposition will remain unchanged until the 1970s. Two tasks suggest themselves. First, identifying the major loci of opposition to Franquist Spain. Second, sketching out the various reasons for that hard-edged and long-lived opposition. Specific

motivation varied from country to country and group to group, but (in the case of Western opposition) many of the same nations, groups, and arguments involved in ostracizing Spain were also involved in the decision to exclude Spain from NATO upon the Alliance's creation in the late 1940s.

In the case of non-Western opposition to Franco, the attack was centered in Moscow, though the careful involvement of Soviet satellites (like Poland) gave the diplomatic offensive a multi-lateral image. On an emotional level Spain was a potent symbol both for Josef Stalin and for communism as an international movement. Stalin had officially supported the Second Republic and the USSR continued to harbor many leftist exiles (perhaps most notably, Dolores Ibarruti, 'La Pasionaria'). For Stalin, and the communist network he controlled, Spain was a reminder of a massive and humiliating failure. As one historian notes, "in Spain the Comintern, if not the Soviet Union, had suffered a grievous defeat."<sup>35</sup> Stalin and the USSR's new found post-war legitimacy allowed it to push for Franco's belated punishment for his 1939 victory. For many European communists, newly influential in the glow of post-war legitimacy (e.g. Italian communist Togliatti, Tito in Yugoslavia, and Gero in Hungary), the Spanish civil war (whether they had directly participated in it or not) had been a formative personal and political event.<sup>36</sup> They too were in no forgiving mood.

The non-Soviet and non-communist opposition to the Franco regime involved many nations and groups, each motivated by a variety of considerations. Most important of these were France, Italy, Mexico, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands. France, who shared one of Spain's two land borders, had taken an early anti-Franco stand. That stand had reflected an amalgam of factors; including guilt over the wide-spread French collaboration with the Nazis, the resentment felt over Spain's cordial relationship with the Petain government in Vichy, and

(after 1958) De Gaulle's personal animosity towards Franco.<sup>37</sup> For its part, Italy was a natural Mediterranean rival to Spain and an isolated Spain enhanced the Italian position in the region.

Beyond that, as Whitaker points out, Italians fumed at Franco's occasional favorable, and apparently sincere, references to his friendship with Benito Mussolini.<sup>38</sup> In the case of Mexico, the ruling Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) had close links to the Spanish government-in-exile (which it continued to recognize after 1939) and it became the leading Spanish-speaking opponent of Franco's regime. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark (representing both the strength of the political left in each country, as well as the bitter experience of each during their occupation by Germany) were steadfast in their opposition.

Non-governmental opponents to the regime in Madrid, especially individual and organized exiles from Spain (representing communist, socialist, centrist, and monarchist viewpoints), also formed a vocal group advocating a hard-line with Franco. These individuals and groups lobbied at the United Nations and in individual national capitals. They also concentrated on generating support among 'natural' allies to shape public opinion and prevent any weakening in the anti-Franco resolve.<sup>39</sup> As Hills points out, their strategy was one of unabashed emotionalism: "they worked on the old emotions and ignorance of many who equated the Spanish words 'liberal' and 'socialista' with liberal and Labour."<sup>40</sup> One category of natural ally was organized labor.

Labor unions were viscerally anti-Franco and had been so since the start of the civil war in 1936. This was particularly true for unions in Britain and Germany, but even the fairly conservative unions in the United States were vocal in their criticisms of the regime in Madrid. The political parties formally connected to, or informally associated with, these unions (e.g. the British Labour Party, the German SPD, and the American Democratic Party) paid attention to their constituents deep opposition. Organized religion was a less dependable target for groups

opposed to Franco. The Catholic church hierarchy in most nations (still wedded to the vision of the 1936 revolt as a crusade against atheistic communism) remained generally pro-Franco. In the United States, however, the anti-Franco message received a more sympathetic hearing from most mainline Protestant denominations and (particularly) the Jewish community.<sup>41</sup> In terms of the origins of the widespread opposition to the incorporation of the Franquist regime into the post-war international order one important attribute stands out: the opposition was remarkable for its strictly irrational element, manifesting an emotionalism that often defied rational analysis. To be sure, many opponents were interested in the concrete political dividends flowing from their opposition (e.g. USSR and the government-in-exile). Yet, most cases seemed steered by a profoundly emotional concern. During the 1940s and early 1950s, the issue of Spain and Franco rarely lent itself to anything approaching calm discussion or debate.

The hyper-emotionalism is readily discernible when one compares the two cases of Iberian dictatorship; Franquist Spain, isolated and condemned because of its political arrangements, and Salazar's Portugal, a member of the world community and charter member of NATO. While, strictly speaking, the regimes in Lisbon and Madrid, were similar in many important respects, the reaction of the world to each was wildly different. As Hills observes: "Franco's record as a neutral did not ... compare unfavorably with that of other European neutrals." However, accepting that "required an unemotional approach to the facts which was beyond ... the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France."<sup>42</sup>

At the 1945 Potsdam meeting, Churchill had tried to dismiss Stalin's anti-Franco position as hypocritical by pointing to the case of the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal, a regime that Stalin did target for destruction.<sup>43</sup> Professor Antonio Oliveira de Salazar had first tasted power as finance minister in 1928. In 1932 he became prime minister and the era of the "Novo Estado" in Portugal began.<sup>44</sup> That regime was a corporatist experiment with results as repressive as

Franco's rule in Spain. Portugal, as we have seen, was closely tied to Spain diplomatically; two versions of the Iberian Pact bound the nations closely together. Indeed, a trip to Sevilla to meet with Franco was Salazar's first official trip outside of Portugal. In many ways, Churchill's Potsdam equation and accusations of hypocrisy were valid. In two crucial ways, however, they were not.

In a strictly factual sense the two dictators were comparably dictatorial; but they were absolutely incomparable in terms of the origins, connections, actions, and (crucially) the emotional importance of the respective regimes. The regime in Lisbon pre-dated Hitler and owed absolutely nothing to the Axis for either its creation or existence. When Churchill had made the Spain-Portugal comparison at Potsdam Stalin reminded him that (in the view of the USSR at least) the Portuguese dictatorship was the result of internal Portuguese factors and not an outside imposition.<sup>45</sup> Beyond that, Salazar had maintained tight relations with Britain during the war and, while not absolutely pristine in terms of neutrality, Portugal did not excessively dally with the Axis.<sup>46</sup> In the sense of both nations being non-democratic, Churchill's claims of equivalency were valid: in the substance of their histories they were not. Crozier puts it simply: "Salazar, though a dictator, was free of the taint of the association with Hitler. Franco was not."<sup>47</sup> The use of the term 'taint' by Crozier is extremely revealing.

To put the matter bluntly, Portugal meant nothing to virtually anyone outside of Portugal. Spain, in the 1930s and 1940s, was an emotion-laden political symbol of great potency. That emotion-laden character ultimately had concrete political consequences. The establishment of the Second Republic, its attempts to politically and economically modernize Spain, the revolt by the anti-democratic sectors of Spanish society against the efforts, and the ensuing civil war were galvanizing events. In his analysis of the reciprocal images of the United States and Spain, Julian Marfas observes that: "for not a few who were then young it was an historical coming of age,



some felt it as strongly as the subsequent World War in which the United States itself was engaged."<sup>48</sup>

While (in the case of the United States) Cantril and Strunk have argued that the Spanish Civil War was easily the most emotional foreign policy issue of the 1930's, an elite-skew in the impact of the war certainly existed.<sup>49</sup> This elite-skew in the importance of the issue is (at least in the case of Britain) colorfully captured by Randolph Churchill's observation that the average Briton did not "give a damn who's right and who should win; a few excitable Catholics and ardent socialists think this war matters, but for the general public it's just a lot of bloody dagoes killing each other."<sup>50</sup> One culturally influential sector of the elite most affected by the events in Spain was the American and British literary community. The community's interest in the Spanish drama at times bordered on the obsessive.

As Diggins observes, "it was the Spanish civil war that brought the overwhelming majority of literary intellectuals into an unequivocally anti-Fascist front."<sup>51</sup> As Dante Puzzo observes, for many American intellectuals the rule of the Second Republic "was not that of Stalin and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, but rather of Roosevelt and the New Deal."<sup>52</sup> In his study of English literature in the 1930's, Valentine Cunningham observes that: "If there is one decisive event which focuses the hopes and fears of the literary 30s, a moment that seems to summarize and test the period's myths and dreams, to enact and encapsulate its dominant themes and images, the Spanish Civil War is it."<sup>53</sup> For the English literary elite the Spanish war was a metaphor for other social and political realities, both positive and negative. The eventual defeat of democracy had ramifications: "by the end of the decade to celebrate Spain and the Spanish war was also to celebrate the demise of the hopes they had once encapsulated."<sup>54</sup> The rarified interest was there, but, in the case of Britain, so were the practical political consequences.

As a matter of politics, the Spanish civil war was a divisive event, between and (perhaps less appreciated) within the major British political parties. At the outset of the hostilities, for example, the Labour Party was torn. The question was not over opposition to Franco and the rebellion but over the acceptable means to oppose the take-over attempt. In the early days of the war Labour's anti-fascist ideology ran headlong into its pacifism.<sup>55</sup> For well over a year, the Labour party, and top leaders like Clement Atlee, vacillated over the question of intervention to aid the Republic. A 1936 party declaration against the advisability of any form of intervention (including arms)—given the associated possibility of igniting a general European war—was reversed within twenty-four hours: though the new position failed to satisfy a rabidly anti-Franco Labour left willing to risk war to stop the revolt.<sup>56</sup>

It was not until a trip to the Spanish front by John Dugdale, Phillip Noel-Baker, Ellen Wilkinson, and Clement Atlee in December 1937 (which saw the founding of the "Major Atlee Company" of anti-Franquist volunteers) did the party move fully to oppose anti-intervention. In a report filed after the trip Atlee came out clearly against non-intervention. In the document Atlee concluded that "continued acquiescence in a one-sided non-intervention has made the British government an accessory to the attempts to murder democracy in Spain."<sup>57</sup> Neville Chamberlain's March 1939 recognition of the Franco regime sparked a censure vote that attracted 137 supporters.<sup>58</sup>

In the Britain of the late 1930s and early 1940s, Spain was, and remained, politically controversial, reflecting (as Smyth argues) the "fundamental cleavage" in British political life.<sup>59</sup> It was a political mirror. A British politician (R.A. Butler) observed that, in 1940, "the feeling about Spain is extremely acute, since all is bound up with the division which all sections here feel is inevitable in English society and politics."<sup>60</sup> The issue was often incendiary in its effects. For example, according to one observer, Clement Atlee was regularly transformed by the mention

of Spain from a "dormouse" to a "rabid rabbit."<sup>61</sup> For many, Franco represented nothing less than "a latter-day incarnation of the sixteenth century symbol of repression and suppression, Phillip II."<sup>62</sup> When the visceral anti-Franquists finally came to power (like Clement Atlee in 1945), one thing seemed clear: "the Caudillo could not be forgiven."<sup>63</sup>

Even after the war, Spain remained a code word for emotions with direct consequences for British domestic politics. In the case of Labour, prodded by left-wing intellectuals and the Trade Union Congress, the party held onto its anti-Franquist leanings "long after the letter of the policy had eroded."<sup>64</sup> A sampling of the transcripts of debates in the House of Commons between 1946 and 1949 reveals the power of the issue to provoke emotional responses. Even granting the colorful rhetoric common to Commons, the exchanges between Conservative and Labour members over Spain and Franco could be stinging.

The political situation was simple but delicate. The ruling Labour party was caught in a vise, prodded by the Labour left to act, unilaterally if necessary, to remove Franco and pushed by the Tories to take the lead in rehabilitating Franco, who was increasingly considered to be a remarkably prescient anti-communist.<sup>65</sup> The Conservative position was summed up by Sir Patrick Hannon who, in July 1947, challenged the Labour foreign minister: "How long is this state of affairs going to continue? Is the right honorable gentleman aware that Spain has been fighting to keep back Bolshevism?" For his part, Labour member of parliament Noel-Baker contemptuously dismissed the vocal Tory support for rehabilitating Franco as nothing more than a cynical play for the Catholic vote.<sup>66</sup>

A February 2, 1949 debate on policy towards Spain featured several heated exchanges.<sup>67</sup> For example, when conservative member of parliament, Follick, described his personal attempts to persuade General Franco to restore Prince Juan, son of Alfonso XIII, to the Spanish throne, Labour member of parliament Orbach (referring to the terror bombing of Basque civilians by the

German Condor Legion) interjected: "he cannot restore the people of Guernica, can he?"

Follick persisted in the face of opposition:

**Follick:** Now nobody in this House knows as much about Spain as I do ...

**Morgan:** Nonsense!

**Follick:** It is no good saying nonsense, and it is no good jeering. It is an accepted fact ... I know the Spanish people; I know most of their politicians; I speak their language ...

**Morgan:** Through phonetics!

The harshest period of Spain's ostracism lasted until 1949. The policy aimed at stimulating internal revolt by creating absolutely intolerable living conditions was only partly successful: it did heap misery on the majority of Spaniards, but it did not stir up any serious opposition. These four years (the nightmarish 'Years of Hunger') saw the Spanish populace faced with a stark choice, they could either "starve to death or revolt against their government."<sup>68</sup> Imperceptible at first, the growing division in the major western anti-Franco powers began to erode the utter isolation. In February 1948 the border with France was reopened and, three months later, a Franco-Spanish commercial treaty was signed<sup>69</sup> The situation seemed promising enough that in his traditional New Year's Eve address at the end of 1948, General Franco could claim that "we have conquered the most difficult years. . .a consoling future is open to us."<sup>70</sup>

The modest economic thaw was just ahead of a major (if not ultimately complete) political and diplomatic thaw. In March 1949, an internal State Department memo described the years of anti-Franco policies as nothing short of "total failure."<sup>71</sup> The British foreign office was coming to a similar conclusion.<sup>72</sup> In an April 1949 letter, Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested to Franco that a genuine liberalization of the regime might ease Spain's reacceptance by the international community. Sensing that the brutal exclusion of Spain was unraveling in

response to the changes in the international system, Franco suggested that an acceptance of the regime by the West might ease the path towards internal liberalization.<sup>73</sup>

The wall began to crack quickly. In December 1949, acting on the recommendation of the Political Committee, the United Nations General Assembly voted to rescind its ban on relations with the Franco regime.<sup>74</sup> In January 1950, the flow of money into Spain began with an American loan of 62.5 million dollars. In December 1955, Spain was admitted to the United Nations (by a vote of 52-7) in an East-West deal that also brought in Portugal, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, and Romania.<sup>75</sup>

Looking closely at the period described above it is possible to better appreciate the internal-external linkages that structured the flow of events. In essence, there is a chain; a complex interaction of domestic considerations and foreign policy, with the former usually the most important consideration. Spanish domestic conditions created the conditions for the civil war; the civil war occurred in an international environment that was conducive to the involvement of outside powers: an involvement solicited by the warring factions, especially the Nationalists. Foreign involvement set particular parameters for the domestic political balance following the 1939 rebel victory. That balance, in turn, predisposed the regime to certain foreign policy stands.

Those foreign policy stands set the stage for the treatment (the ostracism) of Spain following the Axis defeat. That treatment was rooted in the particular emotive power of Franquist Spain, not a rational analysis of the merits of that policy. Finally, the treatment of Spain following the Axis defeat created circumstances that shaped Spanish foreign policy for decades, including the issue of NATO membership. Even once the worst was over, the years of ostracism left important results. By definition, ostracism had created a Spain disconnected

from the world, at least in an institutional sense. Even with United Nations membership (December 1955), the move was away from nearly complete ostracism and utter isolation, but not towards a general and genuine incorporation of the Spanish regime into the international (or even Western European) order. As Pollack and Hunter observe, admission to the United Nations (while an important symbolic achievement for the Franco regime that should not be underestimated) "did not substantively alter the patterns of its foreign policy."<sup>76</sup> Other than the United Nations (and some other lower level organizations), Spain did not yet belong to the blue chip international clubs like the EC or NATO. This selective exclusion had three important consequences.

First, the exclusion led to a concrete issue agenda, an agenda that would form the backbone of Franquist foreign policy until the dictator's death in 1975. Specifically, gaining entry to the organizations denied to Spain for political reasons. Since entry was denied on political grounds, and thus represented a particularly stinging criticism of Spain, entry became (for many Spaniards) imbued with a deeply emotional and symbolic character. Admission would represent the withdrawal of criticism. Over time the symbolic importance of membership in organizations like the EEC and NATO would begin to actually overshadow, indeed supersede, the potential tangible benefits associated with each.

Second, the exclusion had broad consequences in terms of Spain's self-definition. Spain was left out of a unique process during the 1940s and 1950s: the identity-forging dynamics of the initial stages of continental integration and the early days of the Cold War. As Maxwell notes: "Spain did not share in the formative influences and common experience of the modern industrialized nations such as victory or defeat ... post-war reconciliation and economic reconstruction, and the building of European transnational institutions."<sup>77</sup> Nascent integration and the collective opposition to Soviet power acted to produce the mainstream of European

thought during the 1940s and 1950s; a general European consciousness and (at least in matters of economic reconstruction and military security) a trans-Atlantic bonding with the United States.

Non-participation in the war against Hitler, non-participation in the subsequent peace, and non-participation (at least in the early days) in the anti-communist alliance cost Spain the chance to see itself both as a member of Western Europe and a more or less equal partner of the United States. One important policy result of this lost opportunity was the persistence of idiosyncratic and essentially compensatory policies. Denied a place in the Western European mainstream, Spain retained vague attachments and aspirations to Hispanidad, Arabidad, and non-alignment.<sup>78</sup>

Third, the punitive ostracism, as mentioned, served to exacerbate the chronic economic collapse of the country; a collapse that was the result of the cumulative effects of chronic underdevelopment, the depression of the 1930s, the destruction of three years of civil war, and the inevitable failures connected to the experiment with corporatist economic theories. As we have seen, ostracism excluded Spain from access to most bilateral and multilateral aid initiatives, as well most private investment. By the end of the 1940s, even the Peronist regime in Buenos Aires was refusing to extend credit so that Spain could buy more Argentine grain.<sup>79</sup> Even with the economic and political thaw of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Spanish economic situation verged on collapse. In 1940, the per capita income was at 19th century levels, and not until 1948 did industrial production pass 1929 levels. During the 1950s, per capita GDP ran about 40% of the West European average.<sup>80</sup> In terms of foreign policy, the chronically desperate economic situation confronting an increasingly worried regime predisposed Spain to deal with any nation that might make a contribution to alleviating the situation.

The 1953 Pact of Madrid between the United States and Spain was the most spectacular example of that willingness to deal. It was spectacular on three levels. First, it was a major turn in foreign policy for the United States, a nearly literal deal with the Devil. Second, it served

to place the United States at the center of Spanish foreign policy, a position it would effectively occupy until the middle of the 1980s. Third, it is an example of the triumph of domestic considerations over the realistic consideration of Spain's national interest. As Michael Mandelbaum observes, domestic considerations achieve their greatest relevance in terms of foreign policy formulation when a regime is scared, when "acute" divisions ongoing crises within society render the regime vulnerable and potentially "unstable."<sup>81</sup> The dearth of "legitimacy" from other sources (e.g. elections) predisposed the Franco regime to use foreign policy to help alleviate an internal political and economic crisis that threatened the viability of the regime.

The decision-making process in the area of foreign policy was clearly dominated by General Franco and the policy adopted reflected his personal assessment of what was and was not important.<sup>82</sup> In his study of Franco's foreign policy, Jose Mario Armero notes that "the foreign ministers, no doubt in good faith, believed they made foreign policy." That said, however, "they were only pawns" in General Franco's game.<sup>83</sup> The overriding goal of Franco's game was clearly not the maximization of Spain's international position or pursuing any abstract version of the national interest. The goal that Franco sought was Franco's own political survival. As Jose Mario Armero observes, Franco "did what was necessary to preserve power, inciting enthusiasm and patriotism in order to achieve his objective."<sup>84</sup>

The 1953 Pact of Madrid represented an almost pure triumph of domestic considerations over any conceivable foreign policy gain. As Fox argues "national security had not been Spain's primary purpose for negotiating with the United States."<sup>85</sup> There was, from the Spanish point of view, virtually no element of enhanced national security involved with the agreement. Franco was not looking to external threats and Spain's position in the world, he was looking to forestall internal threats to his own power. Franco perceived his position to be so fragile as to require a dramatic foreign policy solution. The 1953 Pact of Madrid was that solution, a security



arrangement with the United States whose chief effect was to insure the internal security of the regime. The agreement served to buttress the Franquist regimes on all important levels; enhancing the government's economic and financial resources prospects, expanding the regime's prestige, and improving its internal coercive capabilities. As Rubottom and Murphy observe, foreign policy, in general, and the 1953 agreement with the United States, in particular, became the principle means to "prevent economic chaos at home and ensure the continuance of the Franco regime."<sup>66</sup>

As mentioned, the United States had begun to rethink its position towards Spain as early as March 1949, but (especially from the Spanish viewpoint) the pace of change was almost glacial. Pre-1950, pro-Franco elements in the executive and legislative branches found little support for, and little reward for, promoting the General's cause. June 1950, however, was a pivotal month for the Spanish-American relations and the Franco regime. Discord between the West and the Soviet Union had deepened all through the late 1940s. The National Security Act was passed in 1947 creating both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. With chronic disagreement over German occupation policy, the 1948 Berlin blockade, and Mao's 1949 victory exacerbated relations between the United States and the USSR. On April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington.<sup>67</sup> By 1950, most of the important elements of the East-West confrontation were in place.

The invasion of South Korea by forces from the communist north did not create the Cold War but it was a transformative event with enormous implications, both generally and for the relationship between the United States and Spain. Shrill ideological rhetoric and Soviet intransigence across a spectrum of issues was one thing, the open use of military power by a nation closely connected to (and perhaps acting at the behest of) the USSR was quite another. The shock of the outbreak of war in June 1950 (with the ominous future events it suggested)

redefined the parameters of what constituted acceptable foreign and security policy. In a very real sense the previously impossible became perfectly possible.

The story of the Truman administration's military response to the attack is well known. However, elements within that administration "utilized the Korean War to fulfill other goals as well."<sup>88</sup> One chief effect of the attack was to place critics of Truman's foreign policy, both on the left and on the right, into a difficult situation. While the NATO treaty had been rather easily approved (July 21, 1949) in the Senate, the concept of the interventionist foreign policy it represented was not without its fervent critics.<sup>89</sup> Korea was, as one American official noted, a veritable God-send for the proponents of an interventionist foreign policy, justifying even the most ambitious visions: like the famous National Security Council Paper Number 68.<sup>90</sup> Within the administration, the Korean War served to immediately enhance Franco's image.

Franco, like Hitler, had always believed the alliance of competing ideologies that had fought the Axis was unnatural and would inevitably collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. Unlike Hitler, Franco lived to see it. When his vision became a reality in 1950, Franco was a big winner. As a result of Kim Il Sung's gamble, Spain gained a "whole new status in government circles."<sup>91</sup> The invasion immediately "stilled" most opposition against expanding United States-Spain relations, and (as Thomas Bailey puts it) Spain "took on a better odor as the Cold War grew hot."<sup>92</sup> As one Spanish historian notes, General Franco very well realized that "the Cold War worked in his favor and he waited for the results."<sup>93</sup> In July 1950, as war raged in Korea, Franco volunteered to provide Spanish troops for the defense effort.<sup>94</sup>

The invasion seemed to prove the implacability and aggressiveness of the communist bloc and fears that the war might spread or (worse) might only be a feint in a more widescale assault, prompted the United States to begin to expand its military capabilities. Even after the initial scare passed, the expansion continued. Along with the purely internal responses (e.g. the defense

budget increased from 17.7 billion in fiscal 1950 to 52.6 billion in fiscal 1953), old strategic arrangements were reenergized and new strategic arrangements sought.<sup>95</sup> Though it had existed for over a year, NATO was still an unsolidified arrangement in 1950; only vaguely organized and (given its enormous mission) definitely underfunded.<sup>96</sup> The search for new allies and alliances launched by the war in Korea, eventually led to Franco's door in Madrid. A place for Spain was found in the global security structure.

That place was not in NATO. Rather, it was to take the form of a bilateral relationship with the United States. The idea for such a relationship had been floated by Franco as early as 1947 and, after June 1950, the proposal was revived. Two months after a June 1951 meeting between Francisco Franco and the American representative Admiral Forrest Sherman, a military mission (under Air Force General James W. Spry) visited Spain and subsequently submitted a report generally favorable to (though not a ringing endorsement of) the basing of American air and naval forces in the country.<sup>97</sup> Formal negotiations between Spanish Foreign Minister Martin Artajo and United States representatives began in April 1952.

With the original sense of urgency connected to the Korean war dampened the negotiations were "prolonged and difficult."<sup>98</sup> Part of the slowness stemmed from Truman's inability to overcome his personal distaste for the Franquist regime and fully embrace the idea of dealing with Franco. Even as late as 1952 Truman fretted over establishing too close a link with Franco, a fear based partly on a desire not to alienate the left-wing of the party. His successor in the White House had no such domestic political concerns. Under Eisenhower the negotiations accelerated and the agreement was signed in September 1953.<sup>99</sup>

The dislike for Franco among many liberals in the Senate did contribute to the decision to finalize the Pact of Madrid as an executive agreement and not a treaty. In Gilbert's useful typology of executive agreements it represented a "Type Two Agreement", an agreement

concluded by the President to carry out the will or intent of Congress without the necessity of securing formal ratification for the arrangements.<sup>100</sup> Its published terms were relatively straightforward and reasonably equitable. The United States received basing rights that eventually resulted in air and Naval facilities at Torrejon, Zaragoza, Moron de la Frontera, Rota, Sevilla, El Ferrol del Caudillo, Cartagena, and Palma de Mallorca; as well as the right to construct a 500 mile jet fuel pipe from the coast to the interior of the country. Formal sovereignty of the bases was retained by Spain and they could be used only with permission. For its cooperation, Spain received an initial transfer of 226 million dollars and the spin-off benefits of 200 million dollars in construction expenditures and base employment.<sup>101</sup>

The actual value for the United States of this investment is difficult to assess. By concluding the "quasi-alliance" the United States gained only marginally in terms of concrete security capability. Access to Spanish geography, particularly its denial to the Soviets in any future conflict, was not an unimportant asset. Keeping a staunchly anti-communist dictator in power was even more attractive. The bases (with the exception of Rota) were of only limited value, as Spry's original military survey had argued. Rapidly changing technology (e.g. the development of long range bombers and inter-continental missiles) as well as the formal restrictions on use demanded by Franco mitigated the utility of the bases. Kaplan describes the paradox: in any war big enough to automatically involve Spain, the bases were only marginally valuable; any smaller war might see permission to use them denied.<sup>102</sup>

Though the agreement was not a formal mutual defense arrangement, any potential Spanish contribution to western defense was a relevant consideration. In 1953, even a supporter of expanded relations like Lawrence Fernsworth (writing in Foreign Affairs) could not avoid offering a grim assessment. In Fernsworth's words, the Spanish military was "poorly paid, insufficiently trained, ill-clothed and fed, entirely lacking in modern equipment ... all that is

implied by the term infrastructure ... is lacking." Remedial measures would have to be extensive. Rectifying the massive defects, he concluded, "would mean starting from scratch."<sup>103</sup>

On the other hand, Franco (though not necessarily Spain itself), was clearly the "single biggest gainer" from the new relationship.<sup>104</sup> By giving up relatively little, the regime gained an enormous amount. As mentioned, the Pact of Madrid buttressed the regime. In the case of material support, the initial money transfer was, of course, only the tip of the economic iceberg. The conclusion of the agreement opened the conduit through which billions of future American dollars, both in the form of direct aid, credit, and private investment, would flow.<sup>105</sup> Those dollars would be matched by the expansion of economic ties with other nations who had, until the establishment of the close ties between Franco's regime and the United States, been hesitant to jump in. The American change in policy was key. As de Blaye observes, once the United States accepted Franco "the atmosphere of universal hostility ... dispersed as though by magic."<sup>106</sup>

In terms of regime prestige, the tacit endorsement of Franco by the United States led to two consequences. First, the agreement clearly served to "add luster to Franco's authority" and this added luster allowed Franco "to govern with a greater sense of security."<sup>107</sup> The United States' endorsement of the regime constituted an "escape-hatch" from disrespectability, an escape-hatch paid for by granting the effective dominance of the United States in the realm of foreign and security policy.<sup>108</sup> In conjunction with the agreement between Spain and the Holy See signed earlier in 1953, the Pact of Madrid (in de la Cierva's words) provided Franco with "the legitimizing power of America and the spiritual power of Rome."<sup>109</sup>

Second, the endorsement eased Franco's job of ruling by undercutting the position of those opponents to the regime who clung to the sad hope that the democracies would ultimately

do away with Franco. That strategy was a mistake. The process of rapprochement between the West and Franco symbolized by the 1953 agreement was devastating to many in the opposition leadership. The leader of the moderate faction of the PSOE in exile, Indalecio Prieto, had steadfastly held to the position that the opposition should wait removal of Franco by the democratic powers. The end of that hope led the socialist to leader remark: "I am responsible for having induced our party to trust the governments of the democratic powers, and they did not merit this confidence...it is my fault that my party has been the victim of an illusion that blinded me."<sup>110</sup> Finally, the agreement and the subsequent military aid aimed at repairing the problems described by Fernsworth served to enhance Franco's coercive capabilities. The aid flow began the process of technological modernization and organizational rationalization, while the American commitment to defend Spain freed up the Spanish military to continue dealing with internal threats to the regime's survival. The military was the most loyal to Franco of all the political families, supporting the Caudillo and faithfully enforcing his will. A chief effect of the arrangement was to (in Fox's words) "strengthen the Spanish military ... the backbone of Franco's authority."<sup>111</sup> Any enhancement of the military's resources was an enhancement of the regime's resources.

Franco referred to the 1953 agreement with the United States as "the most important achievement" of his foreign policy.<sup>112</sup> While the arrangement (as well as subsequent membership in the United Nations) did not represent (as we shall see) Spain's full acceptance into the international community, there is much truth in de Carcer and de la Mora's argument that Spain's "international perspectives" were fundamentally "transformed" by the Pact of Madrid.<sup>113</sup> The new Spanish relationship with the United States had several important consequences stemming from the circumstances of its birth.

First, as we have seen, the relationship served to more fully reinsert Spain into the international political mainstream.<sup>114</sup> The relationship took Spain out of the deep freeze but it also refroze the nation short of a full acceptance within Western Europe. The 1953 agreement acted to reverse the traditional American policy of deferring to Britain and France on matters of Spanish policy (a deference well illustrated by the diplomacy of the civil war period). The inclusion of Spain in the growing United States global defense network made Spain an American, and not European, concern: which, in truth, was how most European leaders (faced with almost institutionalized opposition to Franco at home) preferred it.

Second, given its blatantly utilitarian character, the United States-Spain relationship never developed the collegial legitimacy that marked the American relationship with other Western European nations. Rather than a sense of partnership in an overarching project (e.g. post-war reconstruction) or crusade (e.g. the containment of communism and Soviet power) there appeared to be only a limited relationship. It was a commercial-type relationship; regime to regime, a dollars for territory swap. Spanish defense and foreign policy (at least in those areas that mattered to the United States) became subordinated to requirements of American geostrategy. Not only opposition leaders were troubled by the obvious inequality in the bilateral relationship, many top military and political advisers close to Franco privately and repeatedly objected to the embarrassing dependence on, and subordination to, the North Americans.<sup>115</sup>

Third, the relationship served to implant the United States into the center of Spanish foreign policy. As Moxon Browne observes, the bilateral relationship became, for Spain, the "central feature" of its foreign policy.<sup>116</sup> In doing so it also served to implant the United States firmly into Spanish domestic politics and the relationship inevitably became a key domestic political issue. Over time the United States came to stand for something more than the legalities of the diplomatic and security relationship would suggest. The relationship became weighted

down with symbolic and potently emotional baggage. Of course, at least since 1898, the relationship between Spain and the United States has never been simple.

Writing in 1951, Carlton J. Hayes observed that: "there is nothing stranger or more curious in the annals of United States foreign relations than the story of our relations with Spain."<sup>117</sup> If the Spanish Civil War was a formative event in the lives of many in the American cultural and political elite, the United States was an equally complex and potent issue in Spain. The images embraced were often contradictory, but rarely neutral. The relationship had deep roots. Effectively allied with the United States during the latter's revolution, Spain failed to gain its chief objective, the recapture of Gibraltar, in part because of a hasty conclusion to the peace. The new republic immediately became an economic and military rival to Spain in the western hemisphere. The United States humiliated Spain in 1898, a military defeat made worse by the accusations of dishonor surrounding the Maine incident. The 1930s and 1940s saw the relationship further complicated. Not surprisingly, many supporters of the Second Republic were outraged at the United States' failure to support democracy and its subsequent embrace of Franco.

More surprising was the common anti-Americanism among supporters of the dictatorship. Anti-Americanism among pro-regime Spaniards during the 1940s and 1950s was rooted (in Marías' words) in a "deep-seated antipathy for the foundations of American life and politics diametrically opposed to those they support and defend."<sup>118</sup> The Franco regime had, as Whitaker observes, excoriated the United States "as vigorously as it did communism and the Soviet Union" in the heady days when an Axis victory seemed almost certain.<sup>119</sup> The anti-American Spanish right represented a jumble of motivations and emotions and counted among its members ultra-nationalists who held a grudge over 1898 and who chafed under the American dominance post-1953, the Catholic church hierarchy suspicious of creeping Protestantism and the loose morals inevitably associated with it, left-over Falangists repulsed by American



pluralism, and coddled business elites wary of a closer relationship with the champion of global free-trade.

The anti-American attitude on the right was respectable, indeed almost institutional. From 1939-1952, for example, all students studying for their 'bachillerato' (including those who would lead the nation in the 1960s and 1970s) were required to take a third year class officially described as:

**The United States of America: The materialistic and inferior Spirit of the American civilization. Lack of fundamental principles and moral unity. Immoral financial practices. Their unjust aggression against Spain and the Hispanic-American countries. Moral superiority of Hispanic-America over North America.<sup>120</sup>**

After the signing of the Pact of Madrid, most official criticism was silenced. There began a long period marked by the great irony described by Marfas. The United States was formally praised by Franquist officials (who explicitly rejected the philosophical values embraced by America), while at the same time the United States became increasingly unpopular among (and subject to criticism from) those opponents to the Franco regime who ostensibly aspired to those values.<sup>121</sup>

The preceding discussion sets the stage for a more specific and extended discussion of Spain's relationship with NATO during the lifetime of Francisco Franco, a relationship whose elements spilled-over into the post-Franco period. The origins of NATO are well known and do not need elaboration here. From the very beginning of the Alliance, however, Spain was an important and divisive issue. From a purely military viewpoint including Spain in the Alliance was a logical goal. Geography alone implied a role for Spain in any Western European defense

against the USSR. As Crozier notes, in the face of the perceived Soviet threat "strategic logic suggested that Spain should have been invited to join."<sup>122</sup>

As the leading nation in the Alliance, and the member most capable of a global strategic vision, the United States took the lead in pushing for Spain's inclusion, quietly at first and then with mounting openness and enthusiasm. If affiliation as a charter member was impossible the United States wanted membership as soon as possible thereafter. As Pollack and Hunter observe, most in the American security community were pro-membership and ceaselessly hammered on "the same theme: the need to integrate Spain into NATO."<sup>123</sup> No later than 1950 "the Pentagon was already putting pressure on the State Department to emphasize the desirability of making Spain a full member."<sup>124</sup>

From a purely military viewpoint, including Spain in the Alliance was a logical goal. From a practical political standpoint, inclusion was impossible. Politicians and diplomats, attuned to realities beyond military strategy, vetoed the security analysts and military professionals. Spain did not join NATO because very few influential sectors (both outside and, importantly, inside of Spain) wanted her to join. To an amazing degree, the opposition outside of Spain to its membership in NATO was led by the same groups and the same nations, motivated by the same goals, as led the earlier move to ostracize Franco following the Axis defeat. It was the newest round in an ongoing bout. Even after Spain was partially readmitted to the international community (e.g. via the security agreement with the United States and United Nations membership) the opposition within NATO to Spanish membership remained unstintingly virulent.

The issue was clear. Anti-membership forces realized that with NATO membership Franco's "rehabilitation would be complete."<sup>125</sup> These opponents were dedicated to fighting for every inch of Franco's road to respectability. More specifically the ongoing opposition centered on nations like Belgium, Italy, Holland, Norway, and Denmark: with Labour-controlled

Britain, the French communist and socialist parties, and the German left especially opposed. As Whitaker argues, the rift between NATO members over Spanish membership reflected a more basic dispute over the proper relationship between military and political considerations. In essence it served to focus the competing views of the character of the Alliance.<sup>126</sup> Beyond that, it can also be seen as a competition between a rationalist approach stressing military need and moral consistency and the power of what Crozier describes as "emotional fixations", the insatiable desire to continue punishing Franco steadfastly.<sup>127</sup>

To be sure, geopolitics interacted with the emotional. Portugal, as mentioned, had a terrible record in terms of internal politics, but it was a special case. As Mets observes: "Its participation was important. Not only was it close to the narrow entrance to the Mediterranean, but it also owned the Azores, a group of islands in the North Atlantic."<sup>128</sup> Indeed, the problem with the other Iberian nation was "how to get Portugal in, not whether it should join."<sup>129</sup>

Following the signing of the Pact of Madrid, the bilateral relationship between Spain and the United States served to insulate the other allies from hard strategic choices and free their moral hands. The 1953 agreement allowed the other allies to gain the advantages of dealing with Spain in security matters without the disadvantages. Britain serves as a typical example. As Whitaker notes, successive governments "were not unwilling to share in the military benefits while leaving to the United States whatever moral responsibilities it might entail."<sup>130</sup> It was a fortunate example of getting "a new ally at no cost."<sup>131</sup> It was an irresistible deal: geopolitical necessity was served via the bilateral agreement while each nation that derived benefit from the arrangement could continue to vent its disapproval with the regime in Madrid and collect what domestic political benefits it could from doing so.

This deep split in NATO over the Spanish question constituted an effective veto on membership, freezing the issue. For supporters of Spanish membership (especially after 1953) avoiding another divisive issue within the Alliance was deemed more valuable than the potential rewards of pushing the issue. For its part, however, the Franquist regime was also ambivalent on the issue of membership, at least for the first decade and a half of the Alliance's existence. This ambivalence stemmed from several sources; including diplomatic considerations, ideological obstacles, and bureaucratic opposition.

First, from a diplomatic standpoint, there was a general acceptance within the Spanish leadership of the political impossibility of joining NATO and the futility of trying to force the issue. Also, in a pattern that would be repeated again and again until the ultimate resolution of the issue in 1986, NATO membership was not seen as primarily a security matter. After 1953 the United States saw to Spain's security and, even more fundamentally, it was unclear given Spain's guiding threat assessment (which centered on internal threats and on attacks on Spanish holdings in North Africa) that membership would actually enhance the nation's security. Rather, it was a symbolic issue. That said, the 1953 agreement with the United States provided symbol enough for the time being.

For his part Franco was personally "ambivalent" towards the idea of tying Spain formally and fully to NATO.<sup>132</sup> Despite the fact that he had once referred to a Spain-less NATO as the equivalent of a "tortilla without eggs", and had permitted trial balloons to be floated (e.g. a December 21, 1957 Cortes speech by War Minister Barroso concerning the value to the Alliance of Spanish membership) Franco had little enthusiasm for membership.<sup>133</sup> As Hills notes, as late as 1959 Franco "had no need to be in NATO and continued to stress that he had no wish to be."<sup>134</sup> Franco took the view that a series of bilateral agreements with individual members of the Alliance, modelled on that with the United States, would secure the advantages of

membership with fewer potential political difficulties than joining NATO itself. From his perspective, by locking Spain into the alliance structure, membership weakened future negotiating leverage.

Spanish opposition to membership also took an ideological form (tied up in the interconnected considerations of economic autarky, nationalism, and religious contamination) and was championed by the leftover Falange true-believers, ultra-nationalists (particularly in the military), and the Catholic Church. As Angel Vinas points out, the classic phase of autarky during the "first Franquism" stretched from the conclusion of the civil war in 1939 to the Pact of Madrid in 1953, though economic protectionism pre-dated the Franquist regime and certainly did not end in the 1950's.<sup>135</sup> While during the period of political and economic ostracism, autarkic rhetoric was often compensatory (serving to make an ideological virtue out of an economic necessity) it also represented a more positive orientation. For many it was still a positive commitment to "a set of economic policies aimed at strengthening Spain's economic infrastructure with the theoretical aim of enabling a certain degree of independence and self-sufficiency."<sup>136</sup> It was a policy championed by sections of the ruling coalition who saw continued disconnection, and not alliance, as the key to external and internal security.

Chief of these champions of autarky was what was left of the Falange, certainly diminished in influence but certainly not eliminated. While, as Stanley Payne argues, by the middle 1950s the Falange was, in political terms, relatively unimportant it was not without influence in those areas traditionally allowed it. While it is true (again as Payne argues) that, by 1956, Falange members occupied only 5% of all leadership positions (ministers, civil governors, procuradores, alcaldes, and municipal councilmen), at the national level (i.e. cabinet ministers, the Cortes, and provincial Governors who were appointed in Madrid) the Falange occupied an average of 24% of the positions (12.5% of cabinet positions, 36% of Cortes seats, and 23.0%

of provincial governors).<sup>137</sup> Even given that the Falange of 1956 was not the Falange of 1936, still almost 25% of the top leadership were connected to the group. Despite its diminishment, the Movement, and many of the ideas most closely associated with it (like autarky) had hardly disappeared.

The theoretical benefits of economic autarky were straightforward. Externally, autarky avoided placing a weapon in the hands of potential enemies. Spain, the Falange-inspired 'Industrial Law' (October 24, 1939) ordained, must be "redeemed from the debilitating effects of the importation of exotic products."<sup>138</sup> Internally, autarky helped to guard the character of the regime itself. Even as it slid towards a mundane and traditionally authoritarian form of government (represented by the "reality of the triumph of reactionary capitalism"), the Franquist regime was still viewed by many as an alternative to the prevailing models of social, economic, and political organization offered by the bipolar post-war world (i.e. liberal capitalism and socialism).<sup>139</sup>

Both liberal capitalism and Marxism, at least in theory, represented a vision of society as essentially divided (into either individuals competing in the marketplace or social classes competing for social dominance): a vision anathema to a collectivist, corporatist, mentality.<sup>140</sup> In many ways liberalism and Marxism were identical, their apparent difference mere illusion. Prominent Falangist José Luis Arrese y Magra, who served as Civil Governor of Malaga (1939), Minister of Housing (1957-1960), and who was also a member of the Council of the Realm, wrote in 1940 that "Marxism is the second materialist solution. It is born of liberalism and fights against it; but it doesn't oppose its foundation. It is the ungrateful son of liberal economics...but it is nothing more than liberalism for the use of 'the people'. In effect, Marxism is as materialist as liberalism, its collective is the same as liberalism's individualism."<sup>141</sup> Given that the USSR

was no real military threat to Spain, many felt that NATO represented the Trojan horse within which principles entirely antithetical to the regime could comfortably hide.

Membership was also opposed by many ultra-nationalists, especially (but not exclusively) in the military establishment. This opposition to membership was rooted in one inescapable fact and one important assumption. The inescapable fact: NATO contained a veritable roll-call of Spain's traditional rivals and enemies. Great Britain, which had dethroned Spain as a naval power and which still held Gibraltar; the Netherlands, a former colony whose war for independence had helped destroy Spain's empire; the United States (1898 was sufficient); and Spain's old competitor for European power, France. Many could not bring themselves to bury the hatchet.<sup>142</sup> The important assumption (and one that would appear and reappear all through the subsequent debate over NATO membership) was less convincing, though still powerful. Spain's membership would entail a loss of sovereignty and virtual subjugation (a condition summed up in the absolutely unacceptable vision of Spanish forces forced to serve under foreign officers).

Finally, opposition also centered on grounds of contamination, both political and religious. Just as many outside of Spain feared contaminating themselves by collaborating with Franco, many in Spain feared that "increased contacts with the outside world ... might influence domestic affairs."<sup>143</sup> One theme hammered on incessantly by the Spanish church in the 1950s was that any involvement with the Alliance threatened the loss of Spain's spiritual purity and ran the risk of letting in liberals and liberalizing trends.<sup>144</sup> The danger was not just that foreign Protestants and Jews would have the run of Spain, which in the Church's opinion was bad enough, but (perhaps even more distressing) the relationship would inevitably open the door to the ideas of liberal Catholics from countries less pure than Spain. As Rubottom and Murphy note, the Spanish church was constantly watchful for both "creeping Protestant incursions" and

the hated "modernism."<sup>145</sup> The 1953 agreement with the United States had been bad enough for the religious purists, NATO membership would have been exponentially worse.

The bureaucratic opposition to membership was based on a calculation of the potential gains and losses to various bureaucratic actors connected with NATO membership. The Spanish military establishment is an interesting case in point. While steadfast in its support for Franco (one of its own), the Spanish military establishment was not monolithic in terms of specific policy, as the NATO membership issue amply illustrated. The military's ambivalence in the matter would last until the early 1980s. The trouble lay in two places. First, how disruptive would membership be to the comfortable arrangement in which many of the military leadership found itself? That is, would membership require substantial alterations in the military establishment's functional role within the regime and Spain? Second, how would membership affect the internal balance of resource allocation within the military establishment: would it serve to promote one branch over another? Adherents to the status quo feared disruptions stemming from membership in both areas.

The issues were clearly related. As Snyder correctly observes, under Franco "the Spanish military's only role was to protect the internal integrity of the Spanish state."<sup>146</sup> The disruptive potential of redefining the central threat to the "integrity", of Spain away from the Basques and the working class and towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was enormous, the institutional move from policeman to soldier was daunting. Not surprisingly, the move was more positively viewed by the air force and navy (the power projection services) rather than the army. The latter naturally had the primary responsibility internally, while the air force and navy had the most to gain in terms of resources and responsibilities by membership. The fact was that there was no real role for the Spanish army in the defense of western Europe. There was at least a limited mission for a modernized navy and air force. Indeed, following the initiation of



the United States-Spain military relationship in 1953, American money and attention were focused inordinately on the two more high-tech services, with the army relatively neglected in terms of the benefits being disbursed.<sup>147</sup>

To sum up, from the Alliance's inception a combination of political factors made membership in NATO impossible. The steadfast opposition of many charter-members of the Alliance, as well as important political forces within even favorable states, buttressed by the influence of non-governmental actors, coupled with a luke-warm attitude of Francisco Franco and many of the most influential groups in the ruling elite overcame the influence of those (like Portugal and the United States) who lobbied for entry.

With the 1953 Pact of Madrid, the basic parameters of Spanish foreign policy for the next two decades were set. Foreign policy initiatives and diplomatic activity were pursued within these boundaries. These defining realities included the following.

First, the emergence of Spain's conditional acceptance by the international community. While Spain was accepted into a number of important organizations, the blue-chip organizations (e.g. NATO, EC, WEU, and the Council of Europe) were closed to Spain so long as Franco was in power. This conditional acceptance was buttressed by a prevailing attitude that Spain and Franco were now primarily American, and not generally European, concerns.

Second, there was a virtual hibernation of the NATO issue for a decade while the United States effectively directed Spanish security and (to a lesser degree) foreign policy. Until the early 1960s, for Spain at least, membership in NATO was a non-issue. Third, given the conditional acceptance (and the American veto on the most important areas of security and foreign policy, a veto unmistakably tied to the flow of dollars) Franco was, paradoxically, both free and unfree. Speeches might be made, and an illusion of influence cultivated and promoted, but no substantive actions in conflict with American strategy could actually be taken.

In this sense, Spanish foreign policy between 1953 and 1975 often consisted of fiery rhetoric with little substance. In the absence of the need to actually formulate and implement practical policies, 'psuedo-policies' (rhetorical commitments never to be tested and judged by reality) remained intact. Most importantly, the foreign policy rhetoric was firmly set within the context of the ascendancy of domestic politics over foreign policy, with the latter utilized to aid the survival of the Franquist regime. The overwhelming success of the 1953 agreement in this regard set a precedent, began a tendency towards a reflex action, in which foreign policy initiatives would be undertaken to affect internal political circumstances rather than to achieve any real external goals. The regime could say what it wanted. Since little would ever have to be really done.

#### Spanish Foreign Policy to the Death of Franco

The primary position of the United States did not mean that Spain had no aspirations to policy independence and did not cultivate the illusion that the independence actually existed. The popular socialist claim during the 1970s that the Franquist period represented an era in which Spanish foreign and security policy "was exclusively reactive" was clearly an exaggeration.<sup>148</sup> What American dominance did mean was that in those areas most important to the United States Spain was restricted in its policy latitude. However, there was often a gap between what the Spanish considered important and what the United States considered important. Pollack and Hunter characterize the foreign policy of the Franquist era as a pattern of opportunistic exploitation by the regime of particular issues within the context of a set American structure.<sup>149</sup> Franquist foreign policy in the era of American predominance was, in the words of José Mario Armero: "a slow game, without dynamism, filled with patience, that pursued adaption to circumstances."<sup>150</sup>

1957 was a seminal year in both Spanish domestic and foreign policy. On the domestic side, February 1957 saw the ascendancy within the ruling coalition of the neoliberal economic technocrats closely associated with the Catholic lay organization 'Opus Dei'.<sup>151</sup> These economic technocrats, acting in direct response to the conditions set by the international financial community for financing the recovery of the Spanish economy, set about liberalizing the Spanish economic system.<sup>152</sup> Late February 1957 saw the creation of the 'Office of Economic Coordination and Planning' charged with facilitating "a coherent global economic policy" for the nation.<sup>153</sup> In 1959 the important first 'Stabilization Plan' was put into place.<sup>154</sup> The net effect of these (and other) measures was as simple as it was profound. As Carr and Fusi note, "decree by decree Spain was turned into a capitalist market economy."<sup>155</sup> The autarkic and corporatist past was finally repudiated. The subsequent Spanish 'economic miracle' was, of course, rooted both in this liberalization and the foreign investment it made possible: buttressed by aid, tourism, and the resources funneled back into Spain by Spaniards working abroad.<sup>156</sup>

In terms of foreign policy, 1957 saw the appointment of Fernando Maria Castiella (former professor of international law and recipient of the 'Iron Cross' from the Nazi government for his service to the Blue Division) as foreign minister. Castiella replaced the extremely skilful Alberto Martín Artajo, who had masterminded the 1953 agreement with the United States and who was extremely popular with the Americans.<sup>157</sup> The tenor of subsequent Spanish policy began to reflect the Falange-leaning Castiella's philosophical predispositions and clearly mixed feelings towards the United States and the pursuit of a firmly Western identity for Spain.

In general, as one study concludes, the Castiella-era was marked by "a rather independent foreign policy which included ... a hardening of the relations with the United States with regards to the American bases ... overtures to third world countries ... systematic opposition to Israeli policies in the Middle East; active support for the decolonization process; close relations with

Cuba ... and claims to Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar."<sup>158</sup> Castiella's obstinant single-mindedness in regards to this last issue (spectacularly exhibited in a particularly inflammatory book on the Gibraltar issue) earned him the mocking epithet of "Minister for the Foreign Affair."<sup>159</sup>

Denied admission to the prestige organizations, and under the control of the Falange-leaning Castiella, Spanish foreign policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s turned, at least rhetorically, to some venerable, if not outrightly anachronistic, themes. In terms of domestic political considerations however, the move was not without value for the regime. Emphasis on these themes served to manipulate both elite and public opinion. The manipulation was in part intended to blunt and deflect criticism, especially from the right, over the structural inequalities in Spain's subordinate relationship with the United States.<sup>160</sup> During this period Spain energetically (if only rhetorically) resuscitated the old policies of 'Hispanidad' and 'Arabidad'. Each initiative represented the contention that, owing to geo-historical realities, Spain had a special relationship with both the Hispanic and Arab worlds.

Hispanidad (which was most spectacularly manifested in Franco's maintenance of cordial relations with Cuba, even after Fidel Castro's political excommunication by the United States) was a foreign policy concept that had evolved dramatically throughout the 20th century. Moving from a vague (and not historically unreasonable) identification between Spain and the Spanish-speaking countries of the western hemisphere (based on linguistic, cultural, and religious ties) Hispanidad was, in the hands of ultra-nationalists, turned into an ideology with a much harder (if unrealistic) edge. The rhetorical goal was the reestablishing of Spain's dominance by the careful cultivation of totalitarian movements (inspired and directed by Madrid) in Ibero-America.<sup>161</sup> The aspirations were fanciful, though, in the late 1930s (and indeed throughout World War Two) the United States was suspicious that Nazi operatives were

exploiting the movement in order to enhance the strategic position of the Axis in the western hemisphere.<sup>162</sup> With the defeat of the Axis and Franco's ostracism (a move supported by many, though not all, Latin American nations), Hispanidad returned to its earlier, vaguer, form and served (as was the case of Hispano-Cuban relations) mainly as a symbolic snub of the United States. As one author notes, by the 1960s and 1970s the link between Latin America and Spain was primarily a "romantic" one.<sup>163</sup>

Arabidad (the asserted solidarity between Spain and the Arab world, especially on issues of little practical importance to Spain---like the list of Arab grievances against Israel) had a bit more substance to it. The pursuit of the pro-Arab policy by Franco and Castiella had several motivations behind it. First, given Spain's traditional security orientation---south towards the nations of North Africa---and its particular threat assessment (centered on the vulnerability of the Spanish holdings in North Africa), it was a preemptive measure.<sup>164</sup> There was every incentive to maintain good relations with important Moslem countries. Second, given Franco's personal and professional experience (with his long and distinguished service with the Spanish army in North Africa, as well as his reliance on Moroccan troops during the war against the Republic) North Africa was a natural arena for diplomatic attention. Third, the diplomatic attention was a natural progression of the relationship stemming from the lead taken by some Arab countries in ending the ostracism of Spain. Finally, (mirroring the Cuban case) given the increasing American identification with Israel, Arabidad represented another symbolic (if limited) blow for Spanish diplomatic independence in Castiella's increasingly abrasive foreign policy.<sup>165</sup>

September 1963 saw both the first opportunity to renew the 1953 Pact of Madrid and the reawakening of the NATO membership issue, essentially dormant since the early 1950s. From this point on, NATO (along with the security relationship with the United States and the pursuit of EC membership) would be an anchoring issue in Spanish foreign policy and domestic politics.

Spanish foreign minister Castiella, receptive to the complaints concerning the inequalities of Spain's relationship with the United States from the Spanish right, was anxious to convert the bilateral relationship into some sort of broader connection to NATO. His earlier trepidations concerning the Alliance receding, Franco was also amenable to exploring the possibility of beginning a new phase in Spain's relationship with the West. Their motivations in the matter were varied.

From a domestic political standpoint the rules of the international endorsement game had changed and the original prestige flowing from the bilateral relationship had begun to fade. The relationship had served to enhance Franco's prestige, both internally and externally (Stanley Payne describes the achievement of the link as the "apotheosis" of Franco's foreign policy career).<sup>166</sup> It had also, by insuring Spain's overall security, served to free up resources used to concentrate on internal threats to the regime. By the early 1960s, however, with Spain well into the period of the "greatest sustained economic development and general improvement in living standards" of its entire history, prestige was no longer measured simply by the existence of a simple association but by principles of equity and fairness incorporated in that association, as well as Spain's influence within the bilateral relationship.<sup>167</sup> Franco and Castiella knew that the relationship was structurally unequal and the possibility of meaningfully reforming it were necessarily limited. What was necessary was an overhaul of the relationship and NATO membership was one possible way of doing that. Once again, NATO per se was of little importance. Its functional value in other areas was still clearly the chief concern.

In terms of longer range considerations, 1963 represented the 24th year of Franco's regime: 1964 would see the carefully orchestrated celebration of the '25 Years of Peace'. No one in September 1963 knew, of course, that the aging dictator had over a dozen years left to him, years in which he would never relinquish ultimate power over the nation he had seized in

1939. For his part, (according to a close associate of the foreign minister) Castiella was extremely anxious not to "leave undefined the future course of Spain." He wanted to begin to "plan firmly" the post-Franco era of Spanish foreign policy and the Alliance had a role in that future. By carefully reintroducing the NATO membership issue Castiella was attempting to begin the process of defining the parameters of post-Franco Spanish foreign policy.

The post-Franco period, whenever it should arrive, was bound to be tumultuous and Castiella sensed that foreign policy would be a divisive issue. While moderate and mainstream opposition groups might support NATO membership, there was no guarantee that they would automatically win the day once Franco was dead. Afterall, even some of the regime's staunchest supporters were still (in the words of a senior Spanish diplomat) "not terribly keen" on the idea of membership, indeed Castiella himself was no enthusiastic supporter of the Alliance. By bringing up the issue in 1963, Castiella was attempting to introduce an Atlanticist mentality into Spanish foreign policy. The optimal outcome would be to bind the left (when and if it came to power in a post-Franco Spain) to an anti-communist foreign policy, while at the same time weaning the nation from an exclusive reliance on the United States in matters of foreign and security policy.

The NATO membership issue was dealt with in a rather perfunctory fashion in 1963, the aim was to reintroduce the issue, not to settle it. In 1968, after the expiration of the Pact's five year term, the issue was once again brought up, this time with a bit more urgency. Five more years had passed and, once again, no one knew that Franco had seven more years left to live and Spain had seven more years left before facing the profound issues connected to his death. Also, in the years since 1963 the regime had faced what Stanley Payne has called the "recrudescence" of the internal opposition to what remained, despite all the show reforms, a dictatorship.<sup>168</sup> In what would become a common reaction, domestic opposition prompted the regime to look

externally for assistance. After reaching a nadir in the middle and late 1950s, opposition groups of all stripes (e.g. leftist, monarchist, even church-based), began to reconstitute themselves and instances of surprisingly open defiance began to grow. The assumption that the looming post-Franco period would be one of turmoil seemed even more valid in 1968 than it had in 1963. The resurgence of opposition worried the regime. There was a knee-jerk reaction to seek an expanded approval of the regime by beginning to push seriously for Spain's formal entry into NATO.

The earlier discomfort of Spanish nationalists with the bilateral arrangement was matched by a new militant nationalism on the left (a stridency that represented a break with the precedent set by relative moderates like Indalecio Prieto) and the full-embrace of an anti-American, pro-neutralist, orientation for Spain. The new imperative was not just to weaken the apparent American grip over Spain but to provide the positive alternative of a more 'Europeanized' Spain. The result, however, was the same as 1963. As had been the custom since 1955, the American secretary of state (Dean Rusk) stopped in Madrid after the 1969 NATO winter meeting in Brussels to personally brief Spanish officials (including Franco) on the discussions relevant to Spain. During a working lunch Spanish officials were informed that membership in the Alliance was still impossible for the same reason it had always been impossible: Franco. Despite the American argument that internal Spanish political conditions had improved markedly since 1949, and that (since 1953) Spain had been a loyal ally (and practically a member of NATO), the same basic coalition of states rejected the possibility of allowing any government controlled by Franco from gaining the endorsement implied by NATO membership. The battles of the 1930s continued into the late 1960s.<sup>169</sup>

The 1969 rebuff was much less expected and much more difficult to accept than the earlier rejections. As Rubottom and Murphy observe, the veto on Spanish membership was,



given the desire by Spain to gain that affiliation, an "embarrassment."<sup>170</sup> Castiella was livid, immediately implying that other foreign policy options were certainly open to Spain. Since, he argued, NATO membership had been suggested by Spain as an attempt to rectify an unequal bilateral relationship with the United States, and that form of rectification now seemed indefinitely unattainable, perhaps a more general shift in Spanish strategy was necessary. The nature of that potential shift was clear, a move towards a neutralist stand in regards to the superpowers.

Some of the pique was, of course, pure theater, intended to press the United States to press the anti-Franquist allies harder on the membership issue. After all, despite his generally prickly attitude towards the United States, Castiella could not have missed the fact that the United States was not the obstacle. But, given the centrality of the United States for Spanish foreign policy, the United States was the politically expedient target to strike back at. Aggravating the situation was the fact that news of the closed-door meeting was leaked to the publication El Pueblo, and was seized upon by anti-American hardliners as proof positive of American perfidy. There was an odd paradox in place. While foreign policy remained an area of particular interest with the Caudillo (who held the ultimate authority), foreign policy issues also represented (at least on the elite level) the "area of politics where Francoism was most open, with a reasonable degree of debate ... and certainly more opportunities for public controversy than in any other area."<sup>171</sup> Demands rose for some sort of specific retaliation against the United States. The 1963 renewal of the Pact had expired on September 26, 1968 and, while outright repudiation of the agreement was not, in the end, a feasible option, dissatisfaction with the Pact did lead to a pained six month delay in the renegotiation process. For a time, the negotiations were turned over to a military team, but ultimately it was hammered out by diplomats. As they did so, Franco opened selected Spanish ports to visits by the Soviet fleet and took the first steps in a

process of rapprochement towards the USSR; essentially playing a long dormant 'Soviet card' in order to "blackmail the United States into becoming more understanding of the regime in Madrid."<sup>172</sup>

To placate Spanish unhappiness, and in partial compensation for the NATO rebuff, the 1969 version of the 1953 Pact of Madrid represented a substantial expansion in the United States-Spain relationship. While the March 1969 renegotiation kept the security arrangement as (in the words of one Spanish diplomat, interviewed in 1989, involved in the negotiations) the "main, iron-clad" core of the relationship, a host of other non-security arrangements were added. These included new provisions explicitly added in order to make the Pact "more desirable" in the eyes of the Spanish public, to make the relationship "more understandable to Spanish public opinion." These new provisions included expanding trade ties, cooperation in technological pursuits (like space research and the peaceful use of nuclear power), and the establishment of expanded academic and educational ties. The latter efforts were (according to one Spanish negotiator) especially aimed at winning over the next generation of Spanish leaders by exposing them to life in the United States. To settle the deal, and symbolize the 'new relationship', Spanish negotiators were invited to watch the launch of the first Apollo rocket to the moon.

After the 1969 rebuff it became unavoidably clear to the Spanish leadership that NATO membership would not be granted until Francisco Franco was out of power. In Rubottom and Murphy's words, "it must have been clear to every Spaniard that admission to NATO ... would have to wait until Franco's demise."<sup>173</sup> Of even greater concern, the efforts (which dated back to February 1962) to join the European Community had also reached a impasse essentially centered on the same obstacle. While other issues were certainly relevant (e.g. the fear of various Community members of Spanish competition and Spain's fear of industrial inundation), Franco was clearly the most acute obstacle.

Writing in the middle 1970s, Edwards and Wallace observed that: "Detestation of fascism and memories of the Civil War remain influential in determining the reaction of many member states."<sup>174</sup> The battles of the 1930s continued on in the 1970s. While a preferential trade agreement was signed in June 1970, it was a somewhat hollow achievement, a clear consolation prize.<sup>175</sup> It was clear that the agreement was only nominally a step towards membership, it primarily served to freeze the process until a resolution of the Franco issue was achieved, either politically or biologically. All in all, the next years were marked by an air of expectancy, both within Spain and outside of it.

The air of expectancy notwithstanding, an extremely significant cabinet shakeup in October 1969 saw Castiella replaced as foreign minister by Gregorio Lopéz Bravo. The move was partly in response to the longrunning American displeasure over Castiella's chronically intemperate nature (for example, he never hesitated to publicly and sincerely champion Fidel Castro and the PLO). Of equal importance, however, was the place of the dismissal in the final consolidation of Admiral Carrero Blanco and Opus-Dei power in the face of Franco's decline.<sup>176</sup> The new attitude in the foreign ministry was welcomed by the United States.

To be sure, problems remained in the Spanish-American relationship. Spain still sought greater compensation for the bases (though not necessarily in strictly financial terms), and Lopéz Bravo presided over an expansion of Hispano-Soviet relations (as well as establishing diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China). Still, the early 1970s were, in terms of United States-Spain relations, relatively tranquil times.<sup>177</sup> President Richard Nixon visited Madrid in October 1970. Henry Kissinger recalls that the trip to Spain was particularly significant for Nixon. One of his personal "obsessions" was attracting larger crowds than his former boss Dwight Eisenhower (who had visited Spain in 1959). And, while the meeting between Nixon and Franco was intended to address substantive issues (e.g. the

American bases and divergent views on the situation in the Middle East), both Franco and Kissinger fell asleep.<sup>179</sup>

In the long twilight of the long Franco era some significant (if limited) moves were made to set the stage for a post-Franco expansion of Spain's diplomatic status. During early 1975 (and shortly after Franco's death) secret meetings were held in Paris between senior Spanish military officers and NATO officials exploring possible roles post-Franco Spain might fill in the Alliance. In general, however, the lid was on in virtually every area of diplomacy. In Henry Kissinger's words, "Spain was as if suspended, waiting for a life to end so that it could rejoin European history."<sup>179</sup> The freeze was made irreversible by Franco's refusal to bend to the calls for leniency and the September 21, 1975 execution of ETA and FRAP operatives.<sup>180</sup>

There was a growing air of confusion surrounding Spanish foreign policy. The executions sparked an outbreak of fervent protests in France, Britain, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy and diplomatic protests by numerous countries that (along with Franco's failing health and spectacular demonstrations like the Green March in North Africa) began to push Spanish diplomacy to the limit.<sup>181</sup> Once again EC membership negotiations were broken off to punish Spain.<sup>182</sup> Defiant to the end, Franco, in his final appearance before the Spanish people, attributed opposition to the executions to the work of the everpresent "leftist masonic conspiracy" and untiring "communist terrorists."<sup>183</sup>

### Conclusion: The End of Franquism

General Francisco Franco died at 4:20 AM on November 20, 1975. At 10:00 AM that morning prime minister Carlos Arias Navarro (who had replaced the slain Carrero Blanco) spoke to the nation by radio and television and eulogized the long-lived dictator. The tribute began: "Franco is dead. The exceptional man who before God and before history assumed the immense responsibility ... turned over his life, burning day after day, hour after hour, to the completion

of a transcendental mission."<sup>14</sup> The uncertainty of the period leading up to and following Franco's death led to frenzied diplomatic maneuvering on the part of the Spaniards, a panic that once again exemplified the almost instinctive use by the Franquist regime of foreign policy to affect internal politics. The particular circumstance was the renegotiation of the base agreement with the United States.

The negotiations to renew the agreement had begun in 1973, but did not become serious until the early Spring 1975 arrival of a special American negotiator in Madrid. In the early part of the negotiations, the Spanish (according to a senior American diplomat involved in the process) pushed a very hard line. They did not want changes in the facade of the relationship, but actual base closings (e.g. the large airbase at Torrejon, in many ways the most potent symbol of the American-Spanish relationship) in order to demonstrate that the regime was capable of playing hardball with its superpower patron. The matter remained unsettled until the fall of 1975 and the hail of criticism of Spain following the ETA/FRAP executions. The United States was muted in its criticisms and Franco, seeking (in the words of one American diplomat) to gain "proof again that the great and good friend and Spain got along", ordered that the process be expedited. Spanish foreign minister Pedro Cortina Mauri was instructed to settle the matter immediately and provide the regime with an absolutely vital public relations victory.

In part in response to the unsettled state of affairs surrounding its relations with the world, the Spanish offered the United States a major concession. Foreign minister Cortina met with the Americans in New York in October 1975 and proposed a startling deal: the United States could keep everything it had in Spain, and keep the levels of aid unchanged, if the American negotiators would sign the understanding immediately. They did. At an early November meeting in Madrid to finalize the October understanding, however, the Spanish once

again held to a hardline (in part due to a failure in communication between Cortina and the Madrid team, a failure reflecting the ongoing disruptions within the ministry).

Franco's death reversed the situation. Now, deprived of its only leader since 1939, the successor government grabbed once again at the endorsement of the United States. Their only request was to elevate the agreement to treaty status (so it would appear as important to the United States as it was for Spain) and the creation of some aid package that added up to the magical figure of one billion dollars. According to a senior American diplomat involved in the negotiations, the latter calculation was "all done with mirrors."

Two days after Franco's death, Juan Carlos, the foreign-born grandson of the last reigning Borbon monarch, and Franco's choice, swore his oath as King of Spain. Less than two weeks after the oath was sworn, Juan Carlos reappointed Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister. In doing so the new King (who during his long tutelage under Franco had never uttered a word critical of the regime) seemed to confirm the worst expectations of pro-democracy Spaniards. From the perspective of the opposition, many of whom were preemptively arrested, "the institutional strength of continuism seemed formidable."<sup>15</sup> While the cabinet shuffle surrounding the reappointment of Arias Navarro had brought some generally pro-reform individuals into government, Franco's death obviously did not open the floodgate of change.

On the international level too, the pre-death diplomatic logjam, rooted in uncertainty and exacerbated by the September executions, also did not ease after Franco's departure from the scene. Two basic considerations served to buttress the ongoing stalemate. First, international pressure was firmly on the side of a major, if not revolutionary, political change; a change defined as a clear move towards a genuine democratization and the elimination of the most obvious accoutrements of the dictatorial regime. Unfortunately, Carlos Arias Navarro was almost congenitally unable to initiate such a series of moves. While he occasionally showed

himself open to the idea of reform, he just as often almost reflexively appealed to the icons, symbology, and principles of the old era. Arias Navarro was ultimately incapable of accepting the need for change and exhibiting the courage to pursue it. Arias Navarro's placid commitment to what was perceived as necessary change made most foreign governments, especially those in Western Europe, hesitant to embrace this government as the long sought after replacement for Franco. It was 'post-Franquist' in only the strictest sense of the term. As such, there was no rush to incorporate Spain into either the EC or NATO.

Second, there was very good reason to suspect that Arias Navarro would never finish the term allotted to him. Any open-minded examination of the situation indicated that threats to the regime's existence were sprouting up all over the ideological spectrum. The danger emanated from both the radical left and extremist regionalist forces, as well as the radical right. Indeed, 1976 was an intensely unstable year. As Carr and Fusi observe: "In the first three months of 1976, the Arias cabinet was confronted with a formidable wave of strikes and street demonstrations. Both public services (Madrid underground and busses, Barcelona firemen, the post office, the telephone company) and the main industrial sectors were hit by strikes. Between 10 and 19 January more than 200,000 workers were on strike in Madrid alone."<sup>186</sup>

Simmering regionalist demands began to boil up. The Basque group ETA ratcheted up its violent assault on the Spanish state. According to one estimate, in the entire period between 1968 and 1975, ETA had killed 34 people: in 1976 alone 18 would die. In 1976, total deaths from terrorist violence (right and left), as well as from police, reprisals were equal to the total tally of the previous eight years combined.<sup>187</sup>

In trying to steer a complex course in order to mollify the right (which saw any loosening of central control as tantamount to anarchy), satisfy the left (which rejected the notion that Franquism could be reformed), and reassure the international community Arias Navarro managed

to please no one. The January 1976 reform plan was a failure and through the winter and spring of 1976 the violence continued to grow. Spain's international partners pulled back in expectation of a possibly complete collapse. On July 1, 1976, Carlos Arias Navarro tendered his resignation. Two days later, Juan Carlos selected Adolfo Suárez to succeed the failed Arias Navarro.<sup>188</sup>



NOTES

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182. Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace, A Wider European Community: Issues and Problems of Future Enlargement. pp. 114-115.

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**CHAPTER IV.**  
**SPAIN AND NATO: DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS**  
**AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (1976-1982)**

**Introduction**

As it would become clear in time, the failure of Carlos Arias Navarro was the effective end of the dream that some form of Franquism without Franco was a viable political project. The death of the General and the failure of Arias Navarro opened the door to the possibility of great changes in Spain's political life.

The progress of these changes, the ultimately successful (though by no means inevitable) move towards democracy, was the central Spanish drama of the next few years. The slightly more than six years between Carlos Arias Navarro's resignation and the election of a socialist government in 1982 saw a massive change in Spain's domestic political system.

Unchanging in the midst of this tidal wave of internal reform, however, was the traditional Spanish method for dealing with foreign policy issues. In this sense, the move from dictatorship to democracy changed very little. As exemplified in the treatment of NATO membership for Spain by the first two post-Franco governments, the Spanish proclivity to decide foreign policy questions in light of their domestic ramifications remained effectively unchanged. As the case of Adolfo Suárez illustrates, major issues of external relations (like NATO membership) were subject to constant scrutiny through the lens of domestic political considerations and domestic politics.

### The Rise of Adolfo Suárez

Though for many it did not seem so at the time, the ascension of Adolfo Suárez to the office of prime minister represented the actual beginning of the transition to democracy in Spain. The selection was, as mentioned, a distinct surprise, even to those who prided themselves on their familiarity with Spanish politics. As Carr and Fusi note, "almost the entire Spanish political class thought the King would appoint José Maria de Areilza" (the foreign minister).<sup>1</sup> The surprise went beyond the Spanish political class. According to a senior official serving in the American embassy in Madrid at the time and interviewed in 1990, the Suárez appointment had come as quite a shock. The embassy received a courtesy call from a Spanish official shortly before the public announcement of Suárez's appointment was made. While the official did not reveal who the new prime minister would be, he did pointedly mention to a senior American embassy official that it would not be "anyone presently employed by the government."

Adolfo Suárez was not completely unknown to American diplomats. For example, the King had mentioned, according to the United States ambassador at the time (interviewed later) that, on several occasions, he had solicited Suárez's views on political matters; in essence that he had been unofficially "consulting" with the new prime minister. But the former director of the 'Movimiento Nacional' simply did not, in the eyes of many American analysts familiar with the situation, measure up to what seemed to be the inescapable job at hand (i.e., democratization). The judgment of one senior American diplomat at the time (interviewed in 1989) on Suárez was as succinct as it was unfavorable. Suárez was believed to "know nothing about democracy", indeed he was judged not to "know anything very well."

The surprise generated by Adolfo Suárez's appointment by the King was soon matched by the surprise at the rapidity of Spain's move towards democracy under his leadership. With great energy, Suárez began the dismantling of the institutions of the Franquist regime, institutions

that had both nurtured his career and placed him into power. Between July 1976 and June 1977 Suárez moved from being a creature of the dying Franquist regime, through a period as a political independent acting almost paternally to grant democracy to Spain, to being a practical politician backed by a loosely organized and ideologically heterogeneous political party: the 'Union of the Democratic Center' (UCD). As an independent, and as head of the UCD (which emerged --- out of a pack of over 160 parties --- after the June 15, 1977 general elections as the dominant political group), Adolfo Suárez presided over a political transformation that proceeded at a brisk pace.

Many analysts have dissected Spain's successful transition to democracy and several sources for its success have been identified. While most of these factors were purely internal to Spain (e.g. the particulars of the process employed to create the 1978 constitution, the impact of "transactive" processes on the relationship between the major political parties --- symbolized by the 1977 'Pacts of Moncloa', and the positive impact of the basic socioeconomic changes in Spain since the failed democratic experiment of the 1930s) another source for the success of the transition is also relevant.<sup>2</sup> This factor involves the role of foreign policy and the international environment.<sup>3</sup> The influence of this particular variable factor is two-fold, including both the effects of external forces and the handling of foreign policy issues by political elites as internal political questions.

Externally, the dysfunctional circumstances and effects of the middle and late 1930s no longer existed, even in a restructured form. In the 1930s, powerful foreign elements had numerous reasons to want the democracy in Spain to die. In the 1970s, however, as Kenneth Maxwell points out "one of the contributory factors in achieving the sort of negotiated transition Spain carried through is that the process avoided outside involvements and did not become embroiled in the East-West controversy."<sup>4</sup> It was not the case, of course, that the United States

and the USSR were uninterested in the process and its results (as will be shown later).<sup>5</sup> But it is only when the new democracy became divided over a particular foreign policy issue that involved both nations (i.e., NATO membership) that the shared interest became more conflictual. Absent that division, the international environment was (in contrast to 1931-1936) extremely positive.

If the external environment was a positive one for the transition to democracy, issues of Spain's external relations were, at first, of little import in the progress of the nation's transformation. The government shepherding the transition, a government rightly focused on the success of the change, acted in a preemptive fashion to defuse any divisive effects of foreign policy questions (which, in practical political terms, meant NATO membership). As we shall see, Suárez's absolute fixation on securing democratization (buttressed by his own natural inclinations in the matter) led him to fashion foreign policy in response to almost purely domestic political considerations.

#### Adolfo Suárez and the Question of NATO

As mentioned, foreign policy initially played little role in the relationship between the most important political groups. Parties like the PSOE and the PCE certainly had clear-cut party positions on international issues, positions that were often quite radical.<sup>6</sup> But these commitments rarely intruded into the domestic political debate. Foreign policy (including membership in NATO) was neutralized very early on as a practical partisan political issue. In the case of the EC, widespread support for membership, support that stretched across the ideological and partisan spectrum, effectively made the matter a practical non-issue. There was very little by way of clashing visions centered on membership to power political division. The aforementioned 'Pact of Moncloa' (as well as other less formal arrangements) also served to neutralize the question of Spanish membership in NATO, an issue that clearly involved contrary visions. This

inter-party agreement was primarily intended to address domestic political and economic issues (wage levels, strikes, taxation, the pace of political liberalization, etc.). In addition, however, it did feature a foreign policy component. With EC membership "an almost metapolitical value", NATO was clearly the focus.<sup>7</sup> Regardless of any later hedging by the UCD, the PSOE, at least (according to a former top level PSOE foreign policy official), felt that the Moncloa accords represented a clear-cut commitment on the NATO issue, a commitment whose repudiation would let loose a political firestorm. For its part, the communist party also felt it had made a binding deal with the UCD concerning NATO membership and the question of American bases in Spain (i.e. the communists would not insist on the bases removal and, in return, the UCD government would not act to acquire formal membership in the Alliance).

For his part, Suárez, anxious to secure his government and its control of the transition process, turned eagerly to foreign policy as a cost-effective tool to do so, regardless of any external effects of doing so. The pledge not to take Spain into NATO served, in part, to buy peace at a critical time in Spain's political transformation. In return for their tacit support for Suárez's overall transition program, the representatives of the Spanish left received a promise that he would essentially freeze Spanish foreign policy. A pledge was made that the UCD would not prejudice the foreign policy options of any future non-UCD government by engineering any radical changes in Spain's foreign relations.

This reflexive subsuming of foreign policy to the perceived exigencies of domestic politics nicely illustrates Adolfo Suárez's overall attitude towards the proper priority of foreign policy issues. That is, an almost automatic relegation of foreign policy issues to a secondary level of importance. Foreign policy issues were always secondary to domestic issues, with any importance attached to them flowing from considerations on the part of the prime minister of

their impact on the domestic political system. Options were judged against internal standards of practical politics and not selected primarily for their external effects.

On one level, of course, this is hardly surprising and Suárez was acting in an entirely reasonable fashion. Given the hectic and dramatic context in which Adolfo Suárez was operating (as Spain essentially reinvented itself) the primacy of domestic considerations comes as no shock. As a broader matter, however, in one way, Suárez continued firmly in a well established pattern, not just (as we will see) in the resuscitation of venerable themes (and sometimes contradictory tendencies), but in the vision of foreign policy as really nothing more than a lever to affect the regime's survival. Bluntly put, old habits died hard. All throughout Suárez's involvement with the evolution of the NATO issue this venerable predisposition was apparent.

In terms of NATO membership, the first years of Suárez's tenure were marked by a basic contradiction. In 1977 Suárez had allied himself with a centrist party that generally supported NATO membership for Spain, support made official at the first UCD congress in Madrid (October 19-21, 1978).<sup>8</sup> The next congress held NATO membership to be the third most important foreign policy goal for Spain (actually ahead of Spain's relationship with Latin America, the United States, and the negotiations over the recovery of Gibraltar).<sup>9</sup> Adolfo Suárez was, to say the least, lax in pursuing that stated foreign policy goal; this, despite the open support for Spanish membership (support not yet at the level of outright 'pressure') exhibited by many key members of the Alliance. Following the second party congress a list of fourteen foreign policy goals of the Suárez government was issued, a list that did not mention NATO membership. Indeed, Adolfo Suárez characterized the need to gain membership in NATO as neither "urgent nor immediate."<sup>10</sup>

The foreign policy initiatives that were considered to be important were, even to a casual observer, ill-planned and often contradictory, unpredictable nearly to the point of randomness.



For example, while Adolfo Suárez frequently (and apparently sincerely) spoke of Spain as a fully Western nation and irreversibly within the Western political, military, and economic sphere, he also frequently and publicly flirted with what was referred by some Spaniards to as "terceromundismo" (literally, 'third-worldism'). While protesting that Spain possessed a basically Atlanticist orientation, Suárez enthusiastically expanded relations with the communist world and began to promote a resuscitated version of the old Franquist policies of Hispanidad and Arabidad, as well as presiding over new moves in the direction of non-alignment.

As a part of the new push in the direction of Latin America, Spain expanded its relations with Cuba (Suárez visited Havana in 1978) and, after the revolution in Nicaragua, established cordial ties with the Sandinista regime in Managua.<sup>11</sup> While honoring the base agreement with the United States, Suárez also made some very public moves in exploration of a possible non-alignment option. Indeed (in 1979) he once again visited Havana as an observer at a meeting of the non-aligned nations.<sup>12</sup> Suárez also eagerly expanded links with the Arab world (links that were graphically underlined by Madrid's continuing refusal to normalize relations with the state of Israel), including the most radical regimes. In 1979 Yasser Arafat was received by Suárez with all of the honors normally accorded an important foreign dignitary.<sup>13</sup>

The period was clearly puzzling in its contradictions. Two basic explanations can be constructed for Adolfo Suárez's behavior and Spanish foreign policy during this confusing period, including the tepid attitude towards NATO membership. For the sake of clarity, the first possible explanation can be referred to as an 'Atlanticist' explanation, the second as a 'Suárista' explanation: each reflecting the essentially partisan origins from which they have been assembled. Identifying the most accurate of the two is all but impossible. Interestingly, however, whichever is more accurate in identifying the specific motivation for Suárez's contradictory foreign policy, both turn on the primacy of internal (indeed, at times, almost

idiosyncratic) factors to explain the observable contradictions and inconsistencies. The Atlanticist interpretation for Suárez's hesitancy stresses four reinforcing factors shaping the decision to hold back on NATO membership. These include a political factor, an institutional party factor, an international factor, and a personality factor.

#### Suárez and NATO: The Atlanticist Explanation

The political factor underpinning Suárez's hesitancy has already been discussed in some detail. The transition to democracy was clearly the most important issue facing Spain and the effect of NATO membership on that project was reasonably a top priority for Adolfo Suárez. A Suárez adviser in the finance ministry (interviewed in 1989) put the priorities embraced by the Spanish leader very clearly: "the main issue was an internal issue that was just to insure the passage from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one." It is clear that Adolfo Suárez profoundly appreciated his responsibilities in the historic process and saw the question of membership in the Alliance through that lens.

Another senior Suárez adviser (interviewed in 1990) described the Spanish transition to democracy as the Spanish leader's "obsession." Suárez viewed the success of the transition as crucial to the success of his government, democratization was his great national project. The move to democracy was (as a senior Suárez adviser later put it) the sole goal of "the whole operation" of the Suárez government. Success was defined rather grandly. Success meant that the Suárez government would not only "consolidate the monarchy of Juan Carlos ... but the monarchy of the grandsons, of the grandsons, of the grandsons of Felipe" (the Crown Prince). All other goals (including foreign policy goals) were necessarily of secondary importance, indeed they were judged primarily in terms of how they affected the course of democratization.

It was Suárez's estimation that consensus and not confrontation would serve to successfully consolidate the new system by taming the opposition on the left, and his further

judgment that NATO membership was exceedingly unpopular and thus represented a possible partisan flash-point. NATO membership did not seem to have a natural mass constituency and Suárez's mental image of the public's attitude concerning the issue (an image apparently formed primarily on the advice of an odd combination of close advisers and opposition leaders) was that it was deeply unpopular. In 1990, one senior adviser to Suárez remembered how the prime minister saw the legislative constituency for NATO membership: "in parliament the only people in favor of that issue were the Catalans, the Basques, and the AP ... conservative to such an extent that they are all now sitting in parliament with the right." The PSOE's attitude towards NATO, as well as the position of the communists, and the anticipated reaction of each party to membership, was clearly a key consideration for Suárez.

Membership was not perceived as a serious option since (according to a senior Suárez foreign policy adviser) joining "was considered ... as something that very much could be divisive ... something that could imply a big fight with the Socialists" (and the communists as well). Suárez concluded that if he began any move away from the foreign policy promises of the Pact of Moncloa agreement (and towards membership in the Alliance) the left opposition parties would pounce on the issue, feeling themselves betrayed. Inevitably a long slide into divisive political confrontation would begin with literally unpredictable consequences for the coalescing Spanish democracy. By ignoring his party's call for membership (and by pursuing those initiatives labeled 'terceromundista') Suárez could prevent, deflect, and preempt most criticism from the left on matters of foreign policy.

Adolfo Suárez had the luxury of such a calculation because of the particular international environment within which Spain was acting. As mentioned, the superpowers were willing to allow events to develop in Spain in accordance with their own dynamic. For its part, NATO was willing to allow Suárez a generous amount of room in which to maneuver. Private pressure was

modest and public pressure virtually nonexistent. That apparent charitability on the part of the Alliance was rooted in a particular calculation of what represented the best long range result for the Alliance. Most of the Allies fully supported democratic Spain's admission to the Alliance (though the particulars of each nation's support were, as we shall see, very different). While the acquisition of a more formalized and systematic Spanish contribution (in terms of geography, material, and personnel) to western defense was not an insignificant consideration for NATO, the Alliance's guiding calculation was much more subtle. Spanish membership was clearly valued far more for its symbolic aspects than any concrete contributions it might make to the Alliance's military position vis a vis the Warsaw Pact. A guiding principle for the Alliance appeared to be that by avoiding any public pressure on Spain (indeed avoiding any undue private pressure), the political center in Spain (unburdened by the image of slavishly serving foreign interests) would be strengthened in its competition with the openly anti-NATO left and the unpredictable Spanish right. For its part (as Kissinger reports), the United States had, as far back as 1970, realized that too close an identification with any post-Franco political group would harm that faction's standing in the internal political competition.<sup>14</sup>

Too chummy a relationship with the United States would be the kiss of death given the delicate position the United States held in Spanish politics and culture. A strengthened political center (the reasoning went) would ultimately bring Spain into the Alliance. The appearance of pressure to do so would substantially weaken the image of the UCD's independence in the matter. In response to a specific request by the Spanish government, the NATO allies chose a very unobtrusive strategy. A September 1977 comment by the Dutch foreign minister that NATO membership was a price Spain was going to have to pay to be accepted into Western Europe was notable for its uncommon candor.<sup>15</sup> Few of the Allies were comfortable with the idea of either the extreme left or extreme right coming to power in Spain. In the late 1970s, many experts

considered the UCD to be an extremely viable party, its status enhanced by the unacceptability of the alternatives: the Franquist taint of the Spanish right and the shrill ideological puritanism of the Spanish left. The powers in the West bet on the UCD and the NATO hands-off policy served that commitment.

As a matter of symbolism, at least the appearance of an independent choice was crucial. If the image to be sold is that democracy and NATO are natural partners, it hardly proves your point if membership is not seen as the free choice of a free people. One effect of this was that the Alliance's most important member, and Spain's biggest backer, the United States, took perhaps the softest public line of all. For example, in June 1979 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited Madrid, meeting with King Juan Carlos, Adolfo Suárez, and the foreign minister Marcelino Oreja. The long running American support for Spanish membership had been punctuated by the 1976 elevation of the Pact of Madrid to full treaty status (an impossible move while Franco was alive) which had been ratified in the United States Senate along with a call for membership.<sup>16</sup> The issue could hardly be ignored (in fact to do so would have probably brought even more attention to it) but, pointedly, it was the Spanish leaders who brought it up. The matter was handled gingerly. According to Spanish press reports, the NATO issue was treated with nothing less than an "exquisite caution."<sup>17</sup>

A press release from the American State Department following the talks was a model of sensitivity: "We are pleased with Spain and we do not want to create any type of problem. Of course we want membership to come about, but not now."<sup>18</sup> The next year, during a summer trip to Madrid, President Jimmy Carter continued the soft-line. According to the American President, the United States strongly supported Spanish membership in the Alliance but the question was still primarily an internal Spanish matter.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, Spanish membership was often

only referred to obliquely by NATO leaders, sometimes with the euphemism "reinforcing the southern flank."<sup>20</sup>

Institutionally, an incentive also existed to delay action on the NATO membership issue. In the UCD, Suárez led an extremely heterogeneous political entity (representing the fusion of thirteen separate political parties), a party made up of individuals whose greatest point of agreement was the need to dismantle Franquism and to reap the practical political benefits from leading that dismantling. The party's first official description of itself (October 1970) was a model attempt to cover all of the bases. In its eyes, the UCD was simultaneously "liberal, progressive, and pluralist," committed to the "ethic of the Christian tradition," and happy to embrace the notion of the "corrected and socially advanced market economy," whatever that meant.<sup>21</sup>

As one study notes, the party's "ideological and programmatic heterogeneity ... proved to be an obstacle to the harmonious development and functioning of party institutions and ultimately caused disruptive conflict among its 'political families'."<sup>22</sup> Their positive visions of what the future Spain would look like were often simply incompatible. Issues like abortion, divorce, taxation policy, and regional autonomy were divisive, in part because they served to symbolize deeper divisions in the driving philosophies of the various members of the party leadership.<sup>23</sup> While not as divisive, foreign policy, specifically in the form of NATO membership, also served to point to important basic divisions within the party leadership: this time over Spain's basic character and its proper place in the world.

Just as issues like abortion, divorce, taxation, and regional autonomy forced the party to decide on the basic domestic orientation of Spain, NATO membership was connected to the external image. This conflict placed Suárez in a bit of a quandary, vacillating between competing positions in order to minimize divisiveness within the party. As part of the constitutional process,

the domestic issues had to be faced, there was no choice. Foreign policy could be (for a time at least) put on hold and any potential intra-party conflict avoided. Concerning NATO membership (again, the EC was not controversial) Adolfo Suárez found himself caught between two contending blocs within the government and the party, on both the matter of general foreign policy and NATO membership.

The first group was concentrated in two areas, the diplomatic cabinet of advisers located in the office of the prime minister and the persistent bureaucratic holdovers from the Franco era in the foreign ministry. The diplomatic cabinet was an informal but influential group of advisers (numbering less than ten individuals, some with diplomatic experience and others without) who assisted the prime minister in formulating foreign policy. As one senior foreign ministry official noted in a 1989 interview, the importance of the cabinet varied from prime minister to prime minister. Adolfo Suárez liked it. These informal advisers supplemented the regular foreign ministry bureaucracy which was, at many important levels, still fully dominated by Franquist-era professionals, hold-overs who seemed to have no mortality. The ongoing social and political transformation barely touched these powerful bureaucrats occupying the ministry.

A senior Suárez adviser recalled in 1990 that the influence of these individuals was such that the prime minister had "to be careful ... not to give the opportunity for a strong reaction from the whole other body of the government that could crash on top of us." This reticence to confront the holdovers is confirmed by others. For example, upon coming into office in 1982, the first PSOE foreign minister found that in the foreign ministry "there had developed cliques and groups which controlled the administrative life of the functionaries ... in some cases these families were predominantly from the old regime, and there had not been time or the will to reduce them to a normal state during the first democratic government."<sup>24</sup> This group generally supported some version of the 'terceromundismo' with which Suárez flirted and which

comfortably fit the old Franquist flirtations as well: Hispanidad, Arabidad, and (in many cases) a reflexive and simplistic anti-Americanism.

Ironically, the anti-Americanism of these two groups came to be popularly identified as politically progressive despite their inescapably Franquist pedigree. According to a high-ranking UCD government official, (interviewed in 1989) Suárez was constantly pressured by a faction within the party that persistently argued for the adoption of a "more progressive, left-wing, attitude." For its part, the United States government (according to a senior American diplomat who served in Madrid at the time) eventually came to the conclusion that Suárez's foreign policy flowed almost exclusively from the agenda of these groups. An American diplomat who worked with Adolfo Suárez observed that, in terms of foreign policy, the Spanish prime minister was "manipulated somewhat by his advisers."

The second bloc was made up of several senior UCD leaders (not professional diplomats, but often individuals with considerable foreign experience) who were convinced that Spain had to maintain close ties with the United States (expanding the bilateral security relationship by joining NATO), while also expanding connections with Europe (primarily by way of EC membership). This group represented the genuine 'Atlanticists' in the party and it clashed frequently with Suárez on a variety of policy issues. The varied experiences of this group drove home what they believed to be an uncomfortable but vital lesson: Spain had to dramatically alter the ambiguous status quo and put an end to the unreality of 'terceromundismo' and the unrealistic option of non-alignment. In essence, in their view, Spain had to grow up by accepting responsibility for a responsible foreign policy and accepting that it could not have everything it wanted.

Illustrative of this group was Javier Ruperez, an individual well-versed in seeing the so-called big picture.<sup>25</sup> As Spain's envoy to the Helsinki session of the 'European Conference



on Security and Cooperation' (ECSC), he realized that, because Spain was not a member of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the EC, or even the non-aligned movement, it had no legitimacy, no influence, no reason even for commenting on most issues. It was treated as a mere appendage of the United States. The situation was certainly paradoxical: unbound by extensive international ties Spain was also helpless to exert an independent influence on international affairs. In the determination to rectify this weakness, Ruperez was joined by other influential UCD leaders.

Finally, many analysts adhering to this Atlanticist view have returned again and again to the fundamental impact of Adolfo Suárez's personality on the substance of Spanish foreign policy. For many analysts, and persons close to him, the consequences of Suárez's psychological predispositions and personal idiosyncrasies were at the heart of the matter. Given the influence of the powerful leader of a party with effective control of parliament, Suárez's particular personality characteristics were bound to affect policy. Most analyses of Suárez's attitude towards foreign policy emphasize two points. First, Suárez was not primarily interested in foreign policy issues; not just because of the primacy of domestic political concerns during the transition to democracy, but as a matter of his personal predisposition. The whole arena simply did not resonate with him. Second, insofar as he was interested, Suárez was essentially disconnected from the Atlanticist orientation of associates like Javier Ruperez. Many who knew him were impressed by his inability to bond with this faction of his party, and vice versa.

Many observers, including some who were very close to the prime minister, agree that Adolfo Suárez was relatively uninterested in foreign policy issues. Suárez's Atlanticist successor, as leader of the UCD and prime minister of Spain, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo (who served under Suárez as minister of public works, the vice president for economic affairs, and the minister for EC Affairs) paints an interesting picture of his former boss. When Calvo-Sotelo presented

reports to Suárez and the cabinet on the progress of the complex, at times glacially slow, negotiations with the EC on membership for Spain, the prime minister essentially tuned out.

According to Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, once a cabinet meeting turned to foreign policy, Adolfo Suárez would very often turn the chair over to vice president Gutierrez Mellado. Rather than involve himself in the important discussions, Suárez would "leave and stroll ... with some political adviser that spoke to him of internal politics."<sup>26</sup> There are several possible sources for this disengagement.

The first involves Suárez's particular political socialization in regards to international affairs. Only forty-four in 1976 (surprisingly young for a Spanish politician after the virtual gerontocracy of the Franquist era), Suárez's formative years had been during World War Two and the years of ostracism and isolation that followed. Fully in the generation of officially endorsed anti-Americanism, Suárez had been exposed to wave after wave of Franquist xenophobia that continued up until the last weeks of the Caudillo's life; waves of anti-American, anti-British, and (to a degree) anti-French invective. Second, Suárez was personally and professionally ill-equipped to deal with foreign policy.

For example, Adolfo Suárez spoke no foreign languages. While not being multilingual did not guarantee problems, the linguistic weakness was compounded by a peculiar aversion on Suárez's part to the use of translators in the transaction of business. One prominent Atlanticist leader of the UCD who worked closely with Suárez on foreign policy matters later observed that Suárez sincerely believed that "his superiority was a superiority in communication ... he couldn't communicate as well through translation; through translation he lost part of his magnetism, his charisma." Suárez believed that a translator diluted his control over the situation, his power to shape events.

This aversion to translators held sway even during diplomatic episodes of extreme importance for Spain. For example, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo recalls that during a Madrid meeting with EC head Roy Jenkins on the subject of Spanish membership in the organization: "Suárez sat outside, isolated by the technicalities of the negotiations ... bored by the presence of an interpreter."<sup>27</sup> Detachment was certainly not always the case. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo remarks: "how happy Suárez was with his visits to Latin America, without interpreter, without contrary interests to discuss."<sup>28</sup>

To a significant degree, Suárez's vague (but compelling) urge to (in the words of one senior American diplomat who dealt with him) "find a role" in the non-aligned movement, and an almost reflexive desire to seek retaliation for snubs, helped to frame Spanish foreign policy. Even those who are willing to grant him some major engagement with foreign policy emphasize that Suárez conceived of foreign policy as a means to a rather particular end. For example, one Spanish journalist specializing in foreign policy issues observed in a 1989 interview that Suárez saw foreign policy as a path to glory, a convenient method to secure favorable publicity. He craved "cover stories in the weeklies, newspapers, pictures." Suárez had an almost irresistible urge (as exemplified by his meeting with Yasser Arafat) to "do these shocking things," just to keep his face in the news.

Put simply, as this portion of the Atlanticist explanation goes, Adolfo Suárez wanted to be a big fish in a small pond and he resented reminders that the political pond he swam in was tiny. He especially resented reminders from the United States. The trouble between Suárez and the United States was probably rooted in the Spanish leader's socialization during the Franquist period. That basic predilection was certainly magnified after a disastrous trip to the United States in 1977. In the estimation of one American participant in the summit, the outrageous protocol gaffes (e.g., no lunch was scheduled between Jimmy Carter and Adolfo Suárez, only a brief

photo opportunity) and outright slights (no one of any prominence on the American side would attend a reception at the Spanish embassy, even after a personal invitation from Suárez) humiliated the Spanish leader and justified the anti-American attitude he subsequently exhibited (e.g., he would pointedly snub Senate foreign relations committee chairman Frank Church during the Senator's trip to Spain, an act that enraged American diplomats in Madrid). The choice for Suárez seemed very simple and rational: if he was going to be honored in Havana and publicly insulted in Washington, then Havana would receive his attention, no matter that the United States was infinitely more important to Spain.

According to a senior American diplomat who served in Madrid during part of Suárez's tenure, analysts on the scene became increasingly convinced that Suárez's emotions, rather than any sort of well-planned policy aimed at concrete longterm goals, were dictating Spanish policy towards the United States. That diplomat summed up the the Atlanticist view of the ultimate origins of Suárez's foreign policy very simply. Rather than any sort of rational campaign, it was nothing more than "a big combination of his own personal pride, his lack of preparation, and his seeking of greater prestige and recognition."

#### Suárez and NATO: The Suárezista Explanation

Contrasted to this view is another quite viable interpretation of Suárez's foreign policy, including his seeming contradictions on the NATO membership issue. This interpretation does not deny the appearance of vacillation as such, but it also does not attribute it to the reasons outlined above. Rather, the seeming contradictions resulted from a tight connection between Spain's internal circumstances and external behavior and it reflected a conscious strategy to address internal problems with external action. Following a longstanding tradition, Suárez saw the latter as a potentially painless way to affect the former.

The link was broader than securing a temporary agreement for a conditional cessation of an overly disruptive competition between parties. Rather, it was a way to substantially address very broad challenges to the emerging democratic system. Of these systemic challenges, two were of particular concern to Adolfo Suárez: regionalist-based terrorism and the question of dependable access to energy resources (i.e., petroleum). In this Suárezista explanation, both of these issues had enormous implications for the survival of both the Suárez government and its great national project (the transition to democracy), and foreign policy could profoundly affect both.

Of the two issues, the question of dependable access to energy resources was the most chronic. The Spanish pursuit of dependable supplies of petroleum (searching it out wherever it could be found) gave Suárez's foreign policy a radical-tinge that (the argument goes) it did not actually deserve. Spain, with an economy almost entirely dependent on imported oil for its energy production, had been particularly hurt by the petro-recessions of the 1970s and the 'stagflation' that the resource disruptions seemed to make structural. Disruptions in the flow of cheap oil had direct economic consequences.<sup>29</sup> By the late 1970s, Suárez's government faced mounting political demands rooted in the economic pinch brought on by (in the words of one study) "a severe economic decline, triggered by the massive increase in Spain's energy costs in 1974."<sup>30</sup> The extent of that decline is significant. Between 1976 and 1977, for example, the Spanish economic growth rate was down from 2.9% to 2.6% (between 1964 and 1973 growth had averaged 7.3%); unemployment increased by 132,000; and inflation soared from an already steep 19.8% to 26.4% (between 1964 and 1973 it had averaged a relatively modest 7.7%).<sup>31</sup>

According to a high-ranking political aid to Suárez interviewed in 1990, a real fear existed that future oil shocks (coming in the form of disruptions in availability or massive price increases) would irreversibly damage Spain's economic viability; increasing inflation and

unemployment to dangerously high levels. The net-effect might be to push Spain into an Argentina-like condition of enervating economic chaos. The economic consequences of the rise in oil prices had clear political ramifications for Suárez's great national project. As Gunther, Sani, and Shabad observe: "Just as the Great Depression of the 1930s complicated the task of creating and consolidating the Second Republic, a severe economic decline, triggered by the massive increase in Spain's energy costs in 1974, imposed an added burden on political elites."<sup>32</sup> At the very least, "dealing simultaneously with high levels of unemployment and inflation almost certainly contributed to an undermining of public perceptions of the efficacy of government performance."<sup>33</sup>

As he would also do in regards to terrorism, Suárez went to the source. That move resulted in the adoption of what some of Suárez's Atlanticist critiques would rather unflatteringly describe as his "Straits of Hormuz Syndrome."<sup>34</sup> Under Suárez, Spain explored the possibility of expanding and diversifying its access to oil supplies. Reliance upon traditional sources would be supplemented by improving relations with more politically fringe actors (e.g., Iraq). That improvement in relations sometimes precluded particular foreign policy options. Thus, for example, democratization in Spain did not mean the normalization of relations with Israel. That decision was not ideological. Whatever his personal inclinations, Suárez wanted to offend no state capable of helping.

The issue of regionalist-based terrorism (primarily the guerilla-war waged by the Basque group ETA) was much more concrete and much more immediately threatening. The resulting instability was taken very seriously by a leadership both weaned on the Franquist imperative of national unity and now formally committed to the success of democracy. A high ranking political aid to Suárez characterized the difficult situation facing the new democratic regime: "We had problems of stability in the Canary Islands. We had problems of stability in the Basque and, in

some ways, the Catalan." The acceleration of violence was certainly striking. ETA's demands threatened the territorial integrity of the state and its murderous tactics (which increasingly made a right-wing coup seem less and less unlikely) threatened to destroy democracy. In some ways, according to a top Suárez political aid, terrorism was perceived as the "only serious problem threatening Spain" and its transition to democracy.

The seriousness of the terrorist threat was a result of the combination of its uniqueness and seeming intractability. In the case of economic issues, or matters of governmental organization and administration, (as one high level UCD official later observed) "you could find some precedents, some models" for creating policy. But, the official confessed, "about the Basque problem much has been written, but I don't think we knew much about it." To be sure, the problem itself was ancient, but the political realities had changed. The old Franquist policies were now obsolete, but in their absence there was no obvious alternative strategy. Adolfo Suárez reasonably concluded, according to this interpretation, that the internal problem of terrorism also had (as a senior political aid later remarked) clear "international repercussions." These "international repercussions," for example, involved the fact that ETA operatives often found safe haven among the Basque population across the border in France. Beyond that, ETA was a part of a very complex international web of states and political organizations. In a study of international terrorism, Claire Sterling charts the complex network of which (at least by the mid-1970s) ETA was an integral component. In terms of international terrorist organizations, ETA had important links (in terms of arms deals, training, and overall consultation) with groups as diverse as the Italian Red Brigades and the Uruguayan Tupamaros; as well as terrorist powers like the PLO and the IRA.<sup>35</sup>

In terms of its connections to radical states, ETA had been primarily a project of the People's Republic of China until Mao's death. Subsequently, Chinese support dried up. With

very little delay, however, the KGB eagerly stepped in and assumed the role of patron for the Basque extremists.<sup>36</sup> According to Sterling, Spanish intelligence considered the close working relationship between ETA and the Soviet KGB to be simply a "matter of record." In the period 1977-1980, while Spanish-Soviet relations were on a general upswing (the Spanish foreign minister Marcelino Oreja visited Moscow in January 1979 and Andrei Gromyko reciprocated the following November), six Soviet citizens were expelled from Spain specifically for aiding ETA.<sup>37</sup>

In one incident, Spanish intelligence operatives observed a meeting between ETA leader Eugenio Echeveste Arizgura and suspected KGB agent Vitali Kovich in Saint-Jean de Luz, France.<sup>38</sup> With this extensive relationship between ETA and the international terrorist network, Suárez embraced a solution to the problem that represented (according to a top Suárez political aid) "some kind of compound between political and police measures." The quest to stop ETA from destabilizing the new democracy began to increasingly rely on foreign policy. Once again Suárez decided to go to the source, to try and undermine ETA by using diplomacy. In this interpretation, much of the apparent 'terceromundismo' of the government stemmed from the exigencies of this diplomatic effort.

The policy consequences of this overall effort were varied. One was an attempt to enhance existing relations so as to bolster the relatively weak Spanish intelligence system. ETA was always a tough nut to crack, even under Franco. Language difficulties alone made infiltration difficult, and repression often seemed only to generate additional support for the group.<sup>39</sup> Spain turned to the United States, Great Britain (because of the IRA link), and France (for obvious geographic reasons) for assistance. From the first, according to a close Suárez political adviser, (interviewed in 1990) Spain received "good words but nothing else" from the United States. British and French assistance was also disappointing. Coming up short, the



emphasis was shifted to an attempt to sever the link between ETA and its support network outside of Spain.

In his overtures to the governments in Havana, Tripoli, Managua, and elsewhere, in order to outflank ETA, Suárez did not rely on moral persuasion. He fully understood (according to a close political aid) that "in politics you never get a gift, you have to exchange something." While it had a limited inventory of things to trade, Spain was not without assets. To some, like Yasser Arafat, attention from Spain promoted an image of the PLO as less isolated and provided further international acceptance. That recognition was especially valuable coming from a close military ally of Israel's major patron, the United States. Arafat's 1979 visit to Madrid and his reception by Suárez was a prime example of the ploy and the occasion for a bargain. According to Sterling, during that visit a proposal came from the Spanish side. A simple deal was offered: "if the Palestinians promised to stop helping ETA the Spanish government would promise to recognize the PLO." Arafat's argument that he was not in control of those Palestinian factions directly connected to ETA (they were in the Habash faction) scuttled the deal.<sup>40</sup>

To others, like the USSR, the calculations involved were slightly different. Relations between the USSR and Spain had been restored in April 1977.<sup>41</sup> Between 1974-1979 trade between the two countries (while still modest) grew by 500%: with over 100 separate items traded.<sup>42</sup> Trade, of course, was not the chief Soviet goal in its relationship with Madrid. In the broadest terms, Soviet Spanish policy turned on stirring up as much trouble as possible between Spain and the United States. More specifically, as one author observes, the "only objective" of the USSR in regards to Spain was to prevent "at whatever price" its membership in NATO.<sup>43</sup> The issue was not primarily Spain's potential enhancement of the Alliance's military capabilities, since it was both relatively modest (though not insignificant) and already built into Soviet military calculations. As Krasikov argues, Spain's membership would not "exert

any decisive influence on the existing balance of forces."<sup>44</sup> Spain's first ambassador to NATO (and later ambassador to the United States), Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, observed that, in terms of increasing Alliance firepower, in Moscow's eyes "Spain is a minor fear."<sup>45</sup>

The issue was again one of pure symbolism and the USSR, concerned with the diplomatic mileage the United States could get out of membership, wanted Spain to stay out. As Krasikov observes, "for the US government ... the question of expanding NATO was a question of principle ... what mattered was not the size of the extra but the tendency."<sup>46</sup> The Soviets were certainly worried about the "tendency." The USSR did not want Spain in NATO and had used many tools to avoid it. For example, a 1977 statement signed by M. A. Suslov, B. N. Ponomanov, and Felipe González (on the occasion of the latter's visit to Moscow) seemed to commit the PSOE to keeping Spain out. At the 1981 session of the 'ECSC', for example, the KGB circulated a letter over a forged Reagan signature that sharply criticized "Opus Dei pacifists" for blocking Spain's membership in NATO and which advised Suárez to destroy left-wing opponents to membership.<sup>47</sup> ETA seemed to provide the basis for a deal. While never officially accepting the proposition that ETA was closely connected to the Soviet government, during Spanish foreign minister Marcelino Oreja's 1979 visit to Moscow a "straight swap," breathtaking in its scope, was offered by the Soviets. As in the case of Arafat, the deal was simple: "if Spain would promise not to join NATO, Russia would promise to help Spain ... If not, not."<sup>48</sup> As before, the deal fell through.

#### NATO and the Political End of Adolfo Suárez

Whether the confusing and often contradictory foreign policy pursued by the Suárez government (including the issue of NATO membership) was a result of the idiosyncratic characteristics of Suárez himself, or the outward manifestation of a more subtle program, foreign policy itself could never be much more than an adjunct of domestic policy. With either

interpretation the end results were the same. Whatever the source or sources of Suárez's erratic foreign policy (indeed whether it was actually erratic or not), and his ambivalence towards NATO membership, by 1979 Suárez began to distance himself from the more exotic security options. That move occurred (in the words of a close adviser to the prime minister) in a "very strange way." The net effect of the move was that, despite all of his prior trepidations, NATO membership was moved up on the political agenda. The "strange" character of the switch once again demonstrated how foreign policy became a spin-off of domestic political concerns.

At least three factors, all tied to the internal realities of Spanish politics, led to the change. First, by the end of 1979 Suárez was confronted by a new dynamic in the UCD's relationship with the opposition, specifically the PSOE (and to a lesser degree the PCE). The March 1, 1979 general election was a key point in the transformation of this relationship. As one author observes, Adolfo Suárez had enjoyed a generally positive relationship with the various opposition groups, even those on the left. The relationship was "correct," if "not always cordial."<sup>49</sup> The 1979 general election was a key point in the change in this relationship. In terms of the role played in Spanish domestic politics by the NATO membership issue, 1979 was a crucial crossroad. The importance of the election stems from several considerations.

First, contrary to the expectations of many, the PSOE not only failed to win control of the Congress of Deputies, it even failed to significantly improve its position as the chief opposition party in parliament. Rather than consummate, or even foreshadow, a decisive shift away from the political past and towards a political future controlled by the PSOE, the 1979 election represented an apparent consolidation of UCD power.<sup>50</sup> The campaign itself ended up being rather rough, with the gloves coming off towards the end. In a move calculated to appeal to the undecided vote, both on the right and in the center, Suárez, invoking the idea of the useful vote wooed conservative and moderate voters away from the right and from the PSOE by casting

a PSOE victory as a Marxist victory and the UCD as the only reasonable defense against it. He threw the PSOE's rhetoric back into its face. According to a top Suárez political aid interviewed in 1990, it was a strategy to stop the PSOE built around the alarm that "the Reds are Coming."

Suárez made excellent use of the media in his spirited attack on the PSOE (an effort that a close aid claims Suárez found extremely distasteful), especially television. An election-eve broadcast by Suárez on the threat represented by a PSOE victory swayed a substantial number of undecided voters to the UCD. Flushed with victory, some in the UCD began to speak of a "century of UCD government." That confident attitude was reflected in subsequent UCD actions. For example, the investiture of Adolfo Suárez occurred without even pro forma parliamentary debate and the presentation of the opposition's alternative program.<sup>31</sup>

The basic socialist problem was that the Spanish electorate seemed unwaveringly moderate and cautious, and the PSOE was still saddled with a full load of ideological baggage, seemingly unable to work within those electorate-defined limitations. The 1979 disappointment set off a profound (if all too familiar) debate within the PSOE over the sources of its apparent stagnation. That debate proceeded under a crucial (and perhaps not unreasonable) assumption: another general election defeat at the hands of the UCD would brand the PSOE and, in particular, Felipe González as perpetual losers: an image that would be hard to shake. The aim of the spirited socialist debate was to identify the structural weakness within the party that seemed to create a glass-ceiling in terms of votes.

One place in which the electoral weakness did not seem to originate was the personality of the party leader, Felipe González. Adolfo Suárez might have been the best known politician in Spain during the middle and late 1970s, and the UCD might have been the choice of a plurality of Spaniards, but Felipe González possessed an almost hypnotic power over a large portion of the Spanish electorate. As Gilmour observes: "Spain's affection for its socialist leader, who was

known universally as 'Felipe', was a unique phenomenon. No other leader was known by his Christian name ... Felipe was different; he was an inviolable part of the national patrimony."<sup>52</sup>

A more likely source for the party's electoral weakness was the ambivalent image presented by the party, what David Jordan calls the "three Faces" of the PSOE: radical, social democratic, and reformist.<sup>53</sup> That is, the lack of a collective and streamlined identity. The tension left the PSOE open to assaults (from both the left and right) to accusations that the party was too conservative and too radical. A familiar party debate followed that pitted the advocates of the theory that the PSOE was unable to succeed because it was too radical (and frightened off essentially centrist voters) against those who held that the PSOE was not fully committed to educating the electorate on the necessity for radical change and capitalizing on the resulting radicalism. The debate spilled over to the May 1979 party congress in Madrid.

At the tumultuous congress, González and his supporters (motivated by both genuine moderation and sheer opportunism) clashed with the ideological purists, true-believers who had given Adolfo Suárez the opportunity to paint the PSOE as too radical to govern Spain. The delegates to the congress quarreled over three specific points: the retention of a Marxist self-designation, particular aspects of party organization (affecting the ability of more radical elements to shape party positions), and the acceptability of electoral cooperation with the PCE.<sup>54</sup> Winning on the issues of organization and cooperation with the Communists (i.e., rejecting formal electoral cooperation), González was dealt a pointed defeat in regards to the purely symbolic issue of the party's ideological self-designation. Dramatically, González resigned.<sup>55</sup>

The tactic worked and the ideological purists were crushed, ultimately relenting on the issue of Marxist self-designation. The effect was to essentially purge the party of its more recalcitrant left-wing members. A subsequent extraordinary congress in September 1979 (attended by an almost entirely different set of delegates), tidily reflected the manipulation of the

delegate selection process by Felipistas, and was both well-disciplined and loyal. It welcomed González back and applauded his strategy of moderation and the planned expansion of the party's electoral base.<sup>56</sup>

The PSOE extreme left went into an unwilling hibernation as the party leadership settled upon an intriguing two-track program aimed at destroying the UCD. That strategy centered on an attempt to play to the PSOE's strengths and the UCD's weaknesses. The two-track program featured a moderation of party doctrine (almost to the point of ambiguity) in domestic policy and an increase in the party's rhetoric concerning foreign policy. There was one undeniable fact: the only salient foreign policy issue in Spanish politics was membership in NATO.<sup>57</sup>

This decision ratified the end of the age of consensus politics in Spain.<sup>58</sup> A cycle developed very quickly. As the politics of consensus eroded the intensity of partisan attacks increased; as the partisan attacks intensified the consensus eroded. As the consensus eroded (by 1980 the PCE was openly and officially criticizing the ruling party for embracing, even on paper, the idea of NATO membership) joining NATO was no longer so dangerous for Suárez in terms of domestic politics.<sup>59</sup> Relieved of the immediacy of preserving a consensus that seemed doomed, other considerations began to take precedence.

The second factor in the move by Suárez to membership in NATO concerned what a high-level UCD official called in 1989 the "general problematic of the UCD." As mentioned, the UCD was an enormously heterogeneous party. As Gunther, Sani, and Shabad observe, the UCD was made up of at least three distinct groups: a liberal, a Christian democratic, and a social democratic faction.<sup>60</sup> The party was marked by constant debate touching on the most fundamental issues. One study observes that party elites "were badly divided with regard to their ideological stands, their programmatic preferences, and their basic conception of the party and what it should become."<sup>61</sup> In the case of strategy, as the high of the 1979 election faded

surprisingly fast, and the PSOE campaign to discredit the UCD picked up steam (with a concurrent decline in UCD popularity), a debate, in many ways mirroring that which had occurred among the socialists, began within the ruling party.<sup>62</sup>

According to a close adviser to Suárez, clearly in the Atlanticist camp, some factions within the UCD argued that the party's problem was not doctrinal but essentially stylistic. That is, they believed that there was no real substantive problem but, rather, a public relations problem. The public relations problem turned on the image of the UCD as indecisive. Their basic prescription (often reflecting the advice of non-official, and frequently non-Spanish, advisers) was to retake the initiative from the PSOE by introducing some "radical change" in UCD policy, a "shocking" departure from the status quo aimed at revitalizing the image of the UCD as a dynamic party with an important mission. Given the complexity of the domestic issues facing the government, foreign policy seemed a perfect arena for rectifying the image problem. Specifically, there was a call from some sectors to strike a compelling pose and simply (in the words of a senior political adviser to Suárez) "proclaim that we will be joining NATO."

Adolfo Suárez was personally skeptical. In May 1980 the government did release a study on the economic aspects of an entry into the Alliance entitled "The Economic Impact of Membership and Non-Membership of Spain in NATO." The report concluded that membership would cost money for Spain, but little more than the amount necessary to pursue a policy of armed neutrality.<sup>63</sup> Bowing to internal government pressure from pro-membership forces, Suárez, in the early Summer of 1980, permitted work to begin on a detailed plan for Spanish entry into the Alliance within twelve months. The study (in the words of a high-level Suárez political adviser) served primarily to keep "the restless people preoccupied," to mollify the pro-membership sector of the party and government with the illusion of meaningful action.

Despite Suárez's attempts, however, events relating to NATO membership very quickly began to take on a life of their own.

In the middle of June 1980 foreign minister Marcelino Oreja, apparently jockeying for position within the UCD leadership, quite simply jumped the gun. The Adolfo Suárez-Marcelino Oreja relationship has been interpreted in very different ways, running the gamut from Suárez manipulating and leading his foreign minister to Marcelino Oreja manipulating and leading his prime minister. While the foreign minister may not have been as sensitive to the linkage between foreign policy and domestic policy as was Suárez, he did seem to appreciate the advantage that could be made with a calculated move aimed at putting him out front on an important policy issue. In order to do so, Marcelino Oreja gave an unauthorized interview with the publication Ya in which he promised a radical change in the direction of Spanish foreign policy. That change, he claimed, involved imminent membership for Spain in NATO.

Opposition reaction to the public revelation that a major change in foreign policy was in the offing was strong. The PCE introduced a resolution in the Congress of Deputies calling attention to UCD duplicity in the NATO membership issue. PSOE Senator Fernando Morán (who was charged with leading the anti-NATO campaign in the Senate) characterized the move as "imprudent," accused the UCD of a lurch to the right, and (in a move that foreshadowed much of what was to come) rejected the notion that parliamentary approval alone was sufficient to legitimately take Spain into the Alliance.<sup>64</sup> The popular view of the incident was summed up by the magazine Cambio 16.

Describing the incident as a "bomb" it predicted the resurrection of "a difficult national question that, correctly, has been left dormant." In a heartbeat, NATO membership (as no other single issue) became "the major tension between the government and the opposition."<sup>65</sup> Fearing to retreat in the face of the sharp criticism, Suárez, his hand forced by ambitious underlings,



stepped forward a bit. He used the July 1980 visit to Madrid by Jimmy Carter to clarify the government's stand. The only concession to the mounting fury of the opposition was to suggest that imminent membership actually meant at least 1981.<sup>66</sup>

Finally, and more briefly, two international factors (both with, important potential domestic political ramifications) were relevant to the change in course. First, the EC issue was still simmering. The chief obstruction in the latter part of the decade was French domestic political pressures. With an election for president looming, avoiding the alienation of the economically inefficient, but politically powerful, agricultural and vinicultural sector (which feared Spanish competition) became a powerful consideration in foreign policy.<sup>67</sup> For example, the French (and Italians) were troubled by the vision of a Europe awash in a "perpetual wine lake": more wine for everyone, but less money for the politically influential producers.<sup>68</sup> NATO membership increasingly came to be seen as a way to affect the outcome of the negotiations: especially by securing American, British, and (most important) German influence. Second, the base treaty with the United States was up for renewal in 1981. Several basic issues were connected to the question of the treaty versus NATO membership.

For example, would NATO membership supplement a continued bilateral relationship between Spain and the United States or would it supersede it? If the NATO membership supplemented a retained bilateral relationship, would the number and character of the bases need to be reconfigured to meet NATO needs? Finally, if NATO membership superseded the bilateral relationship, exactly how would the old relationship be wound down? The treaty's lapse set a basic set of time constraints. As Marcelino Oreja's successor as foreign minister would later note in a speech to the Congress of Deputies, NATO membership and the treaty renegotiations were linked in that the latter implied "a necessary time parameter, but it doesn't necessarily imply that

the time parameter requires a definitive, irrevocable, and permanent decision on the issue of entrance or non-entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."<sup>69</sup>

Ironically, the UCD's uncoordinated move towards NATO had the domestic effect expected by some of the Atlanticists. The party now had a clear (if yet unfulfilled) foreign policy orientation valued by that group. Unfortunately, from the perspective of Adolfo Suárez and the UCD, this new clarity of image also had a downside. Specifically, the general impression persisted that, with democratization an established fact, the domestic mission of the UCD was rapidly coming to an end. In addition, there turned out to be little truth in the stylistic argument, at least in regards to NATO membership. That is, the UCD's popularity was not enhanced by membership (despite the daring character it was supposed to reveal) both because of the confused nature in which it was resurrected and the general lack of mass support, a popular constituency, for membership. The image of confusion in the realm of foreign policy (an image enhanced by the PSOE's efforts at smearing Suárez and the party) was part of the UCD's problem. NATO membership, however, simply was not the solution.

Reflecting both conscious manipulation by opponents of the UCD, as well as a basic predisposition to opposition, there was an undeniable lack of support for NATO membership among the Spanish populace. American diplomats in Madrid had detected this lack of a constituency (and reported it to the State Department) as early as 1978. While polling data on this particular issue is woefully thin, by October 1981 a majority of Spaniards were (to a greater or lesser degree) opposed to membership in the Alliance (a poll of 3000 Spaniards conducted under the auspices of the paper El País --- a publication not unfriendly to the Spanish socialist left --- showed 52% of respondents opposed to membership).<sup>70</sup> As Smyth and Preston observe, the Spanish public was simply "not convinced by the argument that Spanish participation in

NATO would be the most effective way to deal with the requirement of defense and national diplomacy."<sup>71</sup>

The NATO membership issue began to boil during the evolution of what Carr and Fusi have referred to as the "crisis of Suárezism," the stunning disintegration of the UCD.<sup>72</sup> As Rafael López Pintor, who was intimately involved in the issue, points out, the basic problem of the UCD was rooted in a "leadership that failed to meet the challenge of political modernization."<sup>73</sup> More specifically, the lack of a genuine mass base permitted the hermetically sealed party elite to struggle over the esoteric and arcane. The leadership became immersed in what one analyst calls "sterile pseudoideological debates."<sup>74</sup> The debates may have been false, but dissolution of the leadership into its constituent ideological components was a concrete result. Once the ideological lines were clearly drawn, the desertion of the party by elite arid cadre was not far behind.<sup>75</sup>

The subsequent "revolt of the barons", governmental instability, and the ultimate resignation of Adolfo Suárez as prime minister (January 29, 1981) brought a new sector to leadership within the party and within the government. The overwhelming sense that the justifying mission of Suárez's government was simply exhausted with the success of democratization is clearly detectable in the Spanish leader's announcement of his resignation. Speaking to the nation he observed that "My political power has eroded during my five years as prime minister. No other person, during the last fifty years, has for so long democratically governed Spain. But the building of a system of liberties, a new model of social coexistence, and a new model of the state, has been at the expense of my political forcefulness. I think it has been worth it. But I do not wish to see this democratic coexistence become, once again, a parenthesis in the history of Spain."<sup>76</sup>

The foreign policy version of the domestic "revolt of the barons" was the rise of the Atlanticists. The ascendancy of the Atlanticists was foreshadowed by Adolfo Suárez's choice of

José Pedro Pérez Llorca as foreign minister to succeed Marcelino Oreja in the Fall of 1980, and ratified by the rise of Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo to the position of prime minister in the winter of 1981. The left immediately characterized the leadership changes as a move to the right.<sup>77</sup> On one level they were correct, but the issue was far more complicated. In the realm of foreign policy, the ascendancy of the Atlanticist faction represented the eclipse of what Anxton Sarasqueta has called the clear-cut "Africanist" mentality that "long predominated among government leaders" in Spain.<sup>78</sup> In terms of NATO membership, the switch from the lingering 'Africanist' mentality was crucial. The new leadership possessed a particular pedigree. In stark contrast with Suárez and his entourage, the Atlanticists were (in Sarasqueta's words) "descended from opposition to Francoism or from the structures of Franco's Spain, the defense of Europe, and pro-Atlanticism."<sup>79</sup> They fancied themselves as the guardian of the big picture in foreign policy.

The switch was subtle but crucial. Insofar as he considered the external impact of NATO, Adolfo Suárez had seen the Alliance as, at base, a military security arrangement. Given that Spain's security was well taken care of by the bilateral arrangement with the United States, and that NATO did not clearly address the area of major historical concern to Spain (North Africa), the domestic political ramifications were absolutely more important to Suárez. For the Atlanticists, the domestic political ramifications were also important, but they were unavoidably bound up with the politically symbolic character of the Alliance and membership in it.<sup>80</sup>

Immediately upon assuming responsibility at the foreign ministry, José Pedro Pérez Llorca began a hard sell to the still wavering Suárez. His argument had two basic elements. The first involved the substance of Spain's foreign policy priorities. According to Pérez Llorca (interviewed in 1989), those centered on "Europe, NATO, and the base agreement." All other considerations were secondary at best, illusory at worst. Second, while Europeanization (symbolized by EC membership) and the base agreement with the United States both had their

own dynamic, NATO had to be addressed much more aggressively. Because of that, it became central in Pérez Llorca's plans. Pérez Llorca advised Adolfo Suárez that he was simply unable to "devise a foreign policy for Spain as a western country, western democracy ... outside the framework of NATO."

In the face of calls to avoid membership because it would constrict Spanish latitude in foreign policy, Pérez Llorca recalled in 1989 arguing that "within the framework of NATO we are able to follow many different techniques, to follow different models ... basically to become a country that was accepted, that was an ally, to contribute in a certain way." He would later publically restate the position by arguing that inside of NATO Spain would not lose latitude but gain it, Spain would have "more weight," not less; it would be "more respected and more active .. for the defense of our interests."<sup>31</sup> In response to the call to avoid membership because NATO was a pseudo-European American enterprise (the basic public position of the PSOE, though its rather incongruous alternative was to retain the bilateral relationship with the United States), Pérez Llorca recalls telling Suárez that he could not see "any intellectually conceivable platform by which we should be tied to the United States by a military agreement and not be willing to enter NATO because the United States was a part of NATO; it was a totally illogical position and I couldn't accept it."

According to one source in the Atlanticist camp close to the issue, Adolfo Suárez relented in the face of Pérez Llorca's insistence and gave his foreign minister permission to officially begin the process of gaining membership. With an overwhelmingly positive response by most of the allies, a meeting was held in mid-January 1981 where a decision was taken to finalize membership by September 1981.

The move to membership was disrupted by Suárez's resignation. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo succeeded Adolfo Suárez both as UCD leader and prime minister of Spain. Neither office was

obtained easily. UCD leadership came only after a bitter confrontation with frustrated Suárez supporters (who sensed that the leadership change augured something more fundamental for the party) beginning at the party congress in Palma de Mallorca.<sup>82</sup> Calvo-Sotelo's election to the office of prime minister by the Congress of Deputies was delayed by the February coup attempt when ultra-right wing operatives took control of the legislature during the televised investiture process.<sup>83</sup> While the coup attempt ultimately collapsed, it had an enormous impact on the subsequent progress of political events in Spain (including the debate over membership in NATO). With Calvo-Sotelo finally in charge, the character of Spanish politics changed.

#### NATO and the Ascendency of the Atlanticists

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo was a complex individual. One writer has characterized Suárez's successor as "ambitious but unwilling to face the consequences of his ambition."<sup>84</sup> There is no doubt he brought a different attitude and style to the office; more the cerebral technocrat than the aspiring populist. Domestic politics, as such, were not the overwhelming priority they were for Adolfo Suárez. As Robert Graham writes, Calvo-Sotelo was: "Fond of music and books he had a natural distaste for bashing heads together and mudslinging. He stood aloof, giving the impression first of calm and then sheer indecision. With his large glasses and high domed head he came to look like a sleepy owl worried about falling off of his perch."<sup>85</sup> Calvo-Sotelo and Pérez Llorca (who had been retained as foreign minister) moved swiftly to implement the tentative Suárez decision on NATO. The new government was, in part, motivated by the desire to deal (for as long as it was available) with a friendly parliament. Beyond that, there was a plan to use membership in an overall clarifying process in Spanish foreign policy. That clarification process would serve to clearly distinguish the new government from the old.

The process of clarification (according to Pérez Llorca) involved a decisive move from Suárez's embrace of a jumbled and ill-defined international policy to a more limited foreign

policy. As Pérez Llorca later described the difference, Suárez's international policy attempted to "express Spain's position in all important fields of international policy," it spread Spain's attention and resources very thin. A foreign policy limited the nation's attention to "the main problems which affect ... our democracy." The basic aim was to avoid any situation where the government could be attacked for "being involved in all kinds of possible things," while not doing anything very effectively, a common critique of Suárezist foreign policy.

The process of clarification required a considered operationalization of options. That is, taking a broad orientation or aspiration and identifying clearly what was necessary in a concrete policy sense and calibrating foreign policy to accomplish that goal. For example, Europeanization not only meant EC membership, it required a focus on settling the concrete issues connected with membership. The vague inclinations of Arabidad were defined in terms of solidifying ties with Morocco and safeguarding Spanish holdings in North Africa. Westernization meant NATO membership.

As they accelerated the NATO membership drive (culminating on December 9, 1981 with an invitation from the Alliance for Spain to formally apply for entry) it is clear the goal was seen symbolically and not in terms of its security implications. The symbolism had two dimensions: a practical (or functional symbolism), and a deeper (self-definitional) symbolism. The first dimension, the practical or functional symbolism, was a reassertion of the analyses of 1979: the UCD was suffering in comparison with other political parties (primarily the PSOE) because it would not take clear stands, if it would it would be rewarded.

By staking its future in part on NATO membership Calvo-Sotelo and the UCD was, in Treverton's words, "searching for surrogates for a foreign policy it did not really have."<sup>66</sup> The EC negotiations (in part because of the coup attempt) were proceeding with their customary slowness. A Spanish observer noted in August 1981 that the NATO issue and the future of the

UCD as a political force in Spain had become "unexpectedly" and "surprisingly" bound together.<sup>77</sup> Unfortunately, the analysis was even more wrong in 1981 than it was in 1979. The UCD was out of touch with public opinion.

Amazingly, quite unlike either his predecessor and successor, Calvo-Sotelo operated in seemingly complete isolation from the public opinion realities connected to the issue. Unlike Suárez's deep concern for the balance of mass opinion, and the PSOE's keen appreciation for the same balance, Calvo-Sotelo commissioned no official polls to illuminate himself on the matter. Whereas Adolfo Suárez had postponed membership (for good or ill) to service a clear set of domestic priorities, the new leadership pursued membership for a bewildering set of reasons. If they had no polling data of their own, the Atlanticists also did not pay attention to the data more generally available. For example, a June 1981 poll of 1200 Spaniards conducted for Cambio 16 showed only 27% supported membership. Indeed only 34% of UCD supporters wanted to join. Yet the Calvo-Sotelo government pushed on as if sheer decisiveness would be its own reward.

That persistence in the face of opposition is explained in part by the second, symbolic, dimension connected to NATO. The symbolic power of NATO membership was summed up by José Pedro Pérez Llorca in 1989: "the time had come to make an historical restitution, to place Spain where Spain should be: and Spain should be in NATO ... because NATO was where the main western democracies were." As Sarasqueta suggests, this general vision draws on a particular analysis of Spain's history embraced by the Atlanticists. This analysis linked Spanish ills directly to Spain's position within the international community. The relationship was reinforcing: Spain's political, social, and economic problems (e.g., economic backwardness and authoritarianism) stemmed from its isolation from the mainstream; and its isolation from the mainstream was a result of its political, social, and economic retardation.<sup>78</sup>



The Atlanticist argument was clear, if not necessarily self-evident: the only way to break the chain of economic and political atavism was to link Spain to the modern world this perception was in direct opposition to the autarkic impulse lingering within some sectors of the UCD (and other parties). There were material benefits to be had from the linkage, but it was the sheer fact of the linkage that was ultimately most valued. The matter was frequently cast in grandiose terms. Calvo-Sotelo would later describe NATO membership for Spain as representing nothing less than "the end of our extremely long historical decadence and the beginning of a new way to be Spanish."<sup>89</sup>

Throughout the summer of 1981 pro-membership and anti-membership forces jockeyed for position and influence over public opinion in what one analyst has labelled the "first campaign."<sup>90</sup> The split was clearly partisan, pitting the right and center against the PSOE and PCE. Each had its own goal. With effective control of the legislature, pro-membership forces focused on softening up public opinion in preparation for the inevitable implementation of the membership policy by the Congress of Deputies. Membership was going to happen and the pro-membership forces sought to make it as acceptable as possible. Anti-membership forces sought to mobilize public opinion against the move so decisively that the membership process might be aborted or, if brought to term, reversed as soon as possible. In an extremely significant move, opponents to membership very early on fixated on the issue of a national referendum to settle the matter.

The government, which was slow to get the pro-membership operation in gear, clearly relied heavily on reasoned arguments aimed primarily at the political elite, rather than any real attempt to mobilize mass support. The opposition utilized sympathetic media (often including, ironically, state-controlled television) and striking demonstrations of mass disapproval that often claimed temporary control of the streets of Madrid and other large cities.<sup>91</sup>

For example, a July 5 anti-NATO rally in Madrid's vast 'Casa de Campo' drew 50,000 demonstrators. Those in attendance heard fiery anti-membership speeches from the UGT's Pablo Castellano, Fernando Sagaseta (representing the Canary Island's nationalist movement, the 'Union of the People of the Canaries'), Luis Otero (of the defunct 'Union Militar Democratica'), and communist labor leader Laureano Cuerdo. The demand for a referendum was extremely popular. For example, Cuerdo defiantly promised the crowd: "If the government does not convene a referendum we are going to assemble the 500,000 signatures necessary in order to make it do so."<sup>92</sup> Similar rallies were held elsewhere in Spain. Their success was, in part, a vindication of the adage that crowds attract crowds. By contrast, the UCD's 'salon strategy' seemed anemic in the face of this calculated display.

The leading Spanish newspapers and magazines, as one analyst points out, quickly chose sides. Influential publications like EL Pais as well as less prestigious publications (e.g., Interviú, which regularly features naked young women along with its political articles), and those periodicals attached to very specific constituencies (e.g., El Alcazar and Mundo Obrero), opposed membership for a variety of often conflicting reasons. They were countered by publications like Ya, ABC, Cambio 16, Diario 16, and the catalan paper La Vanguardia.<sup>93</sup>

In both the pro-membership and anti-membership campaigns the arguments utilized tried to tap into the themes extant in Spanish political culture in regards to foreign policy. The opposition displayed a superior appreciation for the material they had to work with. Although Felipe González acted as his own shadow-foreign minister, the PSOE's anti-membership position was most coherently (and certainly most succinctly) summarized by Senator Fernando Mórán.<sup>94</sup> The PSOE attack contained seven distinct points.

First, the bloc system structuring the Cold War world was wrong and by joining NATO Spain perpetuated the unnatural division of the planet. Spain ought to be seeking global unity,

not supporting its division. Beyond being unnatural, that division was dangerous. The blocs would eventually bring on war. As Morán observed, "not only for reasons of the general peace, nor for reasons of survival ... membership in NATO is a negative." Second, membership, by perpetuating the unnatural arrangements of the bloc system, also perpetuated the unacceptable hegemony of the two global superpowers, especially that of the United States. That hegemony, despite appearances to the contrary, was dying. By joining NATO, Spain would be prolonging an "anachronism." By joining NATO Spain was endorsing the United States' continuing dominance over Spanish affairs: it was an act of self-flagellation.

Third, in terms of military security and diplomatic standing, NATO membership represented a bad bargain. The bargain was bad because it exposed Spain to unacceptable risks without actually addressing its particular security concerns (e.g., the retention of Ceuta and Melilla). Morán was quite clear in his critique: "NATO does not, in any manner, increase our military capability nor diplomatic capability, and it increases our risk." Fourth, Spain could not remain nuclear free after joining NATO. The pressure from other Alliance members would be too great. Just as Germany, Great Britain, and Italy played host to nuclear weapons, Spain would ultimately be forced to become a platform for weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the moral taint associated with conspiring to bring the deaths of thousands, the existence of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil opened the nation up to devastating retaliatory strikes from the Soviet Union in the event of war.

Fifth, the expected benefits from membership in terms of military and economic modernization were by no means guaranteed. What was guaranteed was the necessity to spend more tax money bringing Spanish forces into line with NATO requirements. The Alliance did not want a technologically backward ally. PSOE leader Enrique Mugica, for example, estimated that

the cost of membership to Spain would exceed 840 million dollars. Socialist Luis Solana calculated the cost as nothing less than national "independence."

Sixth, despite the comforting visions of the Atlanticists, the connection of NATO membership to democracy was hardly deterministic (a reality that, ironically, Adolfo Suárez fully appreciated). As demonstrated by the examples of Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, membership did not guarantee democracy for the member states. At best, NATO had a speckled record of encouraging and defending democracy in its member states. For example, the less than ringing endorsement of Spanish democracy by the United States in the face of the February 1981 coup attempt was troubling.<sup>95</sup> Finally, regardless of any other issue involved, membership ought to be decided by consultation with the public via a referendum. The 1978 constitution was both clear and unclear on the use of a referendum in matters of foreign policy.<sup>96</sup>

While one of the document's provisions (Article 87) forbids the use of a referendum to settle a foreign policy matter, another article (92) permits its use in matters of "special transcendence."<sup>97</sup> The opposition to membership held membership to be of such transcendent importance. Morán argued that: "Does there exist a more transcendent question than entrance into NATO, that signifies a change in Spain's traditional position and makes both her foreign and defense policies dependent? Not to hold a referendum would be to fall into an attitude contrary to a democratic conscience, it would break the connection between the most minimal democratic values and would demonstrate an historic inaccessibility to the mind of the Spanish people."

One economic adviser to the prime minister, interviewed in 1989, characterized the spirited assault from the left: "it is one thing to say we don't agree, another to say that if you come in by a simple majority ... then we will go out by a simple majority also, that was very irresponsible." Despite its contention that the issue was too important and "too complex" for slogans and street corner politics, the pro-membership forces tried to offer a response.<sup>98</sup> They

were only partly successful, often times hobbled by divisions within the government. Even Spanish television, while ostensibly under the control of the state, offered frequent, non-neutral, analyses of the membership issue that reflected the "third world, pacifist, and ... not particularly pro-American tendencies among its editorial staff."<sup>99</sup>

While chronically uncoordinated, the pro-membership rejoinder was centered on seven points. First, there was a call for political realism in the form of a recognition that the bloc system was an enduring reality that Spain and its foreign policy could not hope to change. Spain had to accommodate itself as best it could to the geostrategic situation and realities that it faced. The attitude was best expressed by Marcelino Oreja well before the 1981 debate. During a March 1970 trip to Tripoli, the foreign minister remarked that the East-West bloc system "has its own dynamic sufficient to carry it into the foreseeable future" and that Spanish foreign policy could do little to change that.<sup>100</sup>

Writing in 1980, a supporter of Spanish membership in the Alliance put the choice facing Spain very clearly when he noted that: "The Peninsula finds itself on the battle axis between two blocs. It is necessary to opt for integration, with all of its consequences."<sup>101</sup> In an October 1981 speech to the Congress of Deputies, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo observed that: "Military blocs exist, though we would all prefer to live without them. But as long as there is a wall in Berlin, the Government and the Government party knows on which side of it they want to be."<sup>102</sup>

Second, there was an insistence that NATO was not an organizational facade for the American control of Europe. While the United States was the most powerful member of the Alliance, in most ways its leader in matters of policy, NATO was primarily a European entity. After all, thirteen of the Alliance's fifteen members were in Western Europe. As Pérez Llorca argued, refusing to join NATO because the United States was a member, while retaining the bilateral treaty, was both logically incoherent and vaguely Franquist. It was also one of many

anti-membership opposition arguments that UCD defense minister Oliart characterized as falsifiable "with almost the same reasoning with which they are affirmed."<sup>103</sup> Far from solidifying American influence over Spain, NATO membership would dilute the control that the bilateral relationship perpetuates and enhance Spanish sovereignty.<sup>104</sup>

The real problem, as one supporter of membership pointed out, was not any alleged Trojan Horse character of NATO (in which American dominance of Europe rolled in under the guise of defending the continent from the USSR), but the existing and demonstrably unequal treaty relationship: "the US is too much an elephant to give a permanent invitation into our modest dining room."<sup>105</sup> For one membership supporter, the issue was almost painfully clear: "maintaining the status quo with the United States is humiliating and the only viable solution ... is the entrance ... in the defense pact of western democracies."<sup>106</sup>

Third, on the matter of cost versus benefits, supporters argued that membership would entail neither a serious increase in financial outlays nor a serious increase in the threat (particularly in terms of nuclear attack) to Spain. Writing in support of membership, Jorge Fuentes dismissed the notion that membership placed Spain in increased danger of nuclear attack, since the USSR had been targeting Spain ever since its de facto linkage to NATO in 1953. In this regard, membership changed nothing.<sup>107</sup> On the matter of money, Guillermo Medina, UCD delegate and head of the Defense committee in the Congress of Deputies, argued that membership would result in only a modest increase in defense outlays (no more than 15 million dollars) an amount "more reasonable than a policy of armed neutrality."<sup>108</sup>

Fourth, in the view of supporters of membership, the opposition claim that membership inevitably meant the ultimate nuclearization of Spanish territory flew in the face of both policy and precedent. As a matter of government policy, the UCD entered into the membership process guided by a modified non-nuclear principle with its roots in the middle 1970s (Spain did not

allow foreign weapons on its soil, but it reserved the right to construct its own).<sup>109</sup> As a matter of precedent, the party argued, there were several NATO countries that did not allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory. The matter was worked out more or less amicably so that membership did not automatically equal nuclearization.

Fifth, those supporting NATO membership for Spain recognized that it did not guarantee democracy to any member state. Ultimately the creation and maintenance of democracy was up to the individual state. But, along with other affiliations, NATO membership would spin a web around Spain that could certainly provide intangible and tangible benefits for the viability of Spanish democracy.<sup>110</sup> Beyond that, there was no sensible argument to be made that membership damaged any nation's democratic aspirations. Membership might not guarantee democracy but it also certainly did not preclude it.

Sixth, by joining NATO, Spain would not be (as opponents claimed) ignoring the position of Ceuta and Melilla and would also take a giant step towards the resolution of other important foreign policy issues. In the case of Ceuta and Melilla (which one analyst christened the "most polemical issue" in the entire debate), and the possible threats to the North African enclaves, the NATO arrangement would (based on geographic limits) seem to exclude the provinces from protection, a defect relentlessly hammered on by opponents to membership. The pro-membership argument, however, centered on the claim that "the non-inclusion of Ceuta and Melilla in the Treaty of Washington ought not be interpreted as a disinterest on NATO's part."<sup>111</sup> As integral parts of Spain (and not colonies), Ceuta and Melilla would be automatically included, regardless of the Treaty of Washington's geographic stipulations, under the defense umbrella.

In regards to other important issues, NATO membership was cast as a vital first step in achieving resolution. The EC-NATO link was relatively soft-peddled, the ever-emotional issue of Gibraltar was tackled head-on. Despite the opinion of some naysayers, pro-membership forces

trumpeted NATO as a tool for recovering Gibraltar from the British. UCD defense minister Oliart commented that moves toward membership increased the possibility for "fruitful negotiations" concerning Gibraltar.<sup>112</sup> Another UCD leader observed optimistically in a Spanish press report that "The thing is, if we enter NATO we are going to get the British to return Gibraltar to us. If we do not enter they won't give us anything. The strategic position of the Rock is such that neither the English nor NATO would ever permit its transfer to a country outside of the military organization."<sup>113</sup>

Finally, pro-membership forces tried to popularize their guiding Atlanticist vision, to paint NATO membership as part of a greater and grander process and plan for Spain. Reference has already been made to the view by top UCD leaders after Suárez that NATO membership, along with membership in the EC, was a matter of national destiny, defined in internationalist terms. They were both part of an irresistible process that would put an end to the (in Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo's words) "miserable isolation that had lasted two centuries."<sup>114</sup> Oliart cast membership as the logical conclusion to decades of Spanish foreign and defense policy.<sup>115</sup> One analysis flatly claimed that remaining outside of NATO would "liquidate" Spain as "an industrial nation."<sup>116</sup> One supporter of membership (writing in Cambio 16) put the Atlanticist vision very eloquently.

Noting that "since the Napoleonic Wars there has existed a sad correlation between international isolationism and continuing civil conflicts," Tomas de Salas argued that: "The decision to join NATO ... has an historical significance of the first magnitude. It is the decision putting an end to the decadence inevitably provoked by Spanish isolation. It is a decision to stop being a closed country that ... murders itself in its own blood. It is the decision that brings into practice the Spanish dream of regeneration." Admitting that membership might frighten the "most pusillanimous or xenophobic sectors of Spanish society," the author lauded the ongoing



process of opening that permitted Spaniards to discover "with their own eyes that the world is infinitely more than Barcelona, Bilbao, Sevilla, or Madrid."<sup>117</sup>

### Membership is Achieved

For its part, Soviet heavy-handedness and diplomatic ineptitude helped the pro-membership cause. For example, in September 1981 the Soviet ambassador in Madrid presented a note from the Soviet government to foreign minister Pérez Llorca on the subject of Spain and NATO. In a 1989 interview, Pérez Llorca characterized the communication as "very rude" and so hostile in tone that it "menaced Spain in a political and military way." The note strongly implied that membership in NATO would be the functional equivalent of a Spanish declaration of war against the USSR. The Spanish foreign minister refused to officially accept the note. Privately, however, he leaked the contents of the communication to the press in an attempt to contrast outrageous Soviet behavior concerning membership with the virtual silence of the United States. The tactic was fairly successful. The PSOE was forced to repudiate the activities of the Soviet Union and Felipe González publicly admitted that Soviet "meddling" represented a gift to pro-NATO forces who could argue that "since the Russians don't want it membership must be a good thing."<sup>118</sup>

The November 1981 vote in the Congress of Deputies (to authorize the UCD government to negotiate the terms of Spain's entry into NATO) followed seventeen hours of debate stretched over three days. The 186-146 pro-membership vote was pro forma in that party positions had hardened irreversibly. As one observer noted in the press, no possibility existed that the respective groups would convince their opponents or cause them to change their opinions.<sup>119</sup> More important than winning votes in the Congress of Deputies was swaying potential votes in a future general election by slavishly pandering to the sectors of the public the proponents and

opponents targeted. The debate, and the various attempts to block the legislative authorization (primarily by tying it to impossible conditions), produced an often colorful give and take.

One member of parliament likened Ronald Reagan to a Mafia "Godfather." Communist leader Santiago Carrillo complained that, in the event of nuclear war, Calvo-Sotelo did not "have a red phone to tell the bombs to stop." Fernando Sagaseta (Canaries nationalist leader) warned that "in the highest imperial spheres our archipelago is contemplated with a special, lethal, greed."<sup>20</sup> The 186-146 vote opened the door to an official invitation from the Alliance for Spain to join and the ratification process for that application. The defeat in the Congress of Deputies for opponents to NATO membership, particularly the PSOE, was mitigated by two important considerations.

First, some hope still existed to prevent the consummation of the Spain-NATO relationship, hope centered on the Alliance's ratification process. The overall NATO reaction to Spain's application was extremely positive. Within this basically favorable context, however, were what foreign minister Pérez Llorca described in a 1989 interview as "shades in the degree" of support by individual members of the Alliance. Some of the NATO member states (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy) were unhesitatingly favorable. Other states (primarily Portugal and Greece) were a bit less enthusiastic. These variations in the degree of support reflected several factors, particularly: the complex interaction of the state's internal politics, its relationship with the Alliance, its relationship with Spain, and the state's relationship with the PSOE.

In the case of Portugal, its hesitancy was rooted in the smaller Iberian nation's long relationship with Spain as well as the particular place of Spain in its internal politics. Spanish opponents to membership in NATO often referred to the potentially disruptive effects of membership on the relationship between Spain and Portugal. For its part, Portugal had always

been sensitive in regards to Spain and, after the severing of the crucial Salazar-Franco link and the 1974 revolution, the smaller nation had come (according to a senior UCD foreign policy official) to like "having Spain on the outside" of the Alliance. Indeed, José Mario Armero observes that serious friction between the two Iberian states appeared as early as 1959.<sup>121</sup>

Such a subordinate position for Spain served to insure the flow of military and non-military aid to Lisbon. As one Spanish analysis points out: "The reaction in Portugal to Spain's solicitation of membership in NATO was, on one side, one of clear political support and, on the other side, above all in the military media, a preoccupation with the devaluation of the Portuguese position in the Alliance. In some sectors it was reduced to historical resentment."<sup>122</sup> Portugal had traditionally supported membership in NATO for Spain, but the move into skepticism occurred almost immediately after Salazar's successor Caetano's fall from power. Indeed, very quickly, a crucial test for Portuguese political parties came to center on how hard they could be on Spain. France evidently fueled Portugal's "historical resentment" against Spain. During a July 1982 visit to Lisbon, a high-ranking French defense official raised the specter of a "Spain-German alliance" dominating NATO decision-making.<sup>123</sup>

Understanding this, Calvo-Sotelo and Pérez Llorca consciously targeted Portuguese public opinion. According to Pérez Llorca, the tactic was to hammer away on three themes. First, Spain did not seek any arrangement that left it in command of Portuguese forces (air, land, or naval), just as it would not accept Spanish troops serving under foreign commanders. Second, Spain would not seek to have the NATO Iberian command headquarters moved from Lisbon to Madrid, this despite some early talk that such a move would be a proper reward for pursuing membership.<sup>124</sup> Portuguese political leaders of all stripes "unequivocally" rejected any talk of a change.<sup>125</sup> Finally, the Spanish leaders pledged themselves to respect Portuguese interests (as Pérez Llorca's later described it in an interview) "as Portugal defines its interests." The

United States also helped by expediting a \$300-400 million aid package to Portugal that served to smooth over the rough spots.

Greece, controlled by PASOK and restive about virtually every aspect of its relationship with NATO, was (from the point of view of Spanish opponents to membership) an even more promising case. Greek restiveness in regards to the Alliance was exemplified perfectly by Andreas Papandreou in 1977 when he commented that "NATO has meant for Greece a seven year dictatorship ... We want Greece out of the Alliance."<sup>126</sup> Greece of course never left NATO, but the PSOE leadership had great hope that the government in Athens would veto Spanish membership, either out of consideration for the fraternal socialists in Spain or simply to make trouble within the Alliance. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo recalls that even after the defeat in the Congress, PSOE Vice-Secretary Alfonso Guerra virtually guaranteed that membership in the Alliance would ultimately be derailed by the Greeks. "Don't doubt it President," Guerra promised Calvo-Sotelo after losing the vote in the Congress of Deputies, "we are never going to enter the Atlantic Alliance."<sup>127</sup>

A senior foreign policy adviser to Calvo-Sotelo recalls that the UCD government was very leery about the Greek situation and did consider it possible that the government in Athens might veto Spain's application. The Spanish government lobbied the Greeks hard, with telephone calls and visits. With little enthusiasm the Greek leader Papandreou eventually came around. Calvo-Sotelo remembers (with no small amount of satisfaction) that PSOE leader Guerra's "smile disappeared on May 27, the day of the Greek parliament's favorable vote."<sup>128</sup>

The other, longer lasting, solace for the PSOE coming out of the membership vote was the result of the overall struggle for the control of Spanish public opinion in the area of foreign policy. The UCD may have won the undoubtedly important battle over taking Spain into the Alliance, but in doing so it failed to gain a perhaps greater victory in the war for the foreign

policy hearts and minds of the electorate. A poll conducted shortly before the membership vote in the Congress of Deputies indicated that less than 1/5 of Spaniards positively supported membership.<sup>129</sup> A senior American diplomat who served in Madrid in the 1970s characterized the move into NATO during a 1990 interview as nothing more than "a paper thing;" a victory that represented the ability of the UCD to manipulate the Congress of Deputies, not any nationwide endorsement of the new arrangement.

The positive vote on membership (as well as formal membership itself) shifted the parameters of the national debate but absolutely did not end it. The debate centered on the issues of public approval and possible withdrawal. In this debate the opponents of NATO membership, particularly the PSOE, were particularly well situated. Their strong position stemmed from two factors. First, the attractiveness of their central demand, a public referendum on remaining in NATO. Second, by late 1981, they had begun to reap the rewards of their ability to tap into the defining core of Spanish mass thinking on foreign policy and their dedication to doing so.

The parameters of the old debate had shifted, away from the value to membership to the possibility of withdrawal; a withdrawal tied to the calling of a national referendum that would allow the Spanish electorate to directly and definitively judge the matter. The exact origin of the referendum idea is unclear. While as early as 1977 the PCE was arguing that it would only accept NATO membership after a "an authentically democratic consultation," UCD foreign minister Marcelino Oreja (in March 1978) was also casting membership possibilities in terms of its acceptance by a majority of Spaniards.<sup>130</sup> Whatever its origins, after membership became a certainty, the referendum became the central issue. Indeed, during the Congress' perfunctory debate on membership opponents had accused the UCD government of refusing to "allow the people to speak."<sup>131</sup>

Polling data is clear: the referendum idea was enormously popular among most segments of Spanish society. In an October 1981 poll, for example, 70% of Spaniards supported the use of a referendum to decide the issue; even a majority of those respondents supporting the UCD (57%) wanted the issue settled by plebiscite. The majority of Spaniards clearly responded to the PSOE strategy of linking itself with the referendum. The PSOE's embrace of the referendum was accepted as sincere. As one member of the 'Spanish Socialist Youth' confidently predicted in early 1982: "the holding of a referendum on the entrance into NATO is going to occur the moment the Socialists are in government."<sup>132</sup> The referendum took on an almost magical quality to those who opposed Spanish membership in NATO, especially since there was very little doubt as to how what the results of such a plebiscite would be.

By late 1981 the PSOE had also begun to reap the broader benefits of its superior ability to tap into, and manipulate, the defining core of Spanish mass thinking on foreign policy. While the UCD leadership seemed unable to comprehend and exploit existing mass feelings, the PSOE leadership was masterful in its skill at doing so. The rhetorical latitude granted by its opposition status and complete lack of governmental responsibility allowed the PSOE to maximize the public impact of the foreign policy portion of their party program: to promise, condemn, and collectively characterize, all without the reality-check of power. The skillful manipulation was made possible by the particular parameters of Spanish political culture in regards to foreign policy. It is natural to assume that the manipulation was facilitated by the ideological substance of the populace's thinking on foreign policy issues, and to a degree it was. Beyond the substance, however, were more important factors aiding the PSOE leadership in its efforts. On that subject, I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of some attributes of the Spanish public's thinking on foreign policy during the period in question.

### Conclusion: Collective Apathy and Political Opportunity

Eusebio Mujal-Leon has proposed a compelling two-part thesis in this matter. First, the Spanish public's thinking on foreign policy issues (including NATO membership) during the 1970s and 1980s was structured around a relatively limited group of defining attitudes, collective (though certainly not unanimous) orientations which gave foreign policy questions (like NATO membership) meaning by tying them to deeper considerations. Second, the Spanish left (particularly the PSOE) was much better at both appreciating the implications of these attitudes and working within the boundaries they set. The PSOE was better able to both understand the structure of mass attitudes and to structure its message in order to exploit those views. The PSOE was not just on the right side of the NATO issue, it was on the right side in the right way. It was not adequate simply to oppose membership, it was also necessary to package that opposition in a politically resonate way. Mujal-Leon's argument is a good point of departure for a brief discussion of the attitudes structuring the Spanish public's approach to foreign policy.

Eusebio Mujal-Leon is absolutely correct in at least one observation. As a general matter, developing a good empirically-based picture of Spanish thinking about foreign policy is extremely difficult. Trying to construct a broad view of the defining features of mass thinking on foreign policy is frustrating due to the "paucity of reliable and systematic opinion surveys" covering foreign policy issues.<sup>133</sup> Those studies that do exist are difficult to synthesize into a dynamic picture of attitudinal change over time given the lack of comparability across surveys. Problems of empirical verification notwithstanding, Mujal-Leon does provide three defining attributes to Spanish thinking on foreign policy, attributes whose interaction produced the context within which the NATO membership issue had to play out. As the data below suggest, however, the reality of Spanish political culture and its relationship to thinking on foreign policy is far more unclear than Mujal-Leon's presentation of it might suggest.

As mentioned, in Mujal-Leon's view three themes stand out. First, a basic isolationism mingled with vague aspirations to maintain a special relationship with the Arab and (especially) Hispanic world: to serve as a 'puente' (bridge) between Western Europe, the United States, and the aforementioned regions.<sup>134</sup> Second, Europeanism or Europeanization, the collective impulse to tie Spain to the rest of Europe as a part of Spain's national destiny.<sup>135</sup> As Mujal-Leon observes, Spain's pursuit of a European future was "dogged."<sup>136</sup> Indeed (he argues) even Spain's fascist period in the 1930s and 1940s was a warped manifestation of this impulse towards integration and solidarity.<sup>137</sup>

Finally, Spanish attitudes were marked by a "latent" anti-Americanism, a general orientation that colored the public's thinking a host of specific issues (including, of course, the NATO membership issue). Even when not manifested consciously, the anti-American predisposition helped inform opinions subconsciously. According to Mujal-Leon, "many Spaniards have resented the United States for historical reasons and for more recent ones as well."<sup>138</sup> Virtually every ideological sector could find some reason to join in a collective distaste for the United States. Whether the reason was a nationalistic embarrassment over defeat and dependence, or the left's resentment over the American support for Franco after 1953, virtually everyone could find something in the relationship to dislike. Indeed, this anti-Americanism intimately linked elite to mass: it was one thing the groups held in common.<sup>139</sup> As we shall see, the entire issue of anti-Americanism as a defining element of Spanish mass thinking is a far more complicated issue than Mujal-Leon suggests.

While the available data is not extensive, we can make a tentative stab at judging the validity these proposed elements of Spanish thinking against empirical evidence. One must be diligent in avoiding pressing limited data too far. But in scanning the results of the limited polling efforts focusing on foreign policy issues some tentative, but reasonable, observations can



be made. As far as the evidence allows, we can tentatively conclude that Spanish thinking is both less isolationist and Europe-oriented than it is often presented, as well as being far more complicated in terms of the United States.<sup>140</sup>

For example, if Europeanization is defined in terms of support for Spanish membership in the EC, then there has been both substantial (almost reflexive) and long-lived support for membership. For example, in December 1972, 74% of respondents reported positive feelings towards the EC. In March 1980, 54% of Spaniards believed that the effects of EC membership on Spain would be positive or very positive (versus 6% who expected the consequences to be negative or very negative). In June 1980, 52% of respondents were very or fairly supportive of Spanish entry in the EC (only 14% claimed to be little or non-supportive of entry). Polls conducted in December 1983 and March and June 1984 showed 60%, 50%, and 65% of Spaniards very or fairly supportive of membership. If, however, Europeanization is seen as a both broader and deeper identification with something beyond Spain, the matter is somewhat less clear.

For example, despite relatively high levels of public support for membership, there are also strikingly high levels of ignorance of, and apathy towards, an issue ostensibly at the center of Spanish foreign policy. For example, nearly 1/3 of respondents to the March 1980 question concerning the effects of EC membership on Spain did not, or would not, answer. A June 1980 question on support for membership generated a 35% non-response rate. A series of March 1983 questions on the importance and urgency of membership resulted in 32% and 33% of the respondents having no opinion or giving no response. Indeed, even as late 1983, 42% of respondents (a plurality) judged themselves to have little or no interest in the EC issue.

In response to a May 1985 request in a poll commissioned by the magazine Cambio 16 to describe their self-image as "I feel European," "I feel more European than Spanish," "I feel

as much European as Spanish," "I feel more Spanish than European," and "I feel only Spanish," 65% of the 1291 respondent placed themselves in the last two categories. Only 5% felt either purely European or more European than Spanish. Interestingly, only 4% did not answer this question. In this area, a vast majority of Spaniards knew pretty well where they stood. Many Spaniards perhaps aspired to be European, but few had any real idea as to what that actually involved (again, beyond simply belonging to the EC).

As mentioned, the question of Spanish attitudes towards the United States (a central factor in the entire NATO membership issue) is an extremely complex matter. To some, the proposed anti-Americanism of the Spanish populace acts as sort of a 'philosopher's stone': it is assumed to exist and used to transmute most mysteries into answers. The existence of plausible sources for a collective anti-Americanism, however, does not mean that the attitude actually exists. The Spanish attitude towards the United States, as far as the limited data allows us to speculate, is far too intricate and subtle to warrant the label 'anti-Americanism'. The data related to several aspects of Spanish feelings about the United States suggests a different interpretation than that provided by analysts like Mujal-Leon.

For example, in terms of its opponent in the Cold War, the USSR, the United States does very well. In a series of polls (May 1983, June 1983, January 1984, and June 1985) the United States averaged a 39.75% favorable rating. The USSR averaged only 25.25%. On the question of which nation constituted the greatest threat to world peace, another set of surveys (July 1983, November 1983, December 1983, and July 1984) does show a slightly more critical attitude towards the United States than towards the USSR (an average of 16.7% naming the United States versus an average of 14.5% naming the USSR). However, on average a near majority of the respondents to the question (48.5%) quite clearly saw the danger to world peace as shared,

simply as a product of the competition between the two powers rather than either one of the countries alone. In many respects an entirely reasonable conclusion.

On the more specific question of a threat to Spain, the data that is available (polls conducted in November 1983, December 1983, and December 1985) lends credence to the lack of a collective image among Spaniards of the USSR as a threat (an average of only 17.3% believed that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to Spain, only slightly more than identified the United States). Once again, however, the respondents held both nations to be a threat (an average across the three surveys of 46%).

In terms of the loyalty of the United States as an ally of Spain (a loyalty conveniently operationalized as the Spanish public's perception concerning American willingness to help defend Spain in the case of war), a series of polls conducted in the middle and late 1970s indicates a relatively high level of trust in the United States. While the level drops through the period, on average more than 4 out of 10 respondents (41.3%) believed that the United States would defend Spain. On average, only 24.6% flatly stated that the United States would not. On the thornier issue of the American bases in Spain, it is clear that the installations and the presence of the American military personnel was not popular.

Between June 1975 and July 1984, support for retaining the bases and renewing the bilateral relationship with the United States fell from 50% of respondents to only 16%. However, in the same period, explicit support for ending the relationship and expelling American forces also dropped: from 36% to 31%. The major movement in attitudes was towards not having and/or not expressing an opinion: from 14% to 53%. Rather than becoming increasingly anti-American, most Spaniards simply became increasingly confused.

Other surveys indicate that alongside a generally (but not excessively) critical set of opinions towards the United States, a core of pro-American sentiment (manifested in many

different ways) also existed. This sentiment can be seen in several different areas. For example, in December 1972, 16% of respondents to a survey chose the United States as the most appropriate model for Spain to follow. In October 1978, 1 in 10 Spaniards said they would chose the United States as their new home if they could (the USSR attracted only 1%). A December 1979 survey showed 34% of Spaniards in favor of either expanding or maintaining Spain's ties with the United States (only 24% wanted a loosening of ties). In January 1984, a majority of those expressing an opinion (28%) believed that the bilateral relationship benefited Spain. A June 1985 survey found 16% of Spaniards who claimed they felt close or very close to the United States (the USSR received 7%).

In an interesting May 1985 poll conducted by Cambio 16 a series of specific questions about the United States elicited some interesting responses. For example, 31% of the 1291 respondents would have liked to live in a Spain that was like the United States, 22% expressed a favorable (x "simpatico") attitude towards Ronald Reagan, 24% believed Reagan was doing a good job as leader of the West, and a surprising 15% approved of the idea of Reagan as president of Spain. This is not to argue that the United States was fully embraced with unalloyed enthusiasm and held in unimpeachable esteem by all Spaniards; a considerable level of skepticism about the motives of the Americans certainly existed. But the total picture is also certainly less hostile than the idea of anti-Americanism as a defining attribute of Spanish political culture in regards to foreign policy.

In regards to the NATO membership issue, one element of Mujal-Leon's argument concerning Spanish isolationism is important. In Mujal-Leon's view, the striking levels of apathy and ignorance that exist well into the 1980s reflected a deeper isolationist impulse. As Mujal-Leon observes: "even though the isolationist impulse lost much of its vigor by the mid-1960s, international affairs retained a very low salience among the general population."<sup>141</sup>

In my view, this characterization unnecessarily dilutes the concept of isolationism until it has very little real meaning as a defining attitude. Isolationism is a much more positive credo, not just the absence of information and opinion about international affairs (though that may be an element of it). Genuine isolationism is a movement marked by a canon of beliefs (vague as the principles may be) about the world and a nation's proper place in it. Collective apathy and indifference are not.

But this notable lack of information (in a March 1983 survey 77% of the respondents admitted they had insufficient information concerning the NATO issue) and interest is important in understanding the evolution of the NATO membership question. This condition allows a skilled political actor to manipulate opinion by casting an issue in a particular light. A public lacking information or a natural interest in foreign policy issues becomes susceptible to manipulation and their very detachment from the issues opens the door for the emotional exploitation of the public by the elite. Just as one candidate can so often succeed in defining an unknown opponent's character in the absence of the voting public's familiarity with the victim, foreign policy issues are especially susceptible to the same process. Skill at such a definitional campaign was the genius of the PSOE.

## NOTES

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## CHAPTER V

### THE PSOE IN POWER (1982-1986): ILLUSORY OPPOSITION, CALCULATED AMBIGUITY, AND PERFUNCTORY TRANSFORMATION

#### Introduction

A strong argument could be made that the general elections of 1982 marked the coming of age (if not the final consolidation) of Spain's new democracy. Having withstood the dangers of its birth, economic stress, terrorist violence, and an aborted right-wing coup, in 1982 a formerly clandestine party took power in a peaceful manner. This significant changing of the guard did not prompt political chaos, nor did it provoke a right-wing attempt to veto the results. Power passed in an historic and orderly fashion. As in 1976, however, some things remained constant. While moderating its position on many domestic issues, the PSOE had ridden to power, in part, on its anti-NATO membership promise: a position summed up in the party's demand for a referendum to settle the question. The mobilizing power of such a position was considerable and adopting such a stand seemed to bind a PSOE government to a clear policy in the matter. But just as a calculation of the effect on practical domestic politics of an anti-NATO stand had played a part in the adoption of such a position, once in power more long range domestic political considerations began to take priority. Like Adolfo Suárez and democratization, indeed like Francisco Franco and the survival of the dictatorial regime, Felipe González accepted foreign policy (particularly in the form of NATO membership for Spain) as a means to a greater internal end. This chapter will attempt to do two things. First, to identify when the decision to change the PSOE's position on NATO membership occurred. As will be shown, that issue is extremely

complicated. Second, to identify the particular internal motivation for the major switch in policy. That effort is a bit more straightforward. For Felipe González, the modernization of Spain (across a number of dimensions) became the internal goal (and one that would surely aid in his retention of power) to which foreign policy was almost immediately subordinated.

### The PSOE in Power

In a 1980 report written for the Republican National Convention's Platform Committee, W. Salisbury and J. Theberge concluded that the future of Spanish domestic politics lay with the PSOE and the UCD.<sup>1</sup> The authors dismissed most of the other major aspirants to power (primarily the communists and the conservative Alianza Popular, or 'AP') as too extreme for the stubbornly moderate Spanish electorate. The two were half right. The general elections held a little more than two years after Salisbury and Theberge's study (October 1982) represented an extreme transformation of the Spanish party system, a transformation only partly along the lines envisioned by Salisbury and Theberge.

The PSOE emerged as the most important political group, followed by the previously weak AP. The politically exhausted UCD (which was not constitutionally bound to hold elections until March 1983) was simply destroyed at the polls. As Gunther, Sani, and Shabad put it, the UCD's move was from "government to oblivion."<sup>2</sup> The collapse of the UCD was the result of the interplay of many factors purely internal to the party.<sup>3</sup> The overwhelming 1982 PSOE victory (202/350 seats in the Congress of Deputies) was a combination of both circumstance and strategy. The effective strategy employed had its roots in the disappointment of 1979 and, in part, featured the use of a foreign policy issue, NATO membership. While obviously not the only issue, the importance of NATO in the election was significant enough to validate one analysis of the earlier partisan skirmishes over membership which labelled them as nothing less than "the first battle of the next general election."<sup>4</sup>

The victory of PSOE moderates after the two 1979 party conferences was solidified by the 1981 congress that preceded the election campaign. That meeting was a ringing endorsement of ideological moderation. Even the vague references to some future, limited, nationalizations were declared to be non-binding by Felipe González. As the campaign evolved the PSOE leader made it clear that he intended to wage the upcoming campaign on the non-threatening issues of administrative reform, alleviating unemployment (there was an unelaborated upon promise to create 800,000 new jobs), tax reform, buttressing civil liberties, and defense modernization (both organizationally and technologically).<sup>5</sup>

Even in the realm of general foreign policy, the PSOE focused on relatively mundane and traditional goals: expediting the seemingly endless negotiations over EC membership, pursuing the return of Gibraltar, and equalizing (but not terminating) the United States-Spain security relationship.<sup>6</sup> In a masterful performance of programmatic ambiguity, PSOE foreign policy adviser (and aspirant to the position of foreign minister in the event of the party's victory) Elena Flores characterized the essence of PSOE foreign policy as one that "buttresses the role of Spain in international cooperation affirming our equality with other nations ... contributing actively to the cause of peace, liberty, justice, and world progress."<sup>7</sup>

Only in regards to NATO was there an unabashedly immoderate tone to the PSOE campaign. As Pollack and Hunter observe, only in this area was there even a "vestige of the party's radical past."<sup>8</sup> NATO was unrelentingly portrayed as an obstacle to the achievement of peace, liberty, justice, and world progress. A PSOE victory would bring the immediate freezing of the integration process (between official membership in May 1982 and the election in October, Spain had joined six important NATO committees) followed by a referendum. Throughout the final phase of the election campaign the referendum magic held. That the party leadership never



made it clear when a vote could be expected did not seem to trouble the millions of PSOE supporters attracted by the party's opposition to membership.

The combination of González's charisma, the UCD's collapse, a moderate domestic agenda, and the emotional issue of NATO membership worked wonderfully. Indeed, in Fernando Morán's estimation, the anti-NATO/pro-referendum position (which he personally counseled against) was "one of the major factors" in the PSOE victory.<sup>9</sup> The two-track approach, moderation coupled with immoderation, attracted an enormously broad following. As Graham points out, only about 1% of the PSOE voters could even loosely be described as members of the party.<sup>10</sup>

Once in power the convenient freedom made possible by the lack of governing responsibility disappeared, in regards to both domestic and foreign policy. Obviously the leadership could no longer make reckless promises because they were insulated by their legislative minority. Rhetoric had to be transformed into a governmental program, which meant coming to grips with political realities both inside and outside of Spain. In terms of its stance towards NATO membership, the PSOE government passed through three distinct stages upon its ascension to power in late 1982, each stage manifested by a particular policy position. First, the maintenance of a public opposition to membership was marked by the dramatic freezing of the ongoing integration process shortly after González and the PSOE came to power.

Second, a period of internal division and ambiguity as the government slowly backed away from its previously clear opposition; a retreat marked by increasingly public splits within the PSOE leadership (as well as between the governing party and some of its traditional supporters, for example the socialist 'Union the UGT'), as well as the refusal to set a date for the promised referendum. During this stage, Spain seemed to dangle, trapped in a limbo between participation and withdrawal. Third (and most dramatically), a transformation of the party and

government from opposition to membership to championing it, a switch made official by the October 1984 'declogue' (the announcement to parliament of ten foreign policy goals that would guide the PSOE government and which included remaining in the Alliance). Looking deeper under the surface, however, the matter of the party, and its leadership's evolution is far more complicated. What holds the complex transformation together, however, is the overriding importance of the PSOE leadership's estimation (especially the calculations of Felipe González) of the domestic advantages to be gained from every policy stance.

### Illusory Opposition

The PSOE's continued opposition to Spanish membership in NATO seemed to be secure with the announcement that the long-standing party promise to freeze the integration process was to be immediately implemented. On the surface the December 1982 announcement of this implementation was very significant. The United States reaction to the massive 1982 PSOE victory certainly seemed to reflect a concern that the interruption in integration was just an opening move in a long range plan to separate Spain from the Alliance. The Spanish paper ABC noted that, despite the warm official congratulations offered to Felipe González upon his October election, the mood among American diplomats was one of distinct "uneasiness"; particularly an "uneasiness over what is considered the inexperience of these leaders, uneasiness towards their proposals."<sup>11</sup>

However, the significance of the PSOE decision to dramatically freeze membership was lessened by several important factors. First, as mentioned, between the membership ceremonies on June 5, 1982 and the PSOE government's announcement of the freezing, Spain joined the

central NATO committees with great rapidity. The most important of these included:

June 20	Special Consultative Group
June 23	Political Committee
	Economic Committee
July 15	Military Committee
August 11	Executive Committee
October 14	Scientific Committee
	High Committee on Civil Defense
October 19	Armament Committee
November 30	Nuclear Planning Group
December 1	Defense Planning Committee

The effect of the freezing was not to withdraw, or even to suspend participation in the Alliance. By the time of the change in government and the initiation of the promised freeze, Spain had become enmeshed in a web of over twenty important committees and planning groups.<sup>12</sup> Given the extensiveness of Spanish membership by December 1982, freezing it only insured continued participation. According to Fernando Morán, the decision not to withdraw from any organ of the Alliance to which Spain already belonged was taken at the very first cabinet meeting (December 4, 1982), despite the "denunciation" of continued membership and ties with the United States levelled by the more extreme members of the new government.<sup>13</sup> It also did not stop either unofficial consultation or observation.

Spain's intention not to withdraw precipitously from the Alliance was made clear by Morán during talks at the December 1982 foreign ministers conference. At that meeting, the moderate socialist bloc sent former Belgian foreign minister (Henri Simonet) to test how deep

Spanish radicalism in the matter of NATO actually was, as opposed to the rhetoric. As Morán recalls, "he left satisfied with our position: he said he understood."<sup>14</sup> Hans Dietrich Genscher approached Morán the next day, this time clearly pointing out the connection between NATO membership and Spain's aspirations to membership in the EC.<sup>15</sup> Once again the possibility of withdrawal was downplayed. The only reservation offered by Morán was that Spain would not participate in the integrated military command.

Second, even this particular reservation was also misleading since, strictly speaking, no nation in the Alliance is integrated into a military structure. The mode of any given nation's participation in the military activities of the Alliance is, as Josef Joff points out, the result of their choice and encompasses several different (and equally valid) models, including the French model that González and the PSOE had long-touted.<sup>16</sup> There are no mechanisms to coerce the tight adherence of any ally to any particular policy: dissent was tolerated. As a purely symbolic matter, however, integration was an extremely important internal political issue.

For the average Spaniard, the notion of integration into NATO suggested the disturbing vision of Spanish soldiers, sailors, and airmen under the direct command of non-Spanish officers, taking operational orders from the Germans, the French, the British, the Dutch, the Americans, and others (including the Portuguese). The aversion was longstanding and ubiquitous, a matter of mass culture rather than specific ideology. Even the Blue Division that had aided Hitler's fight against the Soviets had retained at least a formal command independence from the Germans. It was (like most of the issues connected to NATO) an inaccurate, but powerful, image. It was easy to oppose something that was not going to happen, and the PSOE happily reaped the benefits of doing so.

Third, it rapidly became clear that the Spanish allergy to integration (whatever the concept meant) was primarily legalistic and not substantive. The PSOE government very quickly

began to draw very fine lines between what constituted integration into the Alliance (which was completely unacceptable), and what was merely cooperation with the Alliance (which was perfectly acceptable). According to a senior Spanish defense official interviewed in 1989, the innovation introduced by the PSOE was the recognition that NATO was both a supranational organization (i.e., in terms of its command structure) and a multinational organization (i.e., in terms of its decision-making organs). For example, Spain was willing to support the bureaucratic expenses of the Military Committee itself, but would not pay to maintain the headquarters building, hence distinguishing between operational and policy aspects of the Alliance.

Fourth, and rarely appreciated, insofar as integration implied any restructuring of command and responsibility arrangements in order to accommodate the new ally, many of the most important members of the Alliance were as anti-integration as the most anti-NATO Spaniard. The political difficulties surrounding membership related to Portuguese concerns about the Iberian-Atlantic Command (based in Lisbon) have already been discussed. But, as a prominent Spanish defense official has observed, the problems were not limited to Portugal. There were a whole host of other similar concerns. Other restructuring considerations centered on the status of Gibraltar, the question of the hibernating Mediterranean Command and France's relationship to it, and the relative influence of Greece and Turkey represented a Pandora's box of divisiveness. All of the potential division was made possible by the potential integration of Spain into the Alliance.<sup>17</sup> The only clearly defined aspect of Spain's integration into NATO was its potential for stirring up trouble. Given that fact, many in the Alliance were more than willing to allow the PSOE government the luxury to adhere to a non-integration policy.

#### Calculated Ambiguity

The movement away from opposition and towards acceptance of Spanish membership was marked by increasingly public splits between governmental leaders, a confused character to the

party's stand on the issue, and was most succinctly manifested by the ongoing refusal of the government to set the date for the promised referendum. In the most general sense, the phenomenon of transformation was hardly out of character for the PSOE. As with anything that has a history (and the PSOE was Spain's oldest continually operating party), the story of the PSOE was one of often dramatic change. As mentioned, victory in 1982 had its roots in a moderation of the party's radicalism (at least in regards to domestic economic and social policy). The radicalism abandoned (save in regards to NATO) at the Extraordinary Congress of 1979 was itself the product, not of a strict party tradition, but of the circumstances of González's rise to power in the early 1970s.

In its origins, the party was fundamentally moderate. As Gerald Brennan notes, "the main principle that separated the Socialist party from the anarchists was their belief in parliamentary and municipal action."<sup>18</sup> Indeed, the Spanish communist party had its origins in the PSOE's ultimate unwillingness to embrace the Bolshevik government in Moscow and subordinate itself to a Russian directed push for general revolution. While a maximalist strain to the party was evident during the Second Republic (for example, in the person of Largo Caballero) the party-in-exile conformed to the vision of Largo Caballero's party adversary Indalecio Prieto: the PSOE as the "social conscience of the middle class."<sup>19</sup> Indeed, until the internal party power struggles of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the party remained strikingly timid in ideological and programmatic terms. As one analyst has noted, for the PSOE, for example, the communists were very often cast as "not a fraternal party" but, rather, "a rival, adversary, and enemy."<sup>20</sup>

The precedent that the party was likely to abandon positions that it seemed to hold with great fervency was well established, but the waffling on NATO was still surprising. Granted, there had always been a little wiggle-room in at least González's personal position on the matter.<sup>21</sup> That said, the party found itself in a strategic dilemma. Justifying the switch was the

challenge and the challenge required finesse. After the decision was made, González and other leaders would insist that they had only opposed Spanish membership under the circumstances in which it occurred, not the Alliance itself nor the abstract idea of Spanish membership in it. Still, opposition to NATO membership was so central to the party's public image and so central an election pledge that any backing away was a major development, whatever the justification. As mentioned, the move away from opposition and towards accommodation was marked by the increasingly public division between PSOE leaders and the redefinition and avoidance of the referendum.

For example, on the matter of leadership divisions, Fernando Morán argues that the slide towards accepting the reality of continued membership (even expanding it) first began in the Spanish military establishment as it pursued unofficial (but expanded) ties with its counterparts in the Alliance. Morán recalls that: "Each time I traveled to Brussels to negotiate with the Community, I encountered military commanders coming from and going to the Organization."<sup>22</sup> While it had generally mixed feelings about entering the Alliance, once in, the military establishment became strongly supportive of the relationship. On a more political level, party leaders like Narcís Serra (ministry of defense) very quickly followed the military leadership into embracing membership. During a March 1904 visit to the United States, for example, Narcís Serra (lionized by the Pentagon, the State Department, and even given a dinner by Henry Kissinger) openly predicted that Spain would remain in NATO. He even boldly predicted that a referendum on membership would never occur.<sup>23</sup>

### Perfunctory Transformation

The ultimate change in the socialist government's position concerning NATO suggests a two-part question: when, and why, did the turnaround in policy occur? Beginning with the first question, it is extremely difficult to pin-down what actually happened. There is no doubt that

Felipe González had "the final word" in the matter: as González went so did the party.<sup>24</sup> The official revelation that the government would support continued membership came, as mentioned, in October 1984. In a speech to the Congress of Deputies, Felipe González presented a ten-point plan that would serve to structure future socialist foreign policy.

Along with relatively innocuous and generally popular proposals (e.g., retaining Spain's non-nuclear status, continuing to press Great Britain to return Gibraltar, full participation in the Western European Union) González announced that Spain would (in the absence of other alternatives) remain in NATO. Such a course was, in his words, simply "unavoidable."<sup>25</sup> That the decision carried the explicit reservation that membership would not mean integration (and was coupled with both a recommitment to the idea of a referendum and a call for a reduction of the military presence of the United States in Spain) did not take away from the shock of the turnaround.

The political right and center were supportive of the move, if a bit confused. The generally conservative newspaper ABC would later describe the dramatic conversion of Felipe González as akin to "the leader of an anti-capital punishment movement suddenly becoming a supporter of the guillotine."<sup>26</sup> Other reactions were equally as dramatic. Left-wing sectors in the PSOE were livid. Labor leader Pablo Castellano described the government's reversal as a "turn of Copernican dimensions."<sup>27</sup> The socialist youth organization absolutely rejected the policy switch.<sup>28</sup> For their part, the Soviets (who believed that an earlier understanding with the PSOE was still binding) displayed a sense of betrayal, publicly leveling "strong criticism" at the socialist government while demanding a referendum.<sup>29</sup>

Once again, the Soviets tried to bargain in the matter. In private the Soviets approached the Spanish government with a deal: if Spain would agree never to accept NATO nuclear weapons then the USSR would promise never to use them against Spain, a promise even the



socialists found hard to accept.<sup>30</sup> The rejection was rooted in both a growing disenchantment with the Soviet Union as well as a growing conviction that there was no real benefits to be had from any real expansion in relations between the two nations.<sup>31</sup> In terms of economics, at least, even a socialist Spain's future lay in the West.

What is very often unappreciated is that Felipe González's stunning October surprise was only the final (and quite logical) stage of a long process, a reasonable manifestation of Felipe González's thinking on the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics. To the careful observer, the symptoms of that process had been obvious for some time. Several indicators served as a barometer for the oncoming policy transformation. For example, relations with the United States (despite some routine strains over basically narrow issues) were surprisingly good during the first few years of the PSOE government. The cordial relations were extremely surprising given the ideological rhetoric that had, with less than 24 months between them, helped boost both Ronald Reagan and Felipe González into power. On paper there should have been discord, in reality there was not. On December 15, 1982 George Schultz had been the first important foreign dignitary to visit Spain after the PSOE victory and Fernando Morán was extremely impressed by his conservative counterpart.

Fernando Morán later described the Republican Schultz in surprisingly glowing terms. In the opinion of the first PSOE foreign minister, George Schultz was a representative of "a rare group of Americans, with good intellectual and academic backgrounds, who did not lose their frankness, simplicity, and bond with the average man."<sup>32</sup> A very cordial March 1983 visit by Caspar Weinberger solidified ties between the two nations' defense chiefs.<sup>33</sup> On a higher level, a June 1983 visit to Washington by Felipe González was critical in the evolution of bilateral relations.<sup>34</sup> The trip left the Spanish leader with an extremely positive impression both of the United States and its Republican leadership, especially then Vice President George Bush.<sup>35</sup>

While in the United States corporate leaders (e.g., those at General Motors) and powerful financiers (David Rockefeller held a dinner for González and his entourage) expressed their confidence in Spain, the Spanish leadership, and Spain's future stability.<sup>36</sup> This vote of confidence clearly implied a willingness to gamble financially on the nation, its leadership, and its future stability.<sup>37</sup>

Second, as mentioned, public splits among the leadership appeared throughout 1983 and 1984. The splits pitted a purist group (containing PSOE leaders like Alfonso Guerra, Luis Yáñez, the leadership of the affiliated labor organization, and many of the local party groups) against policy revisionists like Narcís Serra and Miguel Boyer.<sup>38</sup> In September 1984 a leading opponent of membership (the labor leader Nicolas Redondo) blasted a party leadership he sensed was wavering. Invoking both socialist rhetoric and religious imagery (a quintessentially Spanish exercise), Redondo remarked: "We do not know the reasons that certain comrades have changed, including those who declare themselves (with an excess of enthusiasm) in favor of NATO. Some few comrades have taken up the NATO issue with the fervor of converts, with the enthusiasm of neophytes."<sup>39</sup>

Finally, and perhaps most telling, was the ongoing waffling about the long-promised membership referendum. The history of the PSOE's position on membership was, according to one analyst, a "tragic comedy."<sup>40</sup> Despite the fact that the idea was still enormously popular (mention of it usually drew extremely enthusiastic responses from pro-referendum crowds) nothing happened. From a relatively straightforward electoral commitment to using the referendum to decide the fate of Spanish membership in NATO (and promising to utilize the government's resources to campaign for a 'no' vote), the leadership moved (by March 1983) to casting the referendum simply as a method to determine how Spain's full participation in Western defense would proceed, not whether it would occur.<sup>41</sup> Many reasons were offered for the delay.

Fernando Morán, for example, attributes the delay primarily to the "tension of those years" and casts the PSOE leadership as quite willing to take the public opinion heat over delaying a central election promise in order to guarantee international stability and peace.<sup>42</sup> The roots of the hesitancy, however, are much less profound. As Eusebio Mujal-Leon quite correctly points out, had González and the PSOE leadership "desired a rapid and negative response to the question of Spanish membership, it could have called a referendum immediately ... there is no doubt that this would have resulted in a massive popular vote against membership."<sup>43</sup> The immediate use of the referendum would have been a dependable (if rather melodramatic) method for popularly legitimizing an uncomfortable foreign policy decision. That the referendum was not held strongly suggests that, almost from the beginning, such an outcome was not desired. The waffling over the referendum began surprisingly early. Indeed, shortly after the 1982 election González (while reiterating the party's support for a referendum sometime) described the whole matter as neither "Spain's major or most urgent problem."<sup>44</sup>

In September 1984 González announced that NATO membership was a government matter (and not a PSOE matter) and thus would be decided by a government that "has a national responsibility that transcends the limits of the socialist party" and that the "cabinet, and its president ... will have the last word" on membership.<sup>45</sup> By November 1984, the month after the decalogue, González characterized the referendum as morally, but not legally, binding on his government.<sup>46</sup> He also suggested that no more than 10% of Spaniards really cared about membership.<sup>47</sup> In May of 1985, during a visit to Stockholm, González stated that "constitutionally the referendum is not decisive: it is only able to have a consultative character."<sup>48</sup>

As implied by the above, the move away from opposition began much earlier than its revelation. The question remains as to how much earlier. While it may be practically impossible

to pin-down the timing of (in the words of one analysis) "the transformation of González from apostle of neutralism to the cross of Atlanticism" with any chronological exactitude, some information on the change is intriguing.<sup>49</sup> According to some evidence the decision to accept continued membership had been made by González at least as early as the beginning of 1984.

During January 1984 Felipe González directed his foreign minister to complete a special project. Fernando Morán and several important foreign ministry officials and diplomats (including the Spanish ambassador to NATO and the Director-General for North America) met in a hotel near the city of Segovia. González's instructions were quite simple: finalize a list of the necessary conditions for Spain's remaining in NATO.<sup>50</sup> What is striking about the assigned project was its extremely low profile. The Segovia meetings were held in absolute secrecy (tight security that Fernando Morán was very proud of). It produced an equally secret thirty-eight page document that outlined in great detail the specific conditions under which Spain would accept continued affiliation with the Alliance. When Morán presented the document (June 12, 1984) to González, the PSOE leader ordered his foreign minister "not to distribute it to the rest of the members of government," in effect eliminating the influence of a majority of the socialist cabinet.<sup>51</sup> The plan to endorse continued membership was not revealed to those officials excluded by González's request until very shortly before the public announcement.

Other sources indicate that the process that ultimately resulted in the González turnaround on membership had much deeper roots. Its origins were inextricably tied up with the question of the exact relationship between the Spanish socialists (particularly Felipe González) and NATO's most important member, the United States. That relationship is ordinarily portrayed as virtually non-existent, with the few connections that did exist being less than cordial. Much of the American trepidation connected to the 1982 victory, the story goes, stemmed from the lack of experience dealing with the socialist leadership. Fernando Morán, for example, observes that

George Schultze's December 1982 visit to Spain was primarily to "make contact with us."<sup>52</sup> While much of the standard view is accurate, connections between the United States and the PSOE (and the issue of NATO membership at the center of the relationship) certainly did not start in the Winter of 1982. Rather, they go much further back.

On a restricted level, for example, while in opposition, Felipe González had held two meetings with top American officials. Both meetings, if examined carefully, represent a genuine softening in the socialist leaders position vis a vis the United States and (to a degree) NATO. The first, a brief meeting with Jimmy Carter during the American President's July 1980 visit to Madrid, was used by the PSOE leader to clarify the party's position on NATO. That position (according to González) did not represent a fundamental opposition to the Alliance and its mission nor a rejection of the idea of Spanish membership in NATO per se. Rather, the party was opposed to the particular method (i.e., the use of a parliamentary vote rather than a referendum) the UCD seemed determined to use.<sup>53</sup> An April 1981 visit to Madrid by Secretary of State Alexander Haig included an hour-long meeting between Felipe González and Haig. The meeting resulted in a comment by González that the PSOE's opposition to Spanish membership would change "only under exceptional circumstances." (i.e., it was not final).<sup>54</sup> Beyond these high-profile meetings, however, were more significant connections. Two were of particular importance.

During the last days of the Franco regime, American officials in Washington and Madrid became concerned that their ability to predict events in Spain was being hobbled by a lack of crucial information. That lack of information stemmed from the absence of even the most basic relationship with any significant member of the Spanish opposition. There were a few early missteps in the process of establishing links. In 1974, for example, an American-sponsored luncheon resulted in several arrests when, after the meeting broke up, Spanish security forces

collected the forgotten name placards that had marked each participant's place. The next year, after a change in ambassadors, United States embassy officials quietly informed the Spanish government that they were going to once again seek to establish contact, this time in public, with important opposition members, provided (in the words of a Senior diplomat in the American embassy at the time) "they were not in jail." Rather surprisingly, the prime minister did not object and a general invitation to the non-communist opposition to open lines of communication was circulated.

Most of the major opposition leaders took the embassy up on its offer, including (after a two month delay) the PSOE. The PSOE was torn, dealing with the United States was clearly a political necessity and potentially a great opportunity, but years of ideological faith (as well as suspicion concerning American motives) ran counter to the idea of dallying with the most important foreign supporter of the old Franquist dictatorship. As one American diplomat put it in 1990, the PSOE leadership had to decide whether it wanted to "tar themselves with something of the devil" by openly dealing with the United States or maintain its ideological virginity. Ultimately it accepted and an initial lunch meeting was scheduled. The future prime minister's visit (which occurred after an agreement was reached that González did not have to compromise his proletarian image and wear a necktie) began a quiet but, ongoing, relationship between the socialists and their frequent rhetorical target, the United States.

In 1975 the PSOE was speaking publicly in terms of the class struggle, the need for massive social restructuring, and the necessity to defend the international proletariat from the depredations of capitalism, (two years later the party would still claim that the United States had essentially "abducted" for its own gain a defenseless Latin America).<sup>35</sup> Surprisingly, the overall impression of González among American diplomats in Madrid during this same period was quite favorable. He (unlike some in his entourage) got on fairly well with the Americans. Despite the

inflammatory rhetoric he often uttered in public, American diplomats who knew him saw González as refreshingly straightforward, reasonable, and by nature open to argument and persuasion. He was judged not to be irrevocably set in his ways nor intellectually rigid.

These subjective assessments of Felipe González's personality and temperament were very important. Because of them, the PSOE leader's public and increasingly strident opposition to NATO membership was interpreted not so much as a fundamentally ideological phenomenon (the representation of a firmly fixed world-view) but simply as a result of a lack of information about the day to day realities of operating in the international arena. Shielded as González (as well as the other PSOE leaders, indeed the Spanish populace as a whole) was by the dictatorship and American dominance from having to seriously consider matters of diplomacy, national security, and the international balance of power, he was free to play with lots of ideas on those matters, no matter how unrealistic they might be. There was no reality-check.

He was insulated by his policy-making impotence. According to an American diplomat who met Gonzalez, "he had a very vague idea of what this was all about" (i.e., foreign policy), thus his interpretations of events were also very vague and often contradictory. This lack of basic information suggested a logical remedy, education. Throughout the middle of the 1970s the American embassy (according to a senior official in the ministry at the time) "provided him with material, things of that sort, so he could increase his knowledge in certain areas related to NATO." Through "long conversations" with the socialist leadership in an effort to "broaden their vistas," the Americans managed to affect a "gradual change in thinking" of many top PSOE leaders on matters of national security and international politics. While some at the top of the PSOE (like Alfonso Guerra) remained ideologically unrepentant, many were impressed and (by 1978) began to exhibit a softening, at least in their private positions.

Seven years after the initial contacts (in August 1982), with the socialists on the verge of assuming governmental power, the secret top-level PSOE-American contacts were continued. Several sources have made reference to meetings between Felipe González and prominent Americans (e.g., Thomas Enders), who acted in both an official and unofficial capacity. The basic aim of these meetings was to establish the broad character of a PSOE government in terms of economic policy, trade and investment issues, and foreign policy (primarily in regards to the bilateral security arrangements with the United States and NATO membership).

The basic situation between the United States and Felipe González was, according to one analyst of Spanish diplomacy interviewed in 1989, that "the US cajoled him and he let himself be cajoled." A tacit understanding was reached. Under a PSOE government nothing would be done either to injure the investment climate within Spain or fundamentally disrupt the diplomatic status quo (i.e., by trying to end the bilateral relationship with the United States or by ending its membership in NATO). In return, the United States, both diplomatically and economically, would decisively endorse the new government. As one observer later put it, the PSOE would "launch the people against the Americans and NATO, and at the same time they say to the Americans, 'okay we will be no problem'." There was a promise of expanded private investment to create jobs. Given this, the December Schultze visit to Madrid, as well as the lavishly complimentary attitude of the American business sector take on new meaning. One thing is clear, the October 1984 switch has to be seen as part of a much broader process and simply as an ad hoc reaction to changing circumstances.

#### Felipe González and National Modernization

If it is difficult to pin-down exactly when González changed his mind concerning the acceptability of Spanish membership in the Alliance, the motivations involved in the decision are a bit simpler to comprehend. One observer of Spanish politics remarked in 1989 that, when



considering the NATO membership issue, the behavior of the PSOE has to be seen in terms of a single fact: "all of this is about power." To a very great degree the assumption and display of such an extreme anti-NATO position by the PSOE was "an electoral matter ... nothing more than that," albeit one made very easy to sell by the ideological predisposition of many in the party leadership. As "an electoral matter" it represented an enormously pragmatic and successful response to a particular set of internal Spanish political realities that González brilliantly understood and masterfully manipulated.

Once in power, however, the controlling imperative was to remain in power. The problem lay in the fact that the procedures that had helped insure the achievement of victory in 1982 (i.e., a strong stand in regards to NATO) might not necessarily help keep the PSOE in power. Describing González's calculations, one Spanish journalist who covered the NATO issue (interviewed in 1989) put it this way: "he needs to be against at the beginning to win power ... once he was in power he knew that one of the main things for being in power is to have good relations with the powerful." By definition, the powerful (both within Spain and internationally) could facilitate the policies and programs that could enhance, or damage, a particular PSOE government's longterm electoral viability.

Once in power the controlling imperative for González and the PSOE was to remain in power. If the domestic political use of foreign policy had helped to put him into power, after securing that power González returned to the old established practice of using foreign policy to affect broad aspects of Spanish society in order to buttress the government's future position. Domestic politics gave way to domestic considerations. There was a reversion to an older model (as we have seen, enthusiastically pursued by both Franco and Suárez) in which foreign policy lost much of its inherent importance and came to be seen almost solely in terms of its potential impact on the regime's future viability. While (as one observer notes) a chief PSOE critique of

both the Franco regime and the UCD governments had been that they were too willing to abandon Spain's international independence "in order to receive foreign assistance that would assure its domestic ascendancy," the PSOE positioned itself to, in effect, do precisely the same thing.<sup>56</sup> There is no contention here that the massive, smashing, PSOE victory of October 1982 represented the emergence of a quasi-dictatorship and the 'end of politics' (though some Spanish analysts have questioned the consequences for the young democracy of such a victory, coupled with the PSOE's strict internal discipline and Felipe González's domineering personality).<sup>57</sup>

The 1982 landslide did, however, open up an enormous amount of room to maneuver for a party and a leader whose popularity was so great that no genuinely viable opposition existed. The PSOE's post October 1982 position was, to say the least, dominant. Without the sharp competition a viable opposition could provide, the value of particular issues (including foreign policy issues) to mobilize the populace declined. In regards to NATO, as one analyst has quite correctly observed, the theme of the early years of González's government was the government's concerted attempt to "reduce the emotional pitch" of the issue it had spent years making so emotional.<sup>58</sup>

Party and government interests were no longer defined in terms of mobilizing the population on a particular issue, but, rather, in demobilizing it in preparation for the pursuit of an overarching national project to which the fate of the government would be tied. Adolfo Suárez had successfully used democratization as his national project, at least until his own success had robbed him of his justification for remaining in power. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo had tried (and, due to a failure to appreciate the realities of Spain's internal political mood, spectacularly failed) to make Atlanticism (envisioned in terms of a grand attempt to simultaneously link Spain to the United States, the European Community, and NATO) his project. Felipe González needed something else.

The great national project embraced by González and the PSOE government can be broadly described as national modernization. Pollack and Hunter observe that understanding PSOE foreign policy during its first years requires thoroughly understanding the PSOE's and González's ultimate commitment to "the ethos of modernization."<sup>59</sup> Another study concludes that the PSOE was dedicated to being "the party of modernization," to be identified wholly with the process.<sup>60</sup> According to Fernando Morán, Felipe González was fascinated by a vision of Spain as a kind of Iberian Sweden (prosperous, stable, progressive), with himself filling the role of long-time hero Olaf Palme.<sup>61</sup> While not exclusively so, modernization had an important foreign policy dimension to it. For example, as Carlos Zaldívar has argued, this modernization represented an economic, technological, and organizational goal whose ultimate success hinged on maintaining (even expanding) a "close cooperation with the democratic and industrially advanced countries of the West."<sup>62</sup> Pollack and Hunter observe that those advocating such a close cooperation represented the "foreign policy branch of the modernizers."<sup>63</sup>

Some aspects of this multi-dimensional modernization (e.g., military reform amid the divestment of state-owned industry as part of an overall economic liberalization) could be addressed internally. In terms of military reform, for example, some significant steps were taken by the PSOE government to rectify longstanding problems. For example, as of January 1984 plans were enacted to cut the bloated (but politically sensitive) officer corp by 25% and the enlisted ranks by 33%.<sup>64</sup> Government policy to cut subsidies to dependent industries eventually cost 60,000 jobs in the important steel and shipbuilding industries. To fully succeed, however, it was also necessary to look abroad, to accept that internal modernization policies had to be supplemented by foreign policy. In a nice illustration of Mandelbaum's "inside-out" explanation of state behavior, to be successful, the modernization project required an "external dimension."<sup>65</sup> Pollack and Hunter argue that: "The process of modernization undertaken by the PSOE would

not have been complete without a parallel program in the area of foreign policy. Indeed the foreign policy dimension is at least as important, if not more important, than the internal dimension, both in terms of scope and of prestige."<sup>66</sup>

The guts of modernization turned on the necessity to supplement insufficient internal resources with significant capital investment and technology transfers from abroad. Factories needed renovation, housing and offices had to be built, the national infrastructure was in deep need of attention. In short, the economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s had run-down. This necessary infusion would have to come primarily from the United States and Western Europe, and would take the form of official arrangements and (perhaps more importantly) private investment. Optimally, the resources to underpin the plan of modernization would come from a continued relationship with the United States and (as soon as it was possible) membership in the European Community. In regards to the EC, the PSOE government (motivated by the modernization imperative) almost immediately increased the tempo of negotiations. One author has observed that under the PSOE government negotiations on membership were conducted "with a fervor, intensity, and dedication not matched by previous governments."<sup>67</sup> While virtually all of the political factories in Spain supported membership in the EC, the issue became controversial with the growing acceptance that EC membership required continuing membership in NATO.

The case of the first PSOE foreign minister Fernando Morán is illustrative of the controversy. When he first took office the general impression of Fernando Morán (both among conservatives and moderates within Spain and abroad) was that of an ideologue, deeply suspicious of the United States (if not outrightly anti-American) and dedicated to implementing a particular foreign policy agenda, even at the expense of political reality. Many who worked under him were uncomfortable with both his style and program. One senior Spanish diplomat (interviewed in 1989) remembers Morán as "difficult" and motivated by some deep impulse to force Spanish

foreign policy to conform with the essentially radical agenda described in his 1980 book A Foreign Policy for Spain. As a senior Spanish diplomat who worked with Morán observed in 1989, the first PSOE foreign minister "wanted to stick to his book," he believed that "the book had to be put into practice."

The popular image of Fernando Morán as a simplistic ideologue is itself wildly simplistic. Even a cursory survey of the record indicates that the issue is far more complicated. For example, he did not support breaking ties with the United States, the adoption of a neutralist orientation, or (as mentioned) placing the referendum on membership at the center of the PSOE foreign policy platform. Morán authored the decalogue and was certainly less ideologically rigid and intellectually superficial than, for example, Alfonso Guerra or Elena Flores (as mentioned, an early rival for the job of foreign minister).<sup>68</sup> But in one area Morán was absolutely legalistic, an unflinching true believer in the letter of the law, even in the face of seemingly inescapable reality. That was the connection between NATO membership and EC membership.

While the PSOE party-line (aimed primarily at mobilizing electoral support) had been that these two central foreign issues were not at all related, Morán seemed genuinely to have believed it. This belief was stubbornly persistent. In his 1990 memoirs, for example, Fernando Morán flatly states that: "the question of NATO and the Community were not connected."<sup>69</sup> Morán observes that "not one of the member states demanded, as a condition for its ratification, a prior definition of NATO membership, much less an integration into the military system."<sup>70</sup> Indeed, no such official demand was ever made, but Morán (mirroring the mistake made by Adolfo Suárez) accepted the lack of an official, public, connection as the lack of an actual connection.

Morán's insistence on a lack of linkage is odd since virtually anyone with any interest in, or information on, the subject knew that membership in the EC was, for Spain at least, heavily dependent on a concurrent membership in NATO. Even the average Spaniard accepted

the fact of linkage. In a poll of 1291 Spaniards (conducted April 15-17 1985 by the 'Estudios Comerciales de Opinion') 52% believed that the two issues were completely or partially connected: only 17% held to the non-linkage position. Sterile legalistic considerations aside, the practical connection between the EC and NATO was significant and venerable. At almost every opportunity, and in a variety of ways, Spanish political leaders and diplomats were reminded that action in one area was connected to action in another. For example, when EC head Roy Jenkins visited Spain he acknowledged that while no official linkage existed he thought it impractical to expect membership in the Community without membership in NATO.

The calculus was relatively straightforward: membership in the EC turned on the support of both members who also belonged to NATO (particularly Germany) and (to a lesser degree) the United States. In the face of this reality Morán was overruled. As one study puts it: "the moral problem of coherency with the electorate and with the policy goals of the party lost influence in the face of the support the United States and the Federal Republic were able to give."<sup>71</sup> Especially in the case of Germany, which would have to bear a large portion of the adjustment costs, membership in NATO (especially after the CDU returned to power) was the *sin qua non* for EC membership for Spain.<sup>72</sup> In a positive sense, NATO membership was connected to the project of modernization by the effect it would have on the EC membership aspirations of Spain. It was in this way, as Pollack and Hunter observe, "remaining in NATO was a fundamental prerequisite for the modernization of the country."<sup>73</sup>

NATO membership (or, more precisely, the rejection of membership) was also related in a negative sense. That is, breaking the bond with NATO would have been quite detrimental to the project of modernization. The chief fear in this regard was the expectation that withdrawal would be followed by a significant "commercial retaliation" by the jilted Allies.<sup>74</sup> The overarching concern was that the retaliation might be significant enough to undermine the PSOE

government. Again, the fear was reasonable. As we have seen, any of the Allies might have tolerated a Spain outside of NATO, certainly Greece and Portugal would not have been upset to see Spain remain out. But, once in, withdrawal was another matter completely (the case of France was, as mentioned, more complicated).<sup>75</sup> The potential humiliation involved with such a repudiation was simply intolerable.

As in the case of joining the Alliance, the concern about a possible withdrawal was almost entirely symbolic in nature. It was not particularly a matter of the loss of concrete and important military resources. The calculations were very well summed up in a January 1984 exchange between Fernando Morán and the German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. In response to the question from Morán: "Tell me ... what importance do you attribute to our remaining in the Alliance?", Genscher replied: "If the previous government had not joined NATO the issue would not be important. There would have been other ways to connect the general interest. But leaving now would have effects, more political and moral than military, of clear importance."<sup>76</sup>

Thus it is proper to see this pro-membership shift not just as a matter of direct foreign pressure (e.g., the NATO-EC link), nor just the result of a straightforward deal. Likewise, it is only partially true that it was the result (as many sympathetic to PSOE in the matter argue) of a two-stage decision process whereby an uninformed and irresponsible leadership became informed and responsible. Rather it was an inescapable consequence of a commitment to a rational project. As Pollack and Hunter put it "the ideology of modernization, rather than the question of national security, was the determining factor" in the shift.<sup>77</sup>

#### Selling the Switch: The 1986 NATO Referendum

Felipe González and the supporters of continued membership began a hard-sell of their position. The pro-membership campaign (in the words of one study) "represented one of the

most ostentatious episodes of media manipulation, even the manipulation of conscience, that one can recall."<sup>78</sup> A senior American state department official, who also served as ambassador to Spain in the 1980s, observed in a 1990 interview that the Spanish left and right "have a way of ending up with much the same policies." In the process of bringing the nation into line with the new reality the PSOE's rhetoric began to seem almost eerily familiar. As Pollack and Hunter observe "the PSOE had adopted, virtually wholesale, the views that had previously been expounded by the centrist UCD government."<sup>79</sup> This despite the scorn the PSOE had previously heaped on such arguments.

The similarity manifested itself most spectacularly in the reassertion of the value of Atlanticism as a basic national orientation. One PSOE dissident described the new party line as built along a "neocapitalist Atlanticist model."<sup>80</sup> The membership hard-sell occurred in three overlapping stages. First, reluctant party leaders were brought in line. Of these, Alfonso Guerra was one of the last to be turned, at least in public. Eventually, however, Guerra conveniently concluded that NATO was not an American prison, but rather a virtual "panacea" capable of decisively solving problems ranging from economics to terrorism.<sup>81</sup>

Second, the party as a whole (as well as its affiliated organizations) was brought into line. This was a difficult task. As Sarasqueta observes, despite the shocking elite turnaround, the "anti-Atlanticist idea" dominated "the Socialists rank-and-file."<sup>82</sup> This phase kicked off in a familiar fashion with the redefinition of key terms. The despicable 'OTAN' (of the party's vague, but undeniably effective, anti-membership slogan 'OTAN, de Entrada, No!'), became the inoffensive 'Alianza Atlantica': a term previously favored by Calvo-Sotelo. The United States began to take a public beating again (continuing a PSOE tradition of negative rhetoric connected to actually benign relations) with González's redefinition of the consequences of membership.



Before 1982 membership in NATO meant limitations on Spain's sovereignty and participation in an organization that served only the interest of the United States. In 1976, González had observed that "NATO is nothing more than a military superstructure imposed by Americans in order to guarantee the survival of the capitalist system."<sup>83</sup> In 1980, González had argued that "NATO imposes an abandonment of sovereignty."<sup>84</sup> Post-1984 membership was held to be much more benign. Despite all of the previous rhetoric this new line was that membership did not impinge upon Spain's sovereignty, it enhanced it. Now (according to González) NATO membership "didn't decrease Spain's autonomy, but rather, reinforced it ... it didn't diminish the country's credibility, but, rather, increased it."<sup>85</sup> NATO no longer shackled Spain to the United States, it allowed Spain to counterbalance the United States, to unlock the shackles.

This new Europeanization of NATO did have a distinctly anti-American air to it. As an American journalist remarked, the PSOE plan served "to turn anti-Americanism on its head" by suddenly Europeanizing the Alliance.<sup>86</sup> Now NATO was the tool to dilute American influence over Spain and to grant Spain important diplomatic leverage against the United States that it could not have outside of the Alliance. Previous claims, that by joining the Alliance Spain was opening the door to a serious destabilization of the global balance of power (for example, it was argued that the move might prompt Yugoslavia to abandon its non-aligned status and join the Warsaw Pact) were turned on their head. After the 1984 turnaround, Spanish membership in the Alliance was seen as insuring the balance of power, its withdrawal would promote instability.

The hard-sell continued with attempts to refurbish the party's leftist credentials among its more militant and anti-NATO members by focusing on the few credible socialists (and even communists) who publicly supported membership.<sup>87</sup> Appeals were made to abstract principle and standards of consistency. At one point, Felipe González lectured restive party members,

warning that "you can't be constantly changing foreign policy."<sup>88</sup> Things were no longer black and white, as they apparently had been up to 1982. Now there was an appreciation for the fact that (in González's words): "in foreign policy everything is interdependent."<sup>89</sup>

The 30th PSOE party congress was held in Madrid December 13-16, 1984. The party's history of genuine divisiveness effectively ended at the 1979 Extraordinary Congress, with González's ascendency and the isolation of the radicals. In Pollack and Hunter's words, González's position was "unassailable."<sup>90</sup> The effect was to create what one analyst called "not only the most conservative socialist party in West Europe, but also the most disciplined structurally."<sup>91</sup> Not surprisingly the NATO turnaround threatened that remarkable structural discipline. At the opening of the convocation "the atmosphere was clearly hostile towards remaining in the important organization."<sup>92</sup>

By the end of the proceedings, 412 delegates (71%) voted to support the foreign policy decalogue (along with its pro-membership NATO provisions); 126 (22%) voted against support, with 42 abstentions (7%).<sup>93</sup> On the motion to require the party to take a negative stand on membership during any future referendum on the subject, 394 voted negatively (266 voted yes, with 26 abstentions).<sup>94</sup> While the party still criticized the original UCD decision to join the Alliance (calling it "inflexible, precipitous, gratuitous,") and González admitted that he would never have taken Spain into the Alliance, it allowed González almost complete freedom in making sure the inflexible, precipitous, and gratuitous decision was not reversed.<sup>95</sup> At the conclusion of the congress the socialist delegates, with fists raised in symbolic defiance, sang the leftist anthem the 'Internationale: Felipe González, Enrique Mugica, and Guillermo Galeote excepted.<sup>96</sup>

The latter replaced José Rodríguez de la Borbolla as point man in the national campaign to swing public opinion. José Rodríguez de la Borbolla had alienated many with his brusque attitude and heavy-handed tactics during the internal PSOE campaign.<sup>97</sup> The focus of the new

campaign was securing victory in a membership referendum (whenever it might be called), and its strategy was to play on some central themes that resonated powerfully within the electorate. The decision to validate the government turnaround on membership with the plebescite seems a peculiar, even dangerous., decision for a pro-membership leader to make. The use of the referendum was certainly not endorsed by Spain's NATO allies who fully appreciated the risks involved. Most Spanish foreign policy professionals were appalled at the use of such a method to settle the issue. As one Spanish diplomat argued in a 1989 interview, the question of Spain's membership in NATO was not "like Switzerland, about cows going to the mountains, something more deep, something more serious." These risks seemed absolutely unnecessary. To be sure, the promise to hold a referendum had been central in 1982 and, strictly speaking, had never been formally and finally repudiated.

However, the obvious way out of the situation was to defer the consultation until the next general election, which did not have to occur before October 1986. Rather than fight, an entire campaign focused on a single unpopular issue, validating the membership switch could have been part of a broader election campaign.<sup>94</sup> Such a campaign would have provided an important element of perspective since the Spanish electorate would have had to judge the turnaround both as part of the greater PSOE program and in light of the possible successors to the González government should the party lose control of the Congress of Deputies. Given that the PSOE's main opposition (the conservative AP) was pro-membership (indeed it supported as tight an integration in the Alliance as was possible) it seemed likely that, in the end, the PSOE would win. The widely perceived unreasonableness of sticking to the referendum is reflected in an August 1985 editorial in Cambio 16.

In expressing his befuddlement over the matter, the author observed that: "Parliament has already legitimately decided to integrate Spain into NATO, and the Government has already

declared that it is in agreement with membership. So what, then, is the debate? Nothing, air, vacillations, pride, internal socialist party problems." Such a decision to avoid the referendum, however, was never made. Why? Despite the advice I received from a high ranking foreign ministry official in a 1989 interview to not "judge the intentions" behind the decision, only the decision's actual "results," the issue of motivation in the matter is extremely important. Several, not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations have been offered for the decision to stick with, and try to win, a referendum on membership. Each of the explanations connect the decision to gamble with an important foreign policy issue to purely internal concerns.

One theory chalks the decision up to González's 'orgullo'. The word may be translated as either 'pride' or 'haughtiness'. The party and its leader had vowed to call a referendum. There was both an admirable and less admirable aspect to the promise. On the one hand, González saw himself as bound by his word ( given not once but perhaps hundreds of times). As one high level party official stated in 1985, the referendum would eventually have to be held because "we promised."<sup>99</sup> On the other hand, González was intrigued with the challenge of once again successfully manipulating the electorate to back his position.

Another, broader, theory focuses not on the moral obligations involved with fulfilling campaign promises, but on another version of morality. This version might be referred to as 'electoral morality': the passion for honesty and responsiveness generated by the conclusion that outright dishonesty and unresponsiveness will certainly hurt at the polls. The whole referendum question was a potentially uncomfortable issue for the next election. According to one observer, not calling the plebsscite would have been "the only weak flank of the socialist government during the first four years ... the only, even for the pro-NATO right." The referendum was still enormously popular. Support for holding the plesbecite was also remarkably stable.

For example, in a 1981 poll 70% of respondents wanted a referendum. In an April 1985 poll the same proportion supported this idea: with 79.1% saying that they would definitely or probably vote.<sup>100</sup> Cancelling the referendum outright would have been a public relations nightmare, in part because (as one observer correctly points out) such a cancellation would have immediately "generated in Spanish public opinion the feeling that the government had given in upon finding itself subjected to foreign pressure."<sup>101</sup> There was no way to avoid that impression. The denials themselves would have served as proof-positive that the insidious influence of foreigners was at work. Even those who would have agreed with the cancellation would have chalked it up to such pressure. Those in competition with PSOE, both on the left and right, would not have hesitated in bringing the retreat and its origins up during the campaign.

A final, and the broadest, theory focuses on a process of leadership maturation and the growing sensitivity among the government leadership that a foreign policy consensus was necessary as a buttress to future policy formulation. In March 1985, for example, Carlos Solchaga (who had studied economics at MIT and Cambridge University), in a speech to the 'Club Siglo XXI' in Madrid, attributed the new PSOE stand "not so much to realpolitik conditions as to an internal PSOE process of maturation."<sup>102</sup> The change reflected only a change in the PSOE's character, not a change in the world.

Though written some years later, an analysis in The Economist captures the essence of the emerging and mature PSOE leadership: "Many of the party's top brass, a chummy coterie now in their late 40s and early 50s, seem altogether too beautiful for people whose political rhetoric and often origins lie with the modest middle and working class."<sup>103</sup> One element in the maturation of the party was the recognition that, all other considerations aside, the referendum would (as one senior foreign-ministry official put it in a 1989 interview) serve as a vital step in the guided effort to "reorganize the internal consensus." Indeed, it would serve as a national

"catharsis" after which a more stable Spain (in terms of its fundamental national identity) would emerge. The short-term trauma would pay for itself down the line.

Between the solidification of party support behind a pro-membership position in December 1984, and this holding of the (ultimately positive) referendum in March 1986, the "second NATO campaign" went into high gear.<sup>104</sup> That campaign faced a daunting task. The October recantation had resulted in a measurable loss of support for party. One main issue was the exact timing of the referendum. The timing challenge was simple: when would it be best to hold the plebescite in order to maximize the success of the efforts at generating support. In general the guiding principle was 'later rather than sooner', since the opposition to membership was so difficult (though not impossible) to erode. In June 1984 Alfonso Guerra had argued that the population was solidly opposed to membership, though he conceded that there was an approximately 5% a month move towards support.<sup>105</sup> At such a pace it would take a while to build support. In the interim the overall strategy for Guillermo Galeote's campaign was to portray continued membership as "convenient, necessary, and good."<sup>106</sup> As a part of this there was a two-pronged attack, playing on the positive ("convenient" and "good") and the negative ("necessary") aspects of membership.

First, (as alluded to) it was absolutely necessary to redefine NATO as the 'Atlantic Alliance', something more positive than the hated 'OTAN' of the PSOE's youth. While the pre-power PSOE had ridiculed the Calvo-Sotelo government's attempt to hide 'NATO' under the rhetorical blanket of the 'Atlantic Alliance', the post-decalogue PSOE was (ironically) far more successful in perpetrating the same sleight of hand. Having established its anti-NATO credentials its redefinition seemed to have some validity. The campaign played down the military component of NATO (stressing its political and economic aspects) and placed the freshly neutered organization in the middle of an older, grander, vision: Europeanization.

Second, the campaign hammered on the theme that a rejection of membership was an open door through which those things most valued by Spaniards would be irrevocably lost. In this sense the pro-NATO campaign was a sophisticated and effective fear campaign operating on the premise that utter disaster would follow a repudiation of membership. The aim was clear: create an increasingly steep bill for the luxury of withdrawal. Some forms of retaliation was relatively limited, for example, the claim that withdrawal would cost Spain the 1992 Olympics, which was part of the broader national celebration of the 500th anniversary of both the discovery of the New World and the conclusion of the 'reconquista'.<sup>107</sup> Other threats were potentially more important. Finally casting away the legalistic fiction of non-linkage, the pro-NATO campaign drove home that membership in the EC could not be had or (after January 7, 1986) retained without remaining in NATO. On the domestic front, as the campaign raged, there were vague hints that, in the event of repudiation, González would resign. In the case of a negative vote, one top PSOE leader suggested, González might very well "begin a long vacation to rest and forget everything."<sup>108</sup>

A González resignation might, in one unnerving scenario, lead to the formation of a government headed by the "bogyman" Manuel Fraga (leader of the chief opposition party the conservative Alianza Popular).<sup>109</sup> That possibility was remote, but sobering, for those Spaniards who did not trust Fraga's and the Alianza Popular's commitment to democracy. The overall effect of the scare tactics employed was summed up by an opponent to membership who observed that the PSOE's pro-NATO campaign "warned us of everything except an invasion of AIDS."<sup>110</sup>

One initiative in the pro-membership campaign was the publication of a series of questions and answers, almost in the form of a political catechism, clarifying the party position on membership. In virtually every case, the charges being answered had been originally

popularized by González and the PSOE leadership in the 1970s and early 1980s. In that sense it was a monologue. In answering the crucial question of "What reasons justify the position of belonging to the Alliance" the party listed several. This varied list included the arguments that: United Nations Charter (article 51) permitted such an affiliation, Spain must pay for the benefits it receives from being a part of the Western world by helping to defend it against its enemies, NATO makes both Spain and the world safer, and NATO is not primarily a military organization but (rather) an "international forum" exclusion from which would result in Spain's "marginalization" in terms of international status.<sup>111</sup>

In response to the long held PSOE position that "belonging to NATO restricts liberty in foreign policy," the leadership responded that "no country has full freedom of action in foreign policy." That said, NATO was no more inherently restrictive than affiliation with any other organization.<sup>112</sup> Responding to the emotionally effective charge that membership increased the risk to Spain of becoming involved in a major war, the party argued simply that "reality indicates otherwise."<sup>113</sup> The new party position was that NATO had contributed decisively to the major post-1945 European reality. Appealing to history the response notes that, "there has been no war in Europe ... there have been many wars in the world, but not in this area."<sup>114</sup> On the politically sensitive matter of the party's turnaround in regards to membership the document featured a clever twist. The leadership could not be blamed with hypocrisy because (when all was said and done) there had been no real change of position. PSOE had never claimed that Spain was outside of "the West" and free from the responsibilities of that position. It had only viewed NATO membership as irrelevant in its relationship with the West. The only change was that, post-1984, "the West" was defined in terms of NATO.<sup>115</sup>

In the midst of the pro-membership campaign, and as a result of what Gillespie calls the "most important internal government clash" since the party came to power, the PSOE government



underwent an important shake-up.<sup>116</sup> A July 1985 cabinet change resulted in the removal of Fernando Morán as foreign minister and his replacement by a former left-wing UCD leader. While Morán's position on NATO membership, as well as foreign policy as a whole, was much more complicated than the image perpetuated by critics, his replacement was a dramatic move that clearly indicated the final solidification of the pro-membership commitment of the party's top leaders. Whatever the truth regarding his actual attitude towards the pro-membership campaign, dumping Morán certainly pleased most of Spain's allies, especially the United States.<sup>117</sup> After his dismissal an anonymous NATO official remarked that "the beginning of the end" of the Alliance's Spanish problem was at hand.<sup>118</sup>

Complexities notwithstanding, Morán's departure did put an end to a strained period in which the foreign minister's heart was clearly not in the fight he was expected to help lead. Despite the softening of his attitudes towards the Alliance that experience within NATO provided, Morán had never come to embrace the organization and membership in it. The origins of his reticence were complex. His ideological scruples aside, Fernando Morán was certainly no populist and he pointedly disapproved of the use of the referendum to solve a foreign policy question. Fernando Morán's original appointment had been a nod to the party's left, but his chief underlying fault was his activism more than his ideological predilections.

Morán's ideological paper trail and reputation certainly unsettled Spain's allies: his insistence on a large degree of autonomy, as befitting an individual with enormous experience in the foreign ministry, unsettled González (who, after all, had served as both shadow prime minister and foreign minister before 1982). At base, Morán's dismissal was the result of a conjunction of González's desire for complete control, the constant opposition by conservatives within the foreign ministry and the increasingly insistent wishes of Spain's allies.

For his part, Morán clearly interpreted his dismissal as a result of foreign, particularly American, pressure. Prior to his fall Morán was subject to a campaign of public criticism, and private ridicule, that steadily eroded his prestige and influence within the party and the government. In his view, the campaign was "politically inspired" and "coordinated," representing "a constant headache," since the pro-NATO media "never excluded a single attack or defamation."<sup>119</sup> The phantom campaign was "at times base, often fervently evil, almost always ugly."<sup>120</sup> In his opinion, the primary source of the corrosive campaign was the American embassy, since June 26, 1983 under the control of the ambitious Thomas Enders.

Thomas Enders' involvement with the Reagan Nicaragua policy had earned him a curious reputation as both a hawk and a moderate, as well as an extremely effective problem-solver. Seeing himself as a consummate problem-solver, his tenure in Madrid had to be aimed at some concrete result. He was not there to simply show the flag. He came to Spain with (in Moran's words) "a will to triumph at all costs," a triumph he defined in terms of stopping (or, failing that, securing a positive result from) the referendum on NATO.<sup>121</sup> Once he presented his credentials, Enders apparently (and with great success) set about wooing the Spanish right (the embassy became a favorite hangout for Madrid's conservative business and political elite) and trying to drive "a wedge" between González and the PSOE left (embodied by Fernando Morán)<sup>122</sup> He wanted to control the course of events in regards to NATO. In order to do so, he often utilized some creative, if not extreme, tactics.

For example, in December 1983 he arranged a highly irregular lunch meeting in New York between King Juan Carlos (there on a purely ceremonial visit), Ronald Reagan, and American diplomats connected with NATO. Secretary of State Schultz, who was well aware that the Spanish monarch did not discuss matters of substance, was not invited.<sup>123</sup> Enders evidently hoped that the presence of himself, the President, the King, and the experts would create a sort

of diplomatic critical-mass in which some sort of deal might be struck. The scheme drew protests from the Spanish foreign ministry. By 1985 it was an open secret in Madrid that the United States government was involved in some in the anti-Morán campaign. When pressed by Morán during a dinner meeting, Thomas Ender's took refuge in ambiguity. He denied embassy involvement in directing or feeding the anti-Morán campaign, he conceded that (given the "multilevel" character of the American government) he certainly could not guarantee "that some service or agency did not participate in some manner in certain areas of vilification."<sup>124</sup>

After the dismissal of Morán, the final drive to the referendum truly began. Felipe González began a frenetic campaign, relying on both personal appearances and the mass media.<sup>125</sup> Even a critic of the PSOE would later characterize González's efforts on behalf of membership as "intense and effective."<sup>126</sup> The pitch was sometimes surprisingly frank. In an interview shortly before the referendum, González was plaintive: "If you want to punish me do it in the general elections."<sup>127</sup> That drive was opposed, for wildly different reasons, from both the left and the right. Of the two, the left opposition was the more straightforward. One major portion of leftist opposition was organized under a loose umbrella organization (the PCSEO). That organization's overall program fit comfortably with demands of other European peace movements.

The PCSEO was forced to fight the battle with a war chest of only 300,000,000 ptas. (some of which was rumored to have come from the Soviets). From all sources (including, increasingly, the Spanish business community, an embryonic relationship with later consequences) the pro-membership forces had access to over 1,000,000,000 ptas, as well as the incalculable resources of governmental power.<sup>128</sup> As Pollack and Hunter observe, despite a genuine element of breadth, the anti-membership coalition was severely hobbled by the lack of any genuine depth, at least in terms of organizational resources.<sup>129</sup>

Opposition on the right was naturally focused on the chief parliamentary opposition party, the AP. The AP had been formed by Manuel Fraga by fusing seven center-right parties, many of which were led and staffed by former Franquist officials<sup>130</sup>. The AP's self-image was very complex, combining many elements of traditional Spanish conservatism (e.g., monarchism) and a neo-conservative (almost Thatcherite or Reaganesque) fascination with economic libertarianism. Representing this latter tendency, party leader Jorge Verstrynge Rojas (in a 1982 interview) berated the Spanish left for its unthinking adhesion to redistribution and absolute equality, holding Alianza Popular up as the champion of individual liberty. The Spanish left was, Verstrynge Rojas argued, "messianic" since Marxism was "a religion with its infallible dogmas ... its embalmed gods (like Lenin), its scriptures (like 'Das Kapital')." <sup>131</sup>

Up until 1982 (and in some respects even later) the party and its leadership was hobbled by their clear links to the Franquist past: undeniable personal connections to a regime that hardly sought to maximize "individual liberty." The PSOE regularly painted the party as embracing (in Arango's words) "unalloyed continuismo devoid of even cosmetic retouching." <sup>132</sup> The collapse of the UCD in the 1982 elections (and the expansion of the AP's vote from 6.5% to 25.8%) left the party as the chief opposition group to the powerful PSOE. During the 1982 campaign the AP had promoted a platform that had not just called for continued membership in NATO, but a fuller affiliation with the Alliance. <sup>133</sup> With the increasing moderation of the PSOE (e.g., in economic policy) NATO had been a convenient issue upon which to criticize the government. The October 1984 switch (in truth a victory for the right in terms of pure policy considerations) had clearly complicated matters in terms of practical politics. The whole referendum business put the party in a delicate position, a quandry that González no doubt relished. <sup>134</sup> In Tulchin's view, the PSOE about-face "immobilized" the natural partisans of membership. <sup>135</sup>

On the one hand, the referendum idea was popular among AP supporters (various poll results indicating anywhere between 50% to upwards of 63% wanted the matter settled by referendum).<sup>136</sup> On the other hand, virtually no potential referendum outcome seemed favorable to the AP. If the outcome was negative, and was followed by a withdrawal from the Alliance, a valued policy position championed by the party would be lost. Given the dynamic of the PSOE's pro-membership campaign (making the vote an overall assessment of González and the PSOE government so that a yes vote on membership would be a vote for González, a positive outcome would be an enormously important endorsement of the socialists.

The AP (poll results notwithstanding), and the Spanish right in general, heaped scorn on both the spectacle of the PSOE's switch and the use of a referendum. A particularly stinging critique centered on the party's seeming desire to have NATO, but only on its own terms. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo compared the PSOE to a lapsed Catholic and challenged the ruling party: "if you believe in the Atlantic Alliance, practice it ... if you do not believe say it clearly, denounce the Treaty of Washington."<sup>137</sup> Conservative political leaders, and editorial writers, began to cast the referendum in sinister terms. For example, one writer described the policy as "demogogic" and a "profound position against parliamentary democracy," since it represented a calculated end-run around the Congress of Deputies.<sup>138</sup> Not without reason, the AP's response was to counsel abstention. The optimal result to hope for would be a positive vote (securing a policy goal) but one tainted by a high abstention rate interpreted as a protest (demonstrating the AP's influence).

The protest summed up in abstention was to be aimed at both the PSOE's handling of the entire issue (which Manuel Fraga described as "irresponsible, demogogic, and opportunistic") and (more specifically) the confusing nature of the ultimately settled upon referendum question. The latter was a convenient target. Fraga characterized the extremely convoluted and reservation-

ridden wording of the referendum as "a complete fraud."<sup>139</sup> The wording was certainly confusing and inelegant, and riddled with important conditions and qualifications. The final text read:

"The Government considers it in the national interest that Spain remain in the Atlantic Alliance and resolves that established on the following terms:

1. The participation of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its incorporation in the integrated military structure.
3. The prohibition on the installation, storing, or introducing nuclear arms on Spanish territory will be continued.
4. The progressive reduction of the military presence of the United States in Spain will be proceeded with.

Do you consider it advisable for Spain to remain in the Atlantic Alliance according to the terms set forth by the government of the nation?"<sup>140</sup>

In this particular critique the Spanish right was joined by the anti-NATO left. The options presented by the referendum's wording were so unclear that one anti-NATO PSOE member claimed that the average voter would have to "refer to the Bible" for guidance when he voted.<sup>141</sup> PSOE speeches in favor of membership were frequently met by denunciations, attacks whose wording was certainly clearer than that of the referendum: "NATO Does Not Help Spain's International Position," "NATO Does Not Make Spain's Democracy Stronger," and "NATO Brings Nothing To Our Well-Being."<sup>142</sup>

The abstention policy was not without its critics. The PSOE government, scrambling for every positive vote, from every part of the ideological spectrum, obviously rejected it. The only recently converted Alfonso Guerra remarked that the conservative position represented an attempt by Fraga to "blind himself in order to poke out Felipe González's eye."<sup>143</sup> Even among

conservatives there was significant dissension. Some prominent conservatives broke with their compatriots and supported voting. Beyond wanting to participate in a major policy decision, the fear among many on the right was that if the measure lost they would be blamed. Due to the enmity of those nations who wanted a positive outcome, it was possible (in the words of one analysis) any future conservative prime minister "would not be able to cross the Pyrennes."<sup>144</sup> The AP's decision on abstention also made it a target of external pressure from foreign conservative parties.<sup>145</sup>

While a majority of those abstaining probably supported NATO membership (as well as some portion of the 'No' vote made up by individuals who simply wanted to humiliate Felipe González), and thus the final results underestimate support for the government's pro-membership position, the results of the referendum did confirm that the depth of support for continued membership in NATO was hardly breathtaking. Only 52.54% of the 59.73% of eligible voters who participated supported maintaining the status quo.<sup>146</sup>

The abstention level (40.27%) was the largest for any national or municipal election up to that point (interestingly, the closest competitor on the national level was the 1978 referendum on the constitution (a 32.3% abstention rate).<sup>147</sup> As Pollack and Hunter argue, the results had little to do with NATO as such. Rather, most who supported the government's convoluted position also supported the existence and continuation of the link between NATO membership and national modernization. It was a means to an end, not an end in itself.<sup>148</sup>

#### Conclusion: Victory and Consequences

Abstentions notwithstanding, González reveled in the unexpected victory. Speaking to the nation after the victory seemed secure, González observed: "The result is a success for the whole Spanish people ... Spain's policy of peace and security has emerged strengthened and confirmed by a majority of our people. The result will enable us to continue to take part in

European and Western security and make an active contribution to maintaining peace and the support of peaceful solutions to conflicts in the world. I am firmly convinced that this result strengthens and consolidates the path of peace, coexistence, democracy, and progress which Spain set out on ten years ago."<sup>149</sup>

Supporters of continued membership were ecstatic, the victory (given the pre-election air of doom) seemed almost miraculous. A spokesman for the foreign ministry remarked: "I always said that the final result depended on Felipe's final address, and I was not far wrong."<sup>150</sup> That speech had been delivered on the eve of the referendum. In it González referred to NATO only as the Atlantic Alliance (and then only twice): the word 'peace' was used forty times.<sup>151</sup> Spain's allies, European and American, having feared the worst, "were exultant that a damaging blow to the Alliance's prestige and unity had been avoided."<sup>152</sup> Following the referendum a NATO official confessed: "We worried. It has saved us from a crisis of confidence."<sup>153</sup>

Reactions to the whole "adventure," from both opponents of the pro-membership policy, as well as opponents of the PSOE government, were predictable.<sup>154</sup> Calling the results "a poor victory," the conservative newspaper ABC observed that, "Felipe González has resurrected the character of Goethe ... he unleashed a storm that, later, he did not know how to control ... The complete uselessness of the referendum, combined with the grave risks run by the country, are the two great realities that have discredited the current President of Government."<sup>155</sup> It concluded that "González has tried to present his brusque conversion, from an anti-Alliance position marked by its violence to a reverence before Lord Carrington, as a small change. It is more like the leader of an anti-capital punishment movement suddenly becoming a supporter of the guillotine."<sup>156</sup>

In terms of the practical political ramifications of the referendum's results, everyone claimed some sort of victory. González's position was formally (if grudgingly) affirmed.



Opponents to NATO had managed to attract nearly seven million voters, while supporters of NATO (but opponents of Felipe González and the PSOE government) had convinced (or so they claimed) over eleven million voters to discredit the process by remaining out of it. On a more restricted level, as Gooch argues, the results were clearly a mixed blessing for Felipe González. While he prevailed over those who wanted Spain out of NATO regardless of the consequences, thus insuring the international foundation for national modernization, "his image as a Socialist and a man of ethics was definitely more tarnished than before."<sup>157</sup>

NOTES

1. See the summary of the report provided by "La Espana de Mr. Reagan," Cambio 16, November 17, 1980.
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3. An excellent account of the evaporation of the UCD is provided by Richard Gunther, "El Hundimiento de UCD" in Juan J. Linz and José R. Montero (editors) Crisis y Cambio: Electores y Partidos en la Espana de los Anos Ochenta (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1986), pp. 433-492.
4. See "OTAN: A Ver Quien Gana," Cambio 16, September 14, 1981.
5. The PSOE platform, dealing with both domestic and foreign policy issues, is summarized in ABC: Edición Internacional, September 29-October 5, 1982.
6. Ibid.
7. See José Oneto, Adónde Va Felipe? (Barcelona: Editorial Argos Vergara, 1983), p. 365.
8. Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 106.
9. Fernando Morán, Espana en Su Sitio (Barcelona: Plaza and Janes, 1990), p. 23.
10. Robert Graham, Spain: The Change of a Nation, (London: Michael Joseph Limited, 1984), p. 178.
11. See "Proseguira el Respaldo de Washington al Proceso Democratico," ABC: Edición Internacional, November 3-9, 1982.
12. See Angel Vinas, "Alcance y Delimitacion del Compromiso Adoptado Por el Gobierno Espanol Ante la Alianza Atlantica," pp. 5-6.
13. Fernando Morán, Espana en Su Sitio, pp. 24-25.
14. Ibid., p. 27.
15. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
16. See the argument provided by Josef Joff, "NATO and the Limits of Devolution" in Ted Galen (editor), NATO at Forty: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1990), pp. 59-73.
17. Morán, pp. 22-23.

18. Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 217.
19. Robert Graham, Spain: The Change of a Nation, p. 173.
20. Ibid.
21. See the report of González's 1980 meeting with Jimmy Carter in José Oneto, "OTAN: Nueva Congelacion," Cambio 16, July 6, 1980.
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23. Ibid., p. 279.
24. Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Foreign Policy of the Socialist Government" in Stanley G. Payne (editor), The Politics of Democratic Spain (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), p. 221.
25. Ibid., p. 223.
26. See "Un Pobre Victoria," ABC: Edición Internacional, March 13-18, 1986.
27. See Sergio Vilar, La Década Soprendente: 1976-1986 (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1986), p. 174.
28. See EL País, November 5, 1984.
29. Antxon Sarasqueta, "Reagan Apoyara a Felipe," Cambio 16, February 11-18, 1985.
30. Morán, p. 374.
31. See Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, "The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party's Foreign and Defense Policy: The External Dimension of Modernization" in Tom Gallagher and Allan Williams (editors), Southern European Socialism: Parties, Elections, and the Challenge of Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 89-90.
32. Morán, pp. 31-32.
33. Ibid., p. 142.
34. Ibid., pp. 156-158.
35. Ibid., p. 158.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 156.
38. Sergio Vilar, La Década Soprendente: 1976-1986, pp. 169-170.

39. Nicolas Redondo's remarks are reported in El País, September 24, 1984.
40. Vilar, p. 168.
41. Mujal-Leon, "Foreign Policy of the Socialist Government," p. 224.
42. Morán, p. 29.
43. Mujal-Leon, "Foreign Policy of the Socialist government," p. 219.
44. See Victor Marquez Reviviego, Felipe González: Un Estilo Ético (Barcelona: Editorial Argos Vergara, 1988), p. 176.
45. Vilar, p. 171.
46. El País, November 12, 1984.
47. Ibid.
48. Vilar, p. 172.
49. Ibid., p. 322.
50. Morán, p. 270.
51. Ibid., pp. 272-273.
52. Ibid., pp. 30-32.
53. See José Oneto, "OTAN: Nueva Congelacion," Cambio 16, July 6, 1980.
54. See "Goodbye Mr. Haig," Cambio 16, April 20, 1981.
55. See "Socialistas al Ataque," Cambio 16, January 3, 1977.
56. See Angel Vinas, "Spain, the United States, and NATO" in C. Abel and N. Torrents, Spain: Conditional Democracy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 57.
57. Javier Pérez Royo, "Repercussions on the Democratic Process of Spain's Entry into NATO" in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (editors), Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 21, 25-26.
58. Angel Vinas, "Spain, the United States, and NATO" in C. Abel and N. Torrents, Spain: Conditional Democracy, p. 58.
59. Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy, p. 107.

60. Benny Pollack and Jean Gruge, "Opposition in Spain: Tradition Against Modernity" in Eva Kolinsky (editor), Opposition in Western Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 251.
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62. Carlos Zaldívar, "Spain in Quest of Autonomy and Security: The Policies of the Socialist Governments From 1982-1990" in Kenneth W. Maxwell (editor), Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 188.
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65. Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, "The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party Foreign and Defense Policy: The External Dimension of Modernization" in Tom Gallagher and Allan Williams (editors), Southern European Socialism: Parties, Elections, and the Challenge of Government, p. 107.
66. Ibid., p. 88.
67. Meir Serfaty, "Political Pragmatism in Spain," p. 391.
68. On the Morán-Flores rivalry see Morán, p. 91.
69. Ibid., p. 311.
70. Ibid.
71. José Luis Gutierrez and Amando de Miguel, La Ambición de César: Un Retrato Político y Humano de Felipe González (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1989), p. 322.
72. Richard Gillespie, "Spanish Socialism in the 1980s" in Tom Gallagher and Allan Williams (editors), Southern European Socialism: Parties, Elections, and the Challenge of Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 76.
73. Pollack and Hunter, p. 169.
74. Richard Gillespie, "Spanish Socialism in the 1980s" in Tom Gallagher and Allan Williams (editors), Southern European Socialism: Parties, Elections, and the Challenge of Government, p. 77.
75. On France's modification of its relationship with NATO see Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 316-320.
76. Morán, p. 269.
77. Pollack and Hunter, p. 174.

78. José Luis Gutiérrez and Amando de Miguel, La Ambición de César: Un Retrato Político y Humano de Felipe González, p. 227.
79. Pollack and Hunter, p. 169.
80. Ignacio Sotelo is quoted in Gillespie, "Spanish Socialism in the 1980s," p. 83.
81. José Luis Gutiérrez and Amando de Miguel, p. 328.
82. Antxon Sarasqueta, "Spanish Opinion and the West, Survey, Volume 29, Number 3, Autumn 1985, p. 45.
83. See "Cuando Ha Dicho la Verdad?," Cambio 16, February 17, 1986.
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85. See the interview with Felipe González in "Si Quieren Castigarme Haganlo en las Elecciones," Cambio 16, March 10, 1986.
86. See Michael S. Serrill, "A Crucial Vote for NATO," Time, Volume 127, Number 11, March 17, 1986.
87. Vilar, p. 171.
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89. See El País, December 3, 1984.
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91. Serfaty, p. 377.
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93. Ibid.
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96. Ibid.
97. Morán, p. 384.
98. See Carlos Robles Piquer, "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of Participation," Paper Presented to the Atlantic Treaty Association," September 17, 1986. p. 6.
99. See Caridad Plaza's interview with Txiki Benegas, Cambio 16, September 23-30, 1985.

100. See "Espanoles Contra la OTAN," Cambio 16, October 26, 1981 and "Mirando a Europa Con Amor y Odio," Cambio 16, May 13-20, 1985.
101. See Angel Vinas, "Alcance y Delimitacion del Compromiso Adoptado Por el Gobierno Espanol Ante la Alianza Atlantica, p. 12.
102. See El País, March 4, 1985.
103. See "The Next Transition," The Economist, March 11, 1989.
104. See Inocencio Felix Arias, "Spanish Media and the Two NATO Campaigns" in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (editors), Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives, pp. 34-40.
105. See El País, June 11, 1984.
106. See ABC, July 5, 1985, quoted in José Luis Gutierrez and Amando de Miguel, p. 326.
107. See Michael S. Serrill, "A Stunning Win for NATO," Time, Volume 128, Number 12, March 24, 1986.
108. See José Oneto, "Felipe: Se Puede Ir," Cambio 16, February 17, 1986.
109. Anthony Gooch, "A Surrealistic Referendum: Spain and NATO," Government and Opposition, Volume 21, Number 3, Summer 1986, P. 306.
110. The comment is reported in Michael S. Serrill, "A Stunning Win for NATO," Time, Volume 128, Number 12, March 24, 1986.
111. See "Spain and the Question of the Atlantic Alliance: 16 Questions and Answers," September 1985, pp. 3-4.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
114. *Ibid.*
115. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12.
116. On the importance of the 1985 cabinet reshuffle see Gillespie, p. 82.
117. El País, July 8, 1985.
118. On foreign reactions to Fernando Morán's resignation see "Por Que Se Fue Boyer y Guerra Gano la Guerra," Cambio 16, July 15-22, 1985.
119. Morán, pp. 251-252.

120. Ibid., p. 251.
121. Ibid., p. 248.
122. Ibid., pp. 249-250.
123. Ibid., pp. 250-251.
124. Ibid., pp. 253-254.
125. Anthony Gooch, "A Surrealistic Referendum: Spain and NATO," pp. 305-306.
126. See Carlos Robles Piquer, "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of Partidipation," Per Presented to the Atlantic Treaty Association," September 17, 1986, p. 6.
127. See "Si Quieren Castigarme Haganlo en las Elecciones," Cambio 16, March 10, 1986.
128. See "Los Que Quieren Sacar a Espana de la OTAN," Cambio 16, February 10, 1986. PSOE-business ties have recently led to significant financial scandal. See reports carried in El Pais during the fall and winter of 1992, especially the editions of October 12, 1992 and December 14, 1992.
129. Pollack and Hunter, pp. 103-104.
130. See Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System, pp. 77-92.
131. See "Jorge Verstrynge: A Imagen y Semejanza de Fraga," ABC: Edicion Internacional, July 4, 1982.
132. E. Ramon Arango, The Spanish Political System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 261.
133. ABC: Edición Internacional, September 29-October 5, 1982.
134. Gooch, p. 307.
135. See Joseph S. Tulchin's 'Epilogue' to Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (editors), Spain's Entry into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 161.
136. See "El Chantaje de Felipe González," Cambio 16, March 3, 1986.
137. See "Cuando Ha Dicho la Verdad?," Cambio 16, February 17, 1986.
138. Alejandro Muñoz Alonso, "La OTAN y el Referendum," Cambio 16, March 3, 1986.
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141. See the comments in "Referendum OTAN: la Esquizofrenia Socialista," Cambio 16, February 10, 1986.
142. Sarasqueta, p. 45.
143. The comment is reported in "Si Quieren Castigarme Haganlo en las Elecciones," Cambio 16, March 10, 1986.
144. See "División en AP: A Fraga Le Puede Estallar el Referendum," Cambio 16, March 10, 1986.
145. Ibid.
146. For full results see ABC: Edición Internacional, March 13-18, 1986. See also Luis Peiro, "El Gran Vuelco," Cambio 16, March 17, 1986.
147. See the election analysis in Cambio 16, March 20, 1986.
148. Pollack and Hunter, p. 104.
149. See Alan F. Pater and Jason R. Pater (editors), What They Said in 1986 (Beverly Hills: Monitor Books, 1987), p. 299.
150. Innocencio Félix Arias' comments are reported in Michael S. Serrill, "A Stunning Win for NATO," Time, Volume 128, Number 12, March 24, 1986.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. See "Voting for NATO," Macleans, Volume 99, Number 12, March 24, 1986.
154. "Un Pobre Victoria," ABC: Edición Internacional, March 13-18, 1986.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid.
157. Gooch, p. 316.

## CHAPTER VI

### FOREIGN POLICY AS THEATER

#### Introduction

Though necessarily brief, I believe that the preceding study manages to establish several related points. First, an intense and important interaction between domestic political considerations, domestic politics, and foreign policy appears early in Spanish history and persists well into the late twentieth century. The evolution of the NATO membership issue is a prime example of this resilient linkage. The basic link is relatively impervious to changes in either leadership or particular political system. The exact form of the linkage between internal and external is one in which foreign policy takes on an almost purely utilitarian character. The value of any given position is seen primarily in terms of how that initiative will affect the internal political fortunes of the actor or actors considering it. Foreign policy first serves domestic political needs rather than any overarching external plan.

Focusing just on the twentieth century, several instances readily come to mind. For example, when Spain assumed a neutral stance towards the warring nations after 1914 it was as much (indeed probably more) an attempt to avoid internal conflict as it was a calculated move to serve strategic interests. Also, the imperial adventures in North Africa that occupied Spanish foreign policy after World War One were primarily the result of domestic considerations that superseded questions concerning the policy's effect on Spain's basic national security or international standing. Finally, the 1953 agreement between the Franco regime and the United

States was seen by the former as almost purely a domestic political exercise. What mattered most was how the internal, not external, balance of power was affected by the arrangement. The NATO membership issue, as it evolved in the 1970s and 1980s, must be seen in this relatively unchanging context.

Second, and on a finer level, we can, for the half century between 1936-1986 distinguish two types of internal imperatives (based on the particular attributes of the political system in place) which mark four distinct periods during the five decades. The first period, 1936-1976, featured the full use of foreign policy to sustain the dictatorial regime in the face of its internal opponents. Foreign policy was used again and again to enhance the Franco regime's ability to manage economic affairs, to use coercion, and to accrue the important benefits of the endorsement of the most important powers in the international system (first the Axis, then the United States). Protecting the regime (which in practice really meant protecting Franco's personal power) justified virtually any collateral damage to Spain's standing, influence, latitude, and indeed sovereignty. Spain endured the disadvantages. The Franquist regime time and time again sacrificed Spain's international standing to sustain its internal power.

The second period, 1976-1979, was a transitional period leading to democracy that served also to bridge the period of domestic political considerations and the appearance of foreign policy as a domestic political issue. This period of modified political competition featured the premeditated depoliticization of foreign policy (which, given the metapolitical character of EC membership, effectively meant NATO membership) by agreement between the major political actors (e.g., via the Moncloa Pacts), and the overwhelming necessity to deal with a myriad of pressing domestic issues associated to the move to democracy. Adolfo Suárez assumed the goal of democratization as his great national project. In his successful pursuit of this goal Adolfo Suárez's foreign policy initiatives (including his reticence on the issue of NATO membership)

reflected this priority status for democratization. During the third period, 1979-1982, foreign policy, specifically in the form of NATO membership, became hyper-politicized. Foreign policy, in the form of NATO membership, became a matter of pure partisan politics as the earlier depoliticization dissolved away. Leading up to the October 1982 general elections, NATO membership became a central issue in the competition between the rising PSOE and the doomed UCD. This partisan use of the issue occurred in two reinforcing waves. In the period 1979-1982, the PSOE dominated the debate, effectively defining the agenda and terminology connected to the issue. Post-1979, the UCD government (especially under Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo) tried unsuccessfully to recapture the high ground and cast membership in a distinctly different light. Reflecting the character of the post-Suárez leadership, Atlanticism was held to be the next great national project beckoning Spain.

Finally, the fourth period, 1982-1986, witnessed the massive electoral victory of the PSOE in October 1982, a victory built in large part on the party's seemingly unalterable opposition to Spanish membership in NATO (supplemented by its moderation in other areas), as well as the personal popularity of Felipe González, resulting in a return to a period of modified competition akin to that of the Suárez period. The PSOE's hegemonic position allowed it great policy latitude and freedom and led to the embrace of a great national project (analogous to democratization and Atlanticism), the project of modernization (defined in economic, technological, and organizational terms). Modernization became the PSOE government's central focus and the requirements of that project, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, became the guiding principles of party policy.

The success of modernization required the retention (indeed the expansion) of Spain's contacts with both Western Europe and the United States. In this it was a consciously anti-autarkic enterprise. Leaving NATO would have undoubtedly placed serious strains on the

maintenance of those important relationships crucial to achieve modernization. The lingering referendum issue led to a temporary reemergence of the political use of foreign policy. In this renewed debate leading up to the March 1986 referendum, the pro-membership PSOE leadership once again proved itself superior to its opponents (this time not just conservatives, but also the unreconstructed anti-NATO left) in its ability to mobilize support for remaining in the Alliance (albeit by relying on the fear stemming from exquisitely applied scare tactics).

Third, and most specifically, we can begin to answer the five basic questions posed earlier. We can begin to sketch the motivational priorities relevant in each decision. First, what contributed to the hesitancy on Adolfo Suárez's part to fulfill his party's platform and take Spain into NATO? The problem was certainly not the attitude of most members of the Alliance, especially those who were also members of the European Community. That group steadfastly, though, almost always in a scrupulously unofficial and private fashion, held the two commitments to be necessarily linked. Once Suárez began the decisive move to democracy, Spain was welcomed with open arms. The primary considerations, however, were purely internal: whether they involved the parochial combination of Suárez's personality, the exigencies of the transition to democracy, and the ad hoc character of the UCD, or the Suárezista vision of Suárez brilliantly using foreign policy (including remaining out of NATO) to solve internal problems.

Second, why did Adolfo Suárez finally reject the array of non-NATO (indeed non-Western) options with which he had flirted and move towards membership? For one, it was becoming more and more clear that remaining outside the Alliance was damaging Spain's aspirations in other areas (e.g., membership in the European Community and recovery of Gibraltar), as well as its overall ability to influence European and world affairs. Dissatisfaction with this frustrating condition prompted great pressure from the Atlanticist wing of the party.

Beyond that, the election of 1979, and the subsequent politicization of foreign policy by the opposition, meant the end of consensus politics that had carried Spain through the transition to democracy. There was, in the new era of rising confrontation, little disincentive to pursue membership. Even then, Suárez's move towards securing membership was extremely tentative.

Third, Why did the post-Suárez leadership, both of the UCD and of the Spanish government, so enthusiastically pursue membership (even in the face of obvious opposition). There were two relevant considerations involved. For one, the change reflected a fundamental change in the character of the new leadership. The replacement of Suárez with Calvo-Sotelo was not merely cosmetic in terms of the government's orientation towards the world. It was a qualitative transformation. For the now ascendant Atlanticists, Spain's historical torments (etc. economic underdevelopment, social backwardness, political extremism, the tendency towards authoritarian government, etc.) were both the result and the cause of Spain's stark detachment from the 'civilized' world: that is, Europe proper. It was a grim cycle. For the Atlanticists, the galling notion that Africa began at the Pyrenees had to be repudiated once and for all. For its own sake, Spain had to reestablish its relationship with the rest of the continent.

By joining NATO some of that malignant detachment might be eliminated. In this sense, membership was a valuable end in itself. Beyond that, there was also a utilitarian aspect to the move. Membership was also seen as a means to an end, as a tool to enhance the failing UCD's image as dynamic, decisive, and well-defined. It was to be a partial kick-start for the next electoral campaign. The inability of the leadership to correctly gauge public sentiments in the matter, and to sell its vision of NATO membership as appropriate for Spain in the early 1980s, more than neutralized any possible positive benefits from the dramatic show of decisiveness. The UCD and its misguided leadership played directly into the PSOE and Felipe González's hands.

Fourth, what prompted the PSOE to reject its own tradition of moderation (a moderation marked by a longstanding support for eventual Spanish membership in NATO) in favor of such a virulent stand in opposition to Spain's entry into the Alliance. One factor was the overall militancy of the young insurgents who took control of the party in the early 1970s and recast it in their own peculiar image. In the beginning, the leadership's anti-NATO stand was part and parcel of a broader policy of immoderation involving virtually every issue. For example, while (in the middle 1970s) the PSOE (like virtually every other Spanish political party) supported membership for Spain in the European Community, it did so on its own particular terms. A socialist Spain in the EC would certainly not pursue business as usual. Rather, it would serve as "an ideological counter to monopolistic practices, combating from within as a defense of the working class."<sup>1</sup> In the militant's early, heady, days even the otherwise sacrosanct EC was painted in ideological colors.

Later, however, the opposition was less a reflection of a basic radicalism (though the lingering immoderate predisposition of many in the party certainly facilitated it). As the party substantially moderated its positions on virtually every other important issue (assuming a catch-all character), it retained its extreme stance in regards to NATO. This choice primarily reflected a recognition of the electoral possibilities of selective radicalism, not any deeply-held position. The attributes of Spanish political culture in regards to foreign policy and Spain's proper place in the world, especially the substantial pools of ignorance and apathy (discussed above) permitted the party's fruitful selectivity.

Fifth, what moved the PSOE leadership (specifically Felipe González) to reject a position that had paid such lucrative political dividends and face the political damage and struggle that such a switch almost guaranteed? As a basic observation, the history of the PSOE's relationship with the Alliance (and its most important member, the United States) was clearly more complex

than a cursory examination of the record would suggest. There had long been more to the situation than met the eye of the casual observer. From the significant contacts with American representatives during the middle 1970s, down to the pre-election meeting and tacit understanding on the NATO membership issue reached with United States officials during the summer of 1982, it was clearly not a story of two mutually hostile camps incapable of dialogue.

Indeed, even the freezing of Spain's integration into NATO upon the inauguration of the first PSOE government in 1982 was, as we have seen, more public relations than substance. As a practical matter it accomplished very little. In this same vein, the three reservations attached to the 1986 referendum (non-integration, continued non-nuclear status, and the future reduction of the American military presence in Spain) were more image than reality. Beyond this checkered past, the move to embrace membership was an integral part of the national project embraced by the PSOE government, the modernization of Spain. That modernization required the assistance from abroad (both from the United States and from Western Europe) that withdrawal from NATO would have made extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. The party's success in the referendum campaign represented a victory for this "ethos of modernization."<sup>2</sup>

#### Foreign Policy as Theater: The American Example

The events surrounding the evolution and resolution of the NATO membership issue in Spain suggest a particular characterization of the connection of foreign policy to domestic policy. This image turns on the general notion of 'foreign policy as theater'. Bound up in this notion are several potent images, several relevant aspects to the theatricality of Spanish foreign policy during the entire episode. On the surface, for example, there was a calculated, premeditated, atmosphere to much of the debate. The political dialogue was as scripted as any piece of theater, with positions regarding membership formulated, adopted, implemented, and discarded like



props: momentarily useful but suddenly worthless as the inertia of the narrative drives the debate to the next scene.

Also, like the presentation of any low-brow production, aimed entirely at making money and not art, there was an element of unabashed pandering to the evolution of the issue. Making policy in regards to NATO became an exercise in telling people what they wanted to hear (or, in the unfortunate case of an ill-informed Calvo Sotelo during the last days of the UCD, what the leadership thought they wanted to hear), thus reinforcing their prejudices and predispositions, rather than what might be factually true. The PSOE was masterful in its performance. Its version of political reality managed to manipulate the deepest fears of the Spanish voter. Truth itself seemed to become a relative thing. Finally, there was a subtle element of illusion connected to the NATO membership debate. There was something very strange going on in Spanish politics in regards to the Alliance. The debate was symbolic in that no one was talking about what they were actually talking about.

Like a powerful drama, the debate took its power and visceral kick from the fact that it was a stand-in for a wide variety of other provocative issues. The debate over whether or not Spain should join or remain in was clearly a surrogate debate over more profound issues, such as the abortion debate in the United States is very much a surrogate for other societal disagreements and conflicts. On its own merits, it is unlikely that the questions of joining NATO, or remaining in the Alliance, could have stirred such passion as was exhibited in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The NATO membership issue was ultimately a debate over thorny questions like Spain's proper relationship with the United States; the reality of Spain's cherished self-image as a 'bridge' between Latin America, the Arab world, and Western Europe; the appropriate relationship between Spain and the communist world; what maximized Spanish policy independence; and

Spain's final and full acceptance into the Europe long denied her: in essence, what was Spain's proper international character? The net effect of the visceral kick was to directly affect the character of the Spanish polity; in this the debate played a formative role. Understanding the mechanism for this formative effect requires returning for a moment to the bidirectional model of the linkage between public and leadership in foreign policy issues.

As mentioned, one element of this bidirectional model involves the mutually influential relationship between mass and elite. This relationship is neither hyper-democratic nor hyper-elitist, but (as Russett argues) one in which "opinion and policy interact: each influences the other."<sup>3</sup> Clearly this was the case in Spain, indeed the dissatisfying compromise represented by the 1986 referendum reflects the unavoidable fact that no one was able to get exactly what they wanted. The second element is the independent power of a particular foreign policy issue and the debate it engenders to shape a nation's thinking. At times, foreign policy issues also serve to help create a collective self-definition (whose appearance is often tied to traumatic national experiences). Very much like James Rosenau's concept of the "single-country theory," this role of foreign policy is both a general phenomenon as well as one whose particulars are entirely country-specific.<sup>4</sup> The United States can serve as an illustration of this more general phenomenon that I believe is also related to the terribly divisive NATO debate in Spain.

Most of the empirical efforts at charting the substance and evolution of American public opinion (on both the elite and mass levels) endorse the validity of two basic propositions. First, over the decades, the substance of opinion has moved through more or less distinct periods. These periods have been marked by the ascendancy of one particular orientation towards the world and America's proper place in it. That is, at any given time there is an overall structure to the nation's thinking on foreign policy that can be at least generally characterized. Some authors have cast these periods in very broad terms. For example, writing in the 1950s,

Klingberg argued that American foreign policy operated in a fluid environment marked by shifts in the national mood.<sup>5</sup> In his view, there is an ongoing oscillation between periods defined by "extroversion" (defined in terms of the nation's willingness to engage in world affairs) and "introversion" (the contrary inclination).<sup>6</sup>

Utilizing a variety of data, Klingberg divided American history into several periods each based on the temporary ascendancy of each basic collective orientation. For example, 1871-1891 was a period of national introversion (as the nation focused both on dealing with internal problems and exploiting internal opportunities), while 1891-1919 represented a period of national extroversion (marked, for example, by the 1898 war with Spain, the assumption of imperial responsibilities, the interventionist mentality summed up by Teddy Roosevelt, and American participation in World War One). Klingberg matched these alterations in external orientation to cycles in internal attitudes: a cultural cycle (the swing of the national character between the embrace of rationalism, idealism, and realism) and a political cycle (the swing between the promotion of national unity and advancement of values that serve to undermine national unity and advancement of values that serve to undermine national solidarity).<sup>7</sup>

Klingberg argued that this structural reality had clear policy implications. Though the shifts are inevitable, decision-makers must act to moderate them while also tailoring specific policy initiatives to what is practically possible. In short, the national leadership must act as a brake on the process, a balancing force molding the political reality with which it is faced. Arguing in a similar vein, Roskin identifies alternating paradigms that also reflect collective attitudes and color foreign policy.<sup>8</sup> Unlike Klingberg's almost glacial shifts, Roskin's alternating paradigms are generational phenomena and tied to the lessons collectively derived from particular events (especially perceived policy disasters). Generational paradigms are derived from the

seemingly unmistakable lessons of history, and changed by the dramatic appearance of a new (also seemingly unmistakable) lesson.<sup>9</sup>

The second proposition involves the particulars of two of Roskin's paradigms: the interventionist paradigm (stemming from the conclusion that the isolationism of the 1930s had not prevented war but, rather, guaranteed it), and the anti-interventionist lesson read into the American defeat in Vietnam (that is, immoral causes and an imperial overreach lead ultimately to disaster). Two observations are important. First, as most studies argue, the two generational paradigms were inextricably linked. The galvanizing effect of the sneak attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor shredded the interwar consensus on the value of non-intervention and (so it seemed) euthanized classic isolationism. The new interventionist consensus (which was easily transferred in the late 1940s from being anti-Axis to being anti-Communist and anti-Soviet) defined thinking on foreign policy (especially among the political elite) until the shattering impact of the failed American war in Indochina. In terms of foreign policy, political competition turned on the question of who best could execute (and what tools expedited that execution) the national commitment to involvement.

When Pearl Harbor created, Vietnam broke, and the thinking of the American public (both on the elite and mass levels) in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the effects of this national trauma. The essential consensus on basic principles operative since the end of the war was gone. Historian Paul Kennedy puts the Vietnam experience in perspective in terms of its effect on the American polity: "In so many ways, symbolic as well as practical, it would be difficult to exaggerate the impact of the lengthy American campaign in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia upon the international system or upon the national psyche of the American people themselves, most of whose perceptions of their country's role in the world still remain strongly influenced by that conflict, albeit in different ways."<sup>10</sup> Kennedy concludes that "the Vietnam

War, although far smaller in terms of casualties, impacted upon the American people somewhat as had the First World War upon Europeans."<sup>11</sup>

Second, the new period of American thinking rooted in the trauma of Vietnam was not a one dimensional rejection of the previous assumptions, but rather a genuine fracture. Rather than a bipolar arrangement, a multipolar disposition of attitudes appeared, with splits within the internationalist and isolationist camps. While it is necessary to avoid oversimplifying the past, it seems clear that the American public's thinking on foreign policy in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s was qualitatively different and more complex than in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s.

#### Conclusion: NATO and the Spanish Polity

The applicability of these issues to the case of Spain and NATO may not be immediately apparent. However I do believe there is a connection. The central issue is the tendency of a society towards a sequential change in its thinking about foreign policy: both its place in the grand scheme (essentially the ongoing debate over what face to show the world), and the absolutely vital role played in that natural evolution by particular (but not a majority) of foreign policy events. Just as Pearl Harbor and Vietnam profoundly shaped the American polity, the NATO membership issue for Spain was an important, defining, experience. In terms of shaping the Spanish polity, it did things that both had to be done and which no other foreign policy issue could do. Again, it was a case where an issue met a moment and generated a defining debate.

As mentioned, one thing it did was to test the young democracy by bringing to the fore divisive issues and bitter debate. It took the power to do this not just from the reflected power of deeper issues but from the reaction to the political realities of the preceding decades. While the United States, after World War Two, underwent the natural evolution of collective attitudes (natural in that it was primarily a response to external events), Spain under Franco was unable to evolve in such a natural fashion. The political, ideological, and socioeconomic dissensus of

the Second Republic also had an often underappreciated foreign policy element to it: that is, the debate over who Spain identified with and which camp (if any) in the rapidly deteriorating international system would Spain choose to support.

Franco's victory in 1939 froze that dissensus, essentially burying it under a mountain of systematic repression. The 1953 agreement with the United States gave the nation an officially-imposed consensus, an artificial national character. The natural process of finding the place best suited for Spain was paralyzed for decades by Franco's imperative to keep Franco in power. In short, Spain's development of a national identity was stunted.

In the period 1975-1978 (culminating in the promulgation of the constitution) Spain decisively broke from its authoritarian past and found its proper domestic character. The debate and competition involved in the politics of the transition, and the specific process of writing the post-Franco constitution, forced the Spanish to confront volatile issues that had been long buried. Divisive issues like the role of the Catholic church (which involved subsidiary questions like abortion and liberalized divorce), the retention of the monarchy, the proper relationship between the state and the historic regions, and the role of the military (among many others) were traditional national demons that were during those years (at least partly) exorcised.

The development of Spain's new international character, however, continued to languish (this time due to the necessity of managing the transition to democracy) until at least after the 1979 election. Then, with other issues essentially resolved, it naturally and necessarily stepped forward. The coexistence within the Spain of the 1970s and the early 1980s of sometimes wildly contradictory international orientations (e.g., Atlanticism, non-alignment, lingering autarkic impulses on both the right and left, Hispanidad, Arabidad, etc.) prevented the nation from simply assuming a new character. The jumble was not unprecedented. Like American following Vietnam, Spain before the resolution of the NATO membership issue was faced with a national

debate not simply on how policy should be carried out, but over what the basic and fundamental orientation of the nation ought to be.

Imposing a character unilaterally (even if it could have been done, and the experience of the UCD under Calvo-Sotelo strongly suggests that it could not) would have been the equivalent of trying to impose a particular domestic political order in 1976 with no consideration of the reaction of other sectors of society and no attempt to bind these sectors of society to the new order by incorporating their ideas and addressing their concerns (one of the disastrous attributes of the birth of the Second Republic in 1931). It was not an advisable nor feasible option. The identity issue had to be worked out thoroughly, publicly, debated, and analyzed: not in spite of its unavoidable divisiveness and volatility, but because of those dangerous characteristics.

The matter had to be dealt with until a consensus of some sort (even the grudging one flowing from the 1986 referendum) could emerge. Ultimately that was done. As with most of the potentially destabilizing domestic issues, the national identity question was finally faced and the NATO membership debate was the mechanism the Spanish employed. Until the Spanish people and leadership did so, until they conclusively (if painfully) settled the leftover foreign policy issues of the Franquist period, they could not rightly claim that they had finally laid the nation's non-democratic past to rest and completed Spain's transition to democracy.

**NOTES**

1. See, for example, the PSOE's position as stated in "Socialistas al Ataque," Cambio 16 January 3-9, 1977.
2. The concept of modernization as the defining ethos of the PSOE is introduced in Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
3. Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 8.
4. The idea of a phenomenon with both general properties and specific national manifestations is developed in James Rosenau, "Towards Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy: The Case of the USSR" in Charles Hermann, et. al., (editors) New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, (Winchester: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
5. See the argument presented in Frank L. Klinberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," World Politics 4, 1952, pp. 239-273.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 260-265.
8. Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, 89, 1974, pp. 563-588.
9. Ibid.
10. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 404.
11. Ibid., pp. 404-405.



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